http://www.washingtonpost.com
‘ISIS’ vs. ‘ISIL’ vs. ‘Islamic State’: The political importance of a much-debated acronym
Tonight, President Obama in his State of the Union address refered to "ISIL," or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.Here's the portion of his speech in which he refers to the terror group:
In Iraq and Syria, American leadership – including our military power – is stopping ISIL’s advance. Instead of getting dragged into another ground war in the Middle East, we are leading a broad coalition, including Arab nations, to degrade and ultimately destroy this terrorist group. We’re also supporting a moderate opposition in Syria that can help us in this effort, and assisting people everywhere who stand up to the bankrupt ideology of violent extremism. This effort will take time. It will require focus. But we will succeed. And tonight, I call on this Congress to show the world that we are united in this mission by passing a resolution to authorize the use of force against ISIL.In September, President Obama went on "Meet the Press" to talk with new host Chuck Todd. They talked at length about terrorism and the administration's plans to counter it, but they didn't couldn't quite agree on what to call the enemy.
"I'm preparing the country to make sure that we deal with a threat from ISIL," Obama said. ISIL stands for the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Todd followed up with, "Obviously, if you're going to defeat ISIS, you have used very much stronger language." ISIS stands for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.
Later, after the interview ended, Todd told his panel, "Obviously we refer to it at NBC News as ISIS. The Obama administration, president, says the word ISIL. The last S stands for Syria, the last L they don’t want to have stand for Syria." The insinuation is that the country Obama decided to stay out of last year is also his Voldemort, better left unnamed.
Many conservative news organizations agreed that the acronym was worth 1,000 words.
Many politicians and media organizations that have chosen ISIL rather than ISIS have said they went with the former as a paean to grammar. When you translate the Arabic name for the group of insurgents (Al-Dawla Al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham) into English, many argue that using "the Levant" (a.k.a. ISIL) to describe the region is most accurate -- as this WorldViews post from June explains.
Others have interpreted this acronym choice differently. Maureen Dowd wrote in an Aug. 9 column:
It’s a bit odd that the administration is using “the Levant,” given that it conjures up a colonial association from the early 20th century, when Britain and France drew their maps, carving up Mesopotamia guided by economic gain rather than tribal allegiances. Unless it’s a nostalgic nod to a time when puppets were more malleable and grateful to their imperial overlords.The White House has often faced an army of deconstructionists whenever words come out of Obama's mouth -- and even when they don't -- and it seems a bit excessive to infer an entire foreign policy from an acronym. But politicians and media organizations all over have struggled with what to call this group of Sunni insurgents, and how their choice would be interpreted.
House Democrats last year decided after a long debate that they too would call the extremist group ISIL -- partly because ISIS was a name that first belonged to a goddess, and then to thousands of women who took said goddess's name, before a terrorist group claimed it.
ISIL might sound odd, which is why it has the virtue of not already being taken by other people. The Obama administration has been clear that the Sunni insurgents represent a serious threat, and if the group sounds like nothing you've ever heard before, both in deed and name, it's probably easier to make that sink in.
The Levant also denotes a far larger region than just Iraq and Syria. By calling the group ISIL instead of ISIS, it implies that the group is not only a serious threat, it is a large one too.
Going back to Congress: Even before House Democrats decided to go with ISIL, there was an evident partisan split on Congress on how legislators decided to refer to the group, as shown by data collected by the Sunlight Foundation.
Out of all the mentions of ISIS that have occurred during floor speeches, 86 percent have come from Republicans. Fifty-four percent of ISIL mentions have come from Democrats. However, this split could be explained by many other things -- Republicans out-talking Democrats on the Islamic State overall or the fact that Congress has had the same difficulties settling on a name as the media has.
While the government has been choosing between ISIS and ISIL, many news organizations have been making similar decisions in their style guides. The Washington Post has decided to refer to the group as the Islamic State, after the group itself declared that its ambitions outstripped Iraq and Greater Syria. Several other news organizations have also made the switch, including the Associated Press, as Poynter reported.
About a month ago ISIL changed its name, so our approach is to refer to them on first reference simply as “Islamic militants,” “jihadi fighters,” “the leading Islamic militant group fighting in Iraq (Syria), etc.” On second reference, something like “the group, which calls itself the Islamic State,” with “group” helping to make clear that it is not an internationally recognized state.The ISIL-ISIS debate continues in large part because that the Islamic State is not internationally recognized, and officials wouldn't want to recognize the existence of a state that remains an ambition of a group they hope to extinguish.
Regardless of the reasoning, the fact that the Islamic State suffers so many synonyms has probably done little more than confuse the public, which has only figured out who these Sunni insurgents are very recently. A NBC/Wall Street Journal poll from July asking for opinions on the United States' actions against the group had 40 percent of respondents saying they didn't know enough to have an opinion. A recent ABC News/Washington Post poll shows that people now seem much more informed, but no polling exists testing public opinion on ISIL or the Islamic State.
The lesson: This situation is moving so fast -- the many explainers written about ISIS v. ISIL in June are already a few steps behind -- and the Islamic State's identity is changing so rapidly that it seems futile to treat acronyms as a magnifying glass.
However, it also isn't surprising. Given the White House's caution in explaining its thinking on how to deal with the Sunni insurgents, the media hasn't had much to parse beside the one letter that differentiates the administration from many of the news outlets that cover it.
Jaime
Fuller reports on national politics for "The Fix" and Post Politics.
She worked previously as an associate editor at the American Prospect, a
political magazine based in Washington, D.C.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
| Islamic State |
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
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| Motto: باقية وتتمدد (Arabic) "Bāqiyah wa-Tatamaddad" (transliteration) "Remaining and Expanding"[1][2] |
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| Capital | Ar-Raqqah, Syria[3][4] 35°57′N 39°1′E |
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| Government | Islamic caliphate | |||||
| - | Caliph[5] | Ibrahim[6][7] | ||||
| Establishment | ||||||
| - | Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant declared | 9 April 2013[8] | ||||
| - | Caliphate declared | 29 June 2014[5] | ||||
| Time zone | Arabia Standard Time (UTC+3) | |||||
| Calling code | +963 (Syria) +964 (Iraq) |
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ISIS is the successor to Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn—more commonly known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)—formed by Abu Musab Al Zarqawi in 2004, which took part in the Iraqi insurgency against American-led forces and their Iraqi allies following the 2003 invasion of Iraq.[60][74] During the 2003–2011 Iraq War it combined with other Sunni insurgent groups to form the Mujahideen Shura Council and consolidated further into the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).[75][74] At its height it enjoyed a significant presence in the Iraqi governorates of Al Anbar, Nineveh, Kirkuk, most of Salah ad Din, parts of Babil, Diyala and Baghdad, and claimed Baqubah as a capital city.[76][77][78][79] However, the ISI’s violent attempts to govern its territory led to a backlash from Sunni Iraqis and other insurgent groups, which helped to propel the Awakening movement and a decline in the group.[80][74]
Under its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISIS has grown significantly, gaining support in Iraq due to alleged economic and political discrimination against Arab Iraqi Sunnis, and establishing a large presence in the Syrian governorates of Ar-Raqqah, Idlib, Deir ez-Zor and Aleppo after entering the Syrian Civil War.[81][82][83]
ISIS had close links to al-Qaeda until February 2014, when, after an eight-month power struggle, al-Qaeda cut all ties with the group, reportedly for its brutality and "notorious intractability."[84][85][86]
In June 2014, ISIS had at least 4,000 fighters in its ranks in Iraq[87] who, in addition to attacks on government and military targets, have claimed responsibility for attacks that have killed thousands of civilians.[88] In August 2014, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights claimed that the group had increased its strength to 50,000 fighters in Syria and 30,000 in Iraq.[17]
ISIS’s original aim was to establish a caliphate in the Sunni-majority regions of Iraq. Following its involvement in the Syrian Civil War, this expanded to include controlling Sunni-majority areas of Syria.[89] A caliphate was proclaimed on 29 June 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi—now known as Amir al-Mu'minin Caliph Ibrahim—was named as its caliph, and the group was renamed the Islamic State.[5][6][7]
Contents
- 1 Name and name changes
- 2 Ideology and beliefs
- 3 Goals
- 4 Territorial claims
- 5 Analysis
- 6 Propaganda and social media
- 7 Finances
- 8 Equipment
- 9 History
- 10 Human rights abuses
- 11 Timeline of events
- 12 Notable members
- 13 Designation as a terrorist organization
- 14 See also
- 15 Notes
- 16 References
- 17 Bibliography
- 18 External links
Name and name changes
The group has had a number of different names since its formation in early 2004 as Jamāʻat al-Tawḥīd wa-al-Jihād, "The Organization of Monotheism and Jihad" (JTJ).[9]In October 2004, the group's leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi swore loyalty to Osama bin Laden and changed the name of the group to Tanẓīm Qāʻidat al-Jihād fī Bilād al-Rāfidayn, "The Organization of Jihad's Base in the Country of the Two Rivers," more commonly known as "Al-Qaeda in Iraq" (AQI).[9][90] Although the group has never called itself "Al-Qaeda in Iraq", this name has frequently been used to describe it through its various incarnations.[11]
In January 2006, AQI merged with several smaller Iraqi insurgent groups under an umbrella organization called the "Mujahideen Shura Council." This was little more than a media exercise and an attempt to give the group a more Iraqi flavour and perhaps to distance al-Qaeda from some of al-Zarqawi's tactical errors, notably the 2005 bombings by AQI of three hotels in Amman.[91] Al-Zarqawi was killed in June 2006, after which the group's direction shifted again.
On 12 October 2006, the Mujahideen Shura Council joined four more insurgent factions and the representatives of a number of Iraqi Arab tribes, and together they swore the traditional Arab oath of allegiance known as Ḥilf al-Muṭayyabīn ("Oath of the Scented Ones").[b][92][93] During the ceremony, the participants swore to free Iraq's Sunnis from what they described as Shia and foreign oppression, and to further the name of Allah and restore Islam to glory.[c][92]
On 13 October 2006, the establishment of the Dawlat al-ʻIraq al-Islāmīyah, "Islamic State of Iraq" (ISI) was announced.[9][94] A cabinet was formed and Abu Abdullah al-Rashid al-Baghdadi became ISI's figurehead emir, with the real power residing with the Egyptian Abu Ayyub al-Masri.[95] The declaration was met with hostile criticism, not only from ISI's jihadist rivals in Iraq, but from leading jihadist ideologues outside the country.[96] Al-Baghdadi and al-Masri were both killed in a US–Iraqi operation in April 2010. The next leader of the ISI was Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the current leader of ISIS.
On 9 April 2013, having expanded into Syria, the group adopted the name "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant", also known as "Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham."[97][98] The name is abbreviated as ISIS or alternately ISIL. The final "S" in the acronym ISIS stems from the Arabic word Shām (or Shaam), which in the context of global jihad refers to the Levant or Greater Syria.[99][100] ISIS was also known as al-Dawlah ("the State"), or al-Dawlat al-Islāmīyah ("the Islamic State"). These are short-forms of the name "Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham" in Arabic; it is similar to calling "the United States of America" "the States."[101]
ISIS's detractors, particularly in Syria, refer to the group as "Da'ish" or "Daesh", (داعش), a term that is based on an acronym formed from the letters of the name in Arabic, al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi Iraq wa al-Sham.[102][103] The group considers the term derogatory and reportedly uses flogging as a punishment for people who use the acronym in ISIS-controlled areas.[104][105]
On 14 May 2014, the United States Department of State announced its decision to use "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL) as the group's primary name.[103] The debate over which acronym should be used to designate the group, ISIL or ISIS, has been discussed by several commentators.[100][101] Ishaan Tharoor from The Washington Post concluded: "In the larger battlefield of copy style controversies, the distinction between ISIS or ISIL is not so great."[101]
On 29 June 2014, the establishment of a new caliphate was announced, with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi named as its caliph, and the group formally changed its name to the "Islamic State".[5][106][d]
In late August 2014, a leading Islamic authority, Dar al-Ifta al-Misriyyah, recently advised muslims to refer to the group as QSIS; which stands for al-Qaeda Separatists in Iraq and Syria, due to the militant group's un-islamic character.[108]
Ideology and beliefs
ISIS is an extremist group that follows al-Qaeda's hard-line ideology and adheres to global jihadist principles.[109][110] Like al-Qaeda and many other modern-day jihadist groups, ISIS emerged from the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, the world’s first Islamist group dating back to the late 1920s in Egypt.[111] ISIS follows an extreme anti-Western interpretation of Islam, promotes religious violence and regards those who do not agree with its interpretations as infidels and apostates. Concurrently, ISIS—now IS—aims to establish a Salafist-orientated Islamist state in Iraq, Syria and other parts of the Levant.[110]ISIS's ideology originates in the branch of modern Islam that aims to return to the early days of Islam, rejecting later "innovations" in the religion which it believes corrupt its original spirit. It condemns later caliphates and the Ottoman empire for deviating from what it calls pure Islam and hence has been attempting to establish its own caliphate.[112] However, there are some Sunni commentators, Zaid Hamid, for example, and even Salafi and jihadi muftis such as Adnan al-Aroor and Abu Basir al-Tartusi, who say that ISIS and related terrorist groups are not Sunnis at all, but Kharijite heretics serving an imperial anti-Islamic agenda.[113][114][115][116]
Salafists such as ISIS believe that only a legitimate authority can undertake the leadership of jihad, and that the first priority over other areas of combat, such as fighting against non-Muslim countries, is the purification of Islamic society. For example, when it comes to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, since ISIS regards the Palestinian Sunni group Hamas as apostates who have no legitimate authority to lead jihad, it regards fighting Hamas as the first step toward confrontation with Israel.[117][118]
Goals
From its beginnings the establishment of a pure Islamic state has been one of the group's main goals.[119] According to journalist Sarah Birke, one of the "significant differences" between Al-Nusra Front and ISIS is that ISIS "tends to be more focused on establishing its own rule on conquered territory". While both groups share the ambition to build an Islamic state, ISIS is "far more ruthless ... carrying out sectarian attacks and imposing sharia law immediately".[120] ISIS finally achieved its goal on 29 June 2014, when it removed "Iraq and the Levant" from its name, began to refer to itself as the Islamic State, and declared the territory which it occupied in Iraq and Syria a new caliphate.[5]In mid-2014, the group released a video entitled "The End of Sykes–Picot" featuring an English-speaking Chilean national named Abu Safiyya. The video announced the group's intention to eliminate all modern borders between Islamic Middle Eastern countries; this was a reference to the borders set by the Sykes–Picot Agreement during World War I.[121][122]
Territorial claims
On 13 October 2006, the group announced the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq, which claimed authority over the Iraqi governorates of Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Salah al-Din, Nineveh, and parts of Babil.[94] Following the 2013 expansion of the group into Syria and the announcement of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, the number of wilayah—provinces—which it claimed increased to 16. In addition to the seven Iraqi wilayah, the Syrian divisions, largely lying along existing provincial boundaries, are Al Barakah, Al Kheir, Ar-Raqqah, Al Badiya, Halab, Idlib, Hama, Damascus and the Coast.[123] In Syria, ISIS's seat of power is in Ar-Raqqah Governorate. Top ISIS leaders, including Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, are known to have visited its provincial capital, Ar-Raqqah.[123]During the Iraq conflict in 2014 the group expanded the areas under its control even further, and concerns have now been expressed about the capability of the IS to govern the territories it has conquered.[124]
Analysis
After significant setbacks for the group during the latter stages of the coalition forces' presence in Iraq, by late 2012 it was thought to have renewed its strength and more than doubled the number of its members to about 2,500,[125] and since its formation in April 2013, ISIS has grown rapidly in strength and influence in Iraq and Syria. Analysts have underlined the deliberate inflammation of sectarian conflict between Iraqi Shias and Sunnis during the Iraq War by various Sunni and Shiite actors as the root cause of ISIS's rise. The post-invasion policies of the international coalition forces have also been cited as a factor, with Fanar Haddad, a research fellow at the National University of Singapore's Middle East Institute, blaming the coalition forces during the Iraq War for "enshrining identity politics as the key marker of Iraqi politics".[126] ISIS's violence is directed particularly against Shia Muslims and indigenous Assyrian/Chaldean/Syriac Christians and Armenian Christians.[127] In June 2014, The Economist reported that "ISIS may have up to 6,000 fighters in Iraq and 3,000–5,000 in Syria, including perhaps 3,000 foreigners; nearly a thousand are reported to hail from Chechnya and perhaps 500 or so more from France, Britain and elsewhere in Europe".[128] Chechen fighter Abu Omar al-Shishani, for example, was made commander of the northern sector of ISIS in Syria in 2013.[129][130]By 2014, ISIS was increasingly being viewed as a militia rather than a terrorist group by some organizations.[131] As major Iraqi cities fell to al-Baghdadi's cohorts in June, Jessica Lewis, a former US army intelligence officer at the Institute for the Study of War, described ISIS as "not a terrorism problem anymore", but rather "an army on the move in Iraq and Syria, and they are taking terrain. They have shadow governments in and around Baghdad, and they have an aspirational goal to govern. I don't know whether they want to control Baghdad, or if they want to destroy the functions of the Iraqi state, but either way the outcome will be disastrous for Iraq." Lewis has called ISIS "an advanced military leadership". She said, "They have incredible command and control and they have a sophisticated reporting mechanism from the field that can relay tactics and directives up and down the line. They are well-financed, and they have big sources of manpower, not just the foreign fighters, but also prisoner escapees."[131]
According to the Institute for the Study of War, ISIS's annual reports reveal a metrics-driven military command, which is "a strong indication of a unified, coherent leadership structure that commands from the top down".[132] Middle East Forum's Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi said, "They are highly skilled in urban guerrilla warfare while the new Iraqi Army simply lacks tactical competence."[131] Seasoned observers point to systemic corruption within the Iraq Army, it being little more than a system of patronage, and have attributed to this its spectacular collapse as ISIS and its allies took over large swaths of Iraq in June 2014.[133] On 21 August 2014, in response to a question asking whether ISIS posed a similar threat to al-Qaeda prior to the September 11th attacks[134] United States Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel stated: "(ISIS) is as sophisticated and well-funded as any group that we have seen. They're beyond just a terrorist group".[135]
Hillary Clinton stated: "The failure to help build up a credible fighting force of the people who were the originators of the protests against Assad—there were Islamists, there were secularists, there was everything in the middle—the failure to do that left a big vacuum, which the jihadists have now filled."[136]
ISIS runs a soft-power program in the areas under its control in Iraq and Syria, which includes social services, religious lectures and da'wah—proselytizing—to local populations. It also performs civil tasks such as repairing roads and maintaining the electricity supply.[137]
Propaganda and social media
The group is also known for its effective use of propaganda.[138] In November 2006, shortly after the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq, the group established the al-Furqan Institute for Media Production, which produced CDs, DVDs, posters, pamphlets, and web-related propaganda products.[139] ISIS's main media outlet is the I'tisaam Media Foundation,[140] which was formed in March 2013 and distributes through the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF).[141] In 2014, ISIS established the Al Hayat Media Center, which targets a Western audience and produces material in English, German, Russian and French.[142][143] In 2014 it also launched the Ajnad Media Foundation, which releases jihadist audio chants.[144]In July 2014, ISIS began publishing a digital magazine called Dabiq in multiple languages, including English. According to the magazine, its name is taken from the town in northern Syria, which is mentioned in a hadith about Armageddon.[145] Harleen K. Gambhir, of the Institute for the Study of War, found that while al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's Inspire magazine focused on encouraging its readers to carry out lone-wolf attacks on the West, Dabiq is more concerned with establishing the religious legitimacy of ISIS and its self-proclaimed caliphate, and encouraging Muslims to emigrate there.[146]
ISIS's use of social media has been described by one expert as "probably more sophisticated than [that of] most US companies".[147][148] It regularly takes advantage of social media, particularly Twitter, to distribute its message by organizing hashtag campaigns, encouraging Tweets on popular hashtags, and utilizing software applications that enable ISIS propaganda to be distributed to its supporters' accounts.[149] Another comment is that "ISIS puts more emphasis on social media than other jihadi groups. ... They have a very coordinated social media presence."[150] Although ISIS's social media feeds on Twitter are regularly shut down, it frequently recreates them, maintaining a strong online presence. The group has attempted to branch out into alternate social media sites, such as Quitter, Friendica and Diaspora; Quitter and Friendica, however, almost immediately removed ISIS's presence from their sites.[151]
Egyptian and Lebanese media and politicians, as well as Facebook users, have spread the false claim that in her book Hard Choices Hillary Clinton stated that she created ISIS.[152] Fake quotes supposedly from Hard Choices have been used to support this false claim.[152]
A pivotal moment[citation needed] occurred on 19 August 2014, when militants posted a propaganda video of the beheading of US photojournalist James Foley on the Internet; it claimed that the killing had been carried out in revenge for the US bombing of ISIS targets.[153] The video promised that a second captured US journalist Steven Sotloff would be killed next if the airstrikes continued.[154]
Finances
A study of 200 documents—personal letters, expense reports and membership rosters—captured from Al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Islamic State of Iraq was carried out by the RAND Corporation in 2014.[155] It found that from 2005 until 2010, outside donations amounted to only 5% of the group’s operating budgets, with the rest being raised within Iraq.[155] In the time-period studied, cells were required to send up to 20% of the income generated from kidnapping, extortion rackets and other activities to the next level of the group's leadership. Higher-ranking commanders would then redistribute the funds to provincial or local cells that were in difficulties or needed money to conduct attacks.[155] The records show that the Islamic State of Iraq was dependent on members from Mosul for cash, which the leadership used to provide additional funds to struggling militants in Diyala, Salahuddin and Baghdad.[155]In mid-2014, Iraqi intelligence extracted information from an ISIS operative which revealed that the organization had assets worth US$2 billion,[156] making it the richest jihadist group in the world.[157] About three quarters of this sum is said to be represented by assets seized after the group captured Mosul in June 2014; this includes possibly up to US$429 million looted from Mosul's central bank, along with additional millions and a large quantity of gold bullion stolen from a number of other banks in Mosul.[158][159] However, doubt was later cast on whether ISIS was able to retrieve anywhere near that sum from the central bank,[160] and even on whether the bank robberies had actually occurred.[161]
ISIS has routinely practised extortion, by demanding money from truck drivers and threatening to blow up businesses, for example. Robbing banks and gold shops has been another source of income.[70] The group is widely reported as receiving funding from private donors in the Gulf states,[162][163] and both Iran and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki have accused Saudi Arabia and Qatar of funding ISIS,[164][165][166][167] although there is reportedly no evidence that this is the case.[167][168][169][170]
The group is also believed to receive considerable funds from its operations in Eastern Syria, where it has commandeered oilfields and engages in smuggling out raw materials and archaeological artifacts.[171][172] ISIS also generates revenue from producing crude oil and selling electric power in northern Syria. Some of this electricity is reportedly sold back to the Syrian government.[173]
Since 2012, ISIS has produced annual reports giving numerical information on its operations, somewhat in the style of corporate reports, seemingly in a bid to encourage potential donors.[147][174]
Equipment
The most common weapons used against US and other Coalition forces during the Iraq insurgency were those taken from Saddam Hussein’s weapon stockpiles around the country, these included AKM variant assault rifles, PK machine guns and RPG-7s.[175] ISIS has been able to strengthen its military capability by capturing large quantities and varieties of weaponry during the Syrian Civil War and Post-U.S. Iraq insurgency. These weapons seizures have improved the group's capacity to carry out successful subsequent operations and obtain more equipment.[176] Weaponry that ISIS has reportedly captured and employed include SA-7[177] and Stinger[178] surface-to-air missiles, M79 Osa, HJ-8[179] and AT-4 Spigot[177] anti-tank weapons, Type 59 field guns[179] and M198 howitzers,[180] Humvees, T-54/55 and T-72 main battle tanks,[179] M1117 armoured cars,[181] truck mounted DShK guns,[177] ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns,[182][183] BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers[176] and at least one Scud missile.[184]When ISIS captured Mosul Airport in June 2014, it seized a number of UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters and cargo planes that were stationed there.[185][186] However, according to Peter Beaumont of The Guardian, it seemed unlikely that ISIS would be able to deploy them.[187]
ISIS captured nuclear materials from Mosul University in July 2014. In a letter to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Iraq's UN Ambassador Mohamed Ali Alhakim said that the materials had been kept at the university and "can be used in manufacturing weapons of mass destruction". Nuclear experts regarded the threat as insignificant. International Atomic Energy Agency spokeswoman Gill Tudor said that the seized materials were "low grade and would not present a significant safety, security or nuclear proliferation risk".[188][189]
History
As Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (1999–2004)
Origins
Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (abrreviated JTJ or shortened to Tawhid and Jihad, Tawhid wal-Jihad, sometimes Tawhid al-Jihad, Al Tawhid or Tawhid) was started in 1999 by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and a combination of foreigners and local Islamist sympathizers.[74] Al-Zarqawi was a Jordanian Salafi Jihadist who had traveled to Afghanistan to fight in the Soviet-Afghan War, but he arrived after the departure of the Soviet troops and soon returned to his homeland. He eventually returned to Afghanistan, running an Islamic militant training camp near Herat.Al-Zarqawi started the network with the intention of overthrowing the Kingdom of Jordan, which he considered to be un-Islamic according to the four schools of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence. For this purpose he developed numerous contacts and affiliates in several countries. Although it has not been verified, his network may have been involved in the late 1999 plot to bomb the Millennium celebrations in the United States and Jordan. However, al-Zarqawi's operatives were responsible for the assassination of US diplomat Laurence Foley in Jordan in 2002.[190]
Following the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, al-Zarqawi moved westward into Iraq, where he reportedly received medical treatment in Baghdad for an injured leg. It is believed that he developed extensive ties in Iraq with Ansar al-Islam ("Partisans of Islam"), a Kurdish Islamic militant group based in the extreme northeast of the country. Ansar allegedly had ties to Iraqi Intelligence; Saddam Hussein's motivation would have been to use Ansar as a surrogate force to repress secular Kurds fighting for the independence of Kurdistan.[191] In January 2003, Ansar's founder Mullah Krekar denied any connection with Saddam's government.[192]
The consensus of intelligence officials has since been that there were no links whatsoever between al-Zarqawi and Saddam, and that Saddam viewed Ansar al-Islam "as a threat to the regime"[193] and his intelligence officials were spying on the group. The 2006 Senate Report on Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq concluded: "Postwar information indicates that Saddam Hussein attempted, unsuccessfully, to locate and capture al-Zarqawi and that the regime did not have a relationship with, harbor, or turn a blind eye toward al-Zarqawi."[193] According to Michael Weiss, Ansar entered Iraqi Kurdistan through Iran as part of Iran's covert attempts to destabilize Saddam's government.[194]
Following the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, JTJ developed into an expanding militant network for the purpose of resisting the coalition occupation forces and their Iraqi allies. It included some of the remnants of Ansar al-Islam and a growing number of foreign fighters. Many foreign fighters arriving in Iraq were initially not associated with the group, but once they were in the country they became dependent on al-Zarqawi's local contacts.[195]
Goals and tactics
The stated goals of JTJ were: (i) to force a withdrawal of coalition forces from Iraq; (ii) to topple the Iraqi interim government; (iii) to assassinate collaborators with the occupation regime; (iv) to remove the Shia population and defeat its militias because of its death-squad activities; and (v) to establish subsequently a pure Islamic state.[119]JTJ differed considerably from the other early Iraqi insurgent groups in its tactics. Rather than using only conventional weapons and guerrilla tactics in ambushes against the US and coalition forces, it relied heavily on suicide bombings, often using car bombs. It targeted a wide variety of groups, especially the Iraqi Security Forces and those facilitating the occupation. Groups of workers who have been targeted by JTJ include Iraqi interim officials, Iraqi Shia and Kurdish political and religious figures, the country's Shia Muslim civilians, foreign civilian contractors, and United Nations and humanitarian workers.[195] Al-Zarqawi's militants are also known to have used a wide variety of other tactics, including targeted kidnappings, the planting of improvised explosive devices, and mortar attacks. Beginning in late June 2004, JTJ implemented urban guerrilla-style attacks using rocket-propelled grenades and small arms. They also gained worldwide notoriety for beheading Iraqi and foreign hostages and distributing video recordings of these acts on the Internet.
Activities
The group took either direct responsibility or the blame for many of the early Iraqi insurgent attacks, including the series of high-profile bombings in August 2003, which killed 17 people at the Jordanian embassy in Baghdad,[195] 23 people, including the chief of the United Nations Mission to Iraq Sérgio Vieira de Mello, at the UN headquarters in Baghdad,[195] and at least 86 people, including Ayatollah Sayed Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, in the Imam Ali Mosque bombing in Najaf.[198] Included here is the November truck bombing, which killed 27 people, mostly Italian paramilitary policemen, at the Italian base in Nasiriyah.[195]
The attacks connected with the group in 2004 include the series of bombings in Baghdad and Karbala which killed 178 people during the holy Day of Ashura in March;[199] the failed plot in April to explode chemical bombs in Amman, Jordan, which was said to have been financed by al-Zarqawi's network;[200] a series of suicide boat bombings of the oil pumping stations in the Persian Gulf in April, for which al-Zarqawi took responsibility in a statement published by the Muntada al-Ansar Islamist website; the May car bomb assassination of Iraqi Governing Council president Ezzedine Salim at the entrance to the Green Zone in Baghdad;[201] the June suicide car bombing in Baghdad which killed 35 civilians;[202] and the September car bomb which killed 47 police recruits and civilians on Haifa Street in Baghdad.[203]
As Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (2004–2006)
Goals and umbrella organizations
See also: Mujahideen Shura Council (Iraq)
In a letter to Ayman al-Zawahiri in July 2005, al-Zarqawi outlined a four-stage plan to expand the Iraq War, which included expelling US forces from Iraq, establishing an Islamic authority—a caliphate—spreading the conflict to Iraq's secular neighbors, and engaging in the Arab–Israeli conflict.[197]
The affiliated groups were linked to regional attacks outside Iraq
which were consistent with their stated plan, one example being the 2005
Sharm al-Sheikh bombings in Egypt, which killed 88 people, many of them foreign tourists.In January 2006, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)—the name by which Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn was more commonly known—created an umbrella organization called the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC), in an attempt to unify Sunni insurgents in Iraq. Its efforts to recruit Iraqi Sunni nationalists and secular groups were undermined by the violent tactics it used against civilians and its extreme Islamic fundamentalist doctrine.[204] Because of these impediments, the attempt was largely unsuccessful.[205]
AQI attributed its attacks to the MSC until mid-October 2006, when Abu Ayyub al-Masri declared the formation of the self-styled Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). This was another front which included the Shura Council factions. AQI then began attributing its attacks to the ISI.[206] According to a study compiled by US intelligence agencies, the ISI had plans to seize power and turn the country into a Sunni Islamic state.[207]
As Islamic State of Iraq (2006–2013)
Strength and activity
In 2007, some observers and scholars suggested that the threat posed by AQI was being exaggerated and that a "heavy focus on al-Qaeda obscures a much more complicated situation on the ground".[212][213] According to the July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate and the Defense Intelligence Agency reports, AQI accounted for 15% percent of attacks in Iraq. However, the Congressional Research Service noted in its September 2007 report that attacks from al-Qaeda were less than 2% of the violence in Iraq. It criticized the Bush administration's statistics, noting that its false reporting of insurgency attacks as AQI attacks had increased since the surge operations began in 2007.[208][214] In March 2007, the US-sponsored Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty analyzed AQI attacks for that month and concluded that the group had taken credit for 43 out of 439 attacks on Iraqi security forces and Shia militias, and 17 out of 357 attacks on US troops.[208]
According to the 2006 US Government report, this group was most clearly associated with foreign jihadist cells operating in Iraq and had specifically targeted international forces and Iraqi citizens; most of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)'s operatives were not Iraqi, but were coming through a series of safe houses, the largest of which was on the Iraq-Syrian border. AQI's operations were predominately Iraq-based, but the United States Department of State alleged that the group maintained an extensive logistical network throughout the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia and Europe.[215] In a June 2008 CNN special report, Al-Qaeda in Iraq was called "a well-oiled ... organization ... almost as pedantically bureaucratic as was Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Party", collecting new execution videos long after they stopped publicising them, and having a network of spies even in the US military bases. According to the report, Iraqis—many of them former members of Hussein's secret services—were now effectively running Al-Qaeda in Iraq, with "foreign fighters' roles" seeming to be "mostly relegated to the cannon fodder of suicide attacks", although the organization's top leadership was still dominated by non-Iraqis.[216]
Rise and decline of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)
The group officially pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network in a letter in October 2004.[18][217][218] That same month, the group, now popularly referred to as "Al-Qaeda in Iraq" (AQI), kidnapped and killed Japanese citizen Shosei Koda. In November, al-Zarqawi's network was the main target of the US Operation Phantom Fury in Fallujah, but its leadership managed to escape the American siege and subsequent storming of the city. In December, in two of its many sectarian attacks, AQI bombed a Shia funeral procession in Najaf and the main bus station in nearby Karbala, killing at least 60 people in those two holy cities of Shia Islam. The group also reportedly took responsibility for the 30 September 2004 Baghdad bombing which killed 41 people, mostly children.[201]
In 2005, AQI largely focused on executing high-profile and coordinated suicide attacks, claiming responsibility for numerous attacks which were primarily aimed at Iraqi administrators. The group launched attacks on voters during the Iraqi legislative election in January, a combined suicide and conventional attack on the Abu Ghraib prison in April, and coordinated suicide attacks outside the Sheraton Ishtar and Palestine Hotel in Baghdad in October.[197] In July, AQI claimed responsibility for the kidnapping and execution of Ihab Al-Sherif, Egypt's envoy to Iraq.[219][220] Also in July, a three-day series of suicide attacks, including the Musayyib marketplace bombing, left at least 150 people dead.[221] Al-Zarqawi claimed responsibility for a single-day series of more than a dozen bombings in Baghdad in September, including a bomb attack on 14 September which killed about 160 people, most of whom were unemployed Shia workers.[222] They claimed responsibility for a series of mosque bombings in the same month in the city of Khanaqin, which killed at least 74 people.[223]
The attacks blamed on or claimed by AQI continued to increase in 2006 (see also the list of major resistance attacks in Iraq).[206] In one of the incidents, two US soldiers—Thomas Lowell Tucker and Kristian Menchaca—were captured, tortured and beheaded by the ISI. In another, four Russian embassy officials were abducted and subsequently killed. Iraq's al-Qaeda and its umbrella groups were blamed for multiple attacks targeting the country's Shia population, some of which AQI claimed responsibility for. The US claimed without verification that the group was at least one of the forces behind the wave of chlorine bombings in Iraq, which affected hundreds of people, albeit with few fatalities, after a series of crude chemical warfare attacks between late 2006 and mid-2007.[224] During 2006, several key members of AQI were killed or captured by American and allied forces. This included al-Zarqawi himself, killed on 7 June 2006, his spiritual adviser Sheik Abd-Al-Rahman, and the alleged "number two" deputy leader, Hamid Juma Faris Jouri al-Saeedi. The group's leadership was then assumed by a man called Abu Hamza al-Muhajir,[225] who in reality was the Egyptian militant Abu Ayyub al-Masri.[226]
By late 2007, violent and indiscriminate attacks directed by rogue AQI elements against Iraqi civilians had severely damaged their image and caused loss of support among the population, thus isolating the group. In a major blow to AQI, many former Sunni militants who had previously fought alongside the group started to work with the American forces (see also below). The US troops surge supplied the military with more manpower for operations targeting the group, resulting in dozens of high-level AQI members being captured or killed.[227] Al-Qaeda seemed to have lost its foothold in Iraq and appeared to be severely crippled.[228] Accordingly, the bounty issued for al-Masri was eventually cut from $5 million to $100,000 in April 2008.[229]
As of 2008, a series of US and Iraqi offensives managed to drive out the AQI-aligned insurgents from their former safe havens, such as the Diyala and Al Anbar governorates and the embattled capital of Baghdad, to the area of the northern city of Mosul, the latest of the Iraq War's major battlegrounds.[229] The struggle for control of Ninawa Governorate—the Ninawa campaign—was launched in January 2008 by US and Iraqi forces as part of the large-scale Operation Phantom Phoenix, which was aimed at combating al-Qaeda activity in and around Mosul, and finishing off the network's remnants in central Iraq that had escaped Operation Phantom Thunder in 2007. In Baghdad a pet market was bombed in February 2008 and a shopping centre was bombed in March 2008, killing at least 98 and 68 people respectively; AQI were the suspected perpetrators.
Resisting established sectarian violence
Attacks against militiamen often targeted the Iraqi Shia majority in an attempt to incite sectarian violence.[231] Al-Zarqawi purportedly declared an all-out war on Shias[222] while claiming responsibility for the Shia mosque bombings.[223] The same month, a letter allegedly written by al-Zawahiri—later rejected as a "fake" by the AQI—appeared to question the insurgents' tactic of indiscriminately attacking Shias in Iraq.[232] In a video that appeared in December 2007, al-Zawahiri defended the AQI, but distanced himself from the crimes against civilians committed by "hypocrites and traitors" that he said existed among its ranks.[233]US and Iraqi officials accused the AQI of trying to slide Iraq into a full-scale civil war between Iraq's majority Shia and minority Sunni Arabs via an orchestrated campaign of militiamen massacres and a number of provocative attacks against high-profile religious targets.[234] With attacks purportedly mounted by the AQI such as the Imam Ali Mosque bombing in 2003, the Day of Ashura bombings and Karbala and Najaf bombings in 2004, the first al-Askari Mosque bombing in Samarra in 2006, the deadly single-day series of bombings in November 2006 in which at least 215 people were killed in Baghdad's Shia district of Sadr City, and the second al-Askari bombing in 2007, the AQI provoked Shia militias to unleash a wave of retaliatory attacks. The result was a plague of death squad-style killings and a spiral into further sectarian violence, which escalated in 2006 and brought Iraq to the brink of violent anarchy in 2007.[205] In 2008, sectarian bombings blamed on al-Qaeda killed at least 42 people at the Imam Husayn Shrine in Karbala in March and at least 51 people at a bus stop in Baghdad in June.
Operations outside Iraq and other activities
On 3 December 2004, AQI attempted to blow up an Iraqi–Jordanian border crossing, but failed to do so. In 2006, a Jordanian court sentenced to death al-Zarqawi in absentia and two of his associates for their involvement in the plot.[235] AQI increased its presence outside Iraq by claiming credit for three attacks in 2005. In the most deadly of these attacks, suicide bombs killed 60 people in Amman, Jordan on 9 November 2005.[236] They claimed responsibility for the rocket attacks that narrowly missed the USS Kearsarge and USS Ashland in Jordan, which also targeted the city of Eilat in Israel, and for the firing of several rockets into Israel from Lebanon in December 2005.[197]The Lebanese-Palestinian militant group Fatah al-Islam, which was defeated by Lebanese government forces during the 2007 Lebanon conflict, was linked to AQI and led by al-Zarqawi's former companion who had fought alongside him in Iraq.[237] The group may have been linked to the little-known group called "Tawhid and Jihad in Syria",[238] and may have influenced the Palestinian resistance group in Gaza called "Tawhid and Jihad Brigades", better known as the Army of Islam.[239]
American officials believed that Al-Qaeda in Iraq had conducted bomb attacks against Syrian government forces.[240][241][242] Al-Nusra Front, another al-Qaeda-inspired group, claimed responsibility for attacks inside Syria, and Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said that Al-Qaeda in Iraq members were going to Syria, where the militants had previously received support and weapons.[243]
Conflicts with other groups
See also: Awakening movements in Iraq and Islamic Army-al-Qaeda conflict
The first reports of a split and even armed clashes between Al-Qaeda in Iraq and other Sunni groups date back to 2005.[244][245] In the summer of 2006, local Sunni tribes and insurgent groups, including the prominent Islamist-nationalist group Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI), began to speak of their dissatisfaction with al-Qaeda and its tactics,[246]
openly criticizing the foreign fighters for their deliberate targeting
of Iraqi civilians. In September 2006, 30 Anbar tribes formed their own
local alliance called the Anbar Salvation Council (ASC), which was directed specifically at countering al-Qaeda-allied terrorist forces in the province,[247][248] and they openly sided with the government and the US troops.[249]By the beginning of 2007, Sunni tribes and nationalist insurgents had begun battling with their former allies in AQI in order to retake control of their communities.[250] In early 2007, forces allied to Al-Qaeda in Iraq committed a series of attacks on Sunnis critical of the group, including the February 2007 attack in which scores of people were killed when a truck bomb exploded near a Sunni mosque in Fallujah.[251] Al-Qaeda supposedly played a role in the assassination of the leader of the Anbar-based insurgent group 1920 Revolution Brigade, the military wing of the Islamic Resistance Movement.[252] In April 2007, the IAI spokesman accused the ISI of killing at least 30 members of the IAI, as well as members of the Jamaat Ansar al-Sunna and Mujahideen Army insurgent groups, and called on Osama bin Laden to intervene personally to rein in Al-Qaeda in Iraq.[230][253] The following month, the government announced that AQI leader al-Masri had been killed by ASC fighters.[226][234] Four days later, AQI released an audio tape in which a man claiming to be al-Masri warned Sunnis not to take part in the political process; he also said that reports of internal fighting between Sunni militia groups were "lies and fabrications".[254] Later in May, the US forces announced the release of dozens of Iraqis who were tortured by AQI as a part of the group's intimidation campaign.[255]
By June 2007, the growing hostility between foreign-influenced jihadists and Sunni nationalists had led to open gun battles between the groups in Baghdad.[256][257] The Islamic Army soon reached a ceasefire agreement with AQI, but refused to sign on to the ISI.[258] There were reports that Hamas of Iraq insurgents were involved in assisting US troops in their Diyala Governorate operations against Al-Qaeda in August 2007. In September 2007, AQI claimed responsibility for the assassination of three people including the prominent Sunni sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, leader of the Anbar "Awakening council". That same month, a suicide attack on a mosque in the city of Baqubah killed 28 people, including members of Hamas of Iraq and the 1920 Revolution Brigade, during a meeting at the mosque between tribal and guerilla leaders and the police.[259] Meanwhile, the US military began arming moderate insurgent factions when they promised to fight Al-Qaeda in Iraq instead of the Americans.[260]
By December 2007, the strength of the "Awakening" movement irregulars—also called "Concerned Local Citizens" and "Sons of Iraq"—was estimated at 65,000–80,000 fighters.[261] Many of them were former insurgents, including alienated former AQI supporters, and they were now being armed and paid by the Americans specifically to combat al-Qaeda's presence in Iraq. As of July 2007, this highly controversial strategy proved to be effective in helping to secure the Sunni districts of Baghdad and the other hotspots of central Iraq, and to root out the al-Qaeda-aligned militants.
By 2008, the ISI was describing itself as being in a state of "extraordinary crisis",[262] which was attributable to a number of factors,[263] notably the Anbar Awakening, but a few years later the group was greatly re-energised by the Syrian Civil War.
Transformation and resurgence
In early 2009, US forces began pulling out of cities across the country, turning over the task of maintaining security to the Iraqi Army, the Iraqi Police Service and their paramilitary allies. Experts and many Iraqis were worried that in the absence of US soldiers the ISI might resurface and attempt mass-casualty attacks to destabilize the country.[264] There was indeed a spike in the number of suicide attacks,[265] and through mid- and late 2009, the ISI rebounded in strength and appeared to be launching a concerted effort to cripple the Iraqi government.[266] During August and October 2009, the ISI claimed responsibility for four bombings targeting five government buildings in Baghdad, including attacks that killed 101 at the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance in August and 155 at the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works in September; these were the deadliest attacks directed at the new government in more than six years of war. These attacks represented a shift away from the group's previous efforts to incite sectarian violence, although a series of suicide attacks in April targeted mainly Iranian Shia pilgrims, killing 76, and in June, a mosque bombing in Taza killed at least 73 Shias from the Turkmen ethnic minority.In late 2009, the commander of the US forces in Iraq, General Ray Odierno, stated that the ISI "has transformed significantly in the last two years. What once was dominated by foreign individuals has now become more and more dominated by Iraqi citizens". Odierno's comments reinforced accusations by the government of Nouri al-Maliki that al-Qaeda and ex-Ba'athists were working together to undermine improved security and sabotage the planned Iraqi parliamentary elections in 2010.[267] On 18 April 2010, the ISI’s two top leaders, Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, were killed in a joint US-Iraqi raid near Tikrit.[268] In a press conference in June 2010, General Odierno reported that 80% of the ISI’s top 42 leaders, including recruiters and financiers, had been killed or captured, with only eight remaining at large. He said that they had been cut off from Al Qaeda's leadership in Pakistan, and that improved intelligence had enabled the successful mission in April that led to the killing of al-Masri and al-Baghdadi; in addition, the number of attacks and casualty figures in Iraq for the first five months of 2010 were the lowest since 2003.[269][270][271] In May 2011, the Islamic State of Iraq's "emir of Baghdad" Huthaifa al-Batawi, captured during the crackdown after the 2010 Baghdad church attack in which 68 people died, was killed during an attempted prison break, during which an Iraqi general and several others were also killed.[272][273]
On 16 May 2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was appointed the new leader of the Islamic State of Iraq;[274] he had previously been the general supervisor of the group's provincial sharia committees and a member of its senior consultative council.[275] Al-Baghdadi replenished the group's leadership, many of whom had been killed or captured, by appointing former Ba'athist military and intelligence officers who had served during the Saddam Hussein regime. Among these was a former army officer known as Haji Bakr, who became the group's overall military commander in charge of overseeing operations.[276]
In July 2012, al-Baghdadi’s first audio statement was released online. In this he announced that the group was returning to the former strongholds that US troops and their Sunni allies had driven them from prior to the withdrawal of US troops.[277] He also declared the start of a new offensive in Iraq called Breaking the Walls which would focus on freeing members of the group held in Iraqi prisons.[277] Violence in Iraq began to escalate that month, and in the following year the group carried out 24 waves of VBIED attacks and eight prison breaks. By July 2013, monthly fatalities had exceeded 1,000 for the first time since April 2008.[278] The Breaking the Walls campaign culminated in July 2013, with the group carrying out simultaneous raids on Taji and Abu Ghraib prison, freeing more than 500 prisoners, many of them veterans of the Iraqi insurgency.[278][279]
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was declared a Specially Designated Global Terrorist on 4 October 2011 by the US State Department, with an announced reward of US$10 million for information leading to his capture or death.[280]
As Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (2013–2014)
Declaration and dispute with Al-Nusra Front
In March 2011, protests began in Syria against the government of Bashar al-Assad. In the following month violence between demonstrators and security forces lead to a gradual militarisation of the conflict.[281] In August 2011, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi began sending Syrian and Iraqi ISI members, experienced in guerilla warfare, across the border into Syria to establish an organisation inside the country. Lead by a Syrian known as Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, the group began to recruit fighters and establish cells throughout the country.[282][283] On 23 January 2012, the group announced its formation as Jabhat al-Nusra l’Ahl as-Sham, more commonly known as al-Nusra Front. Nusra rapidly expanded into a capable fighting force with a level of popular support among opposition supporters in Syria.[282]In April 2013, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi released an audio statement in which he announced that Al-Nusra Front—also known as Jabhat al-Nusra—had been established, financed and supported by the Islamic State of Iraq.[284] Al-Baghdadi declared that the two groups were merging under the name "Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham".[285] The leader of Al-Nusra Front, Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, issued a statement denying the merger and complaining that neither he nor anyone else in Al-Nusra's leadership had been consulted about it.[286] In June 2013, Al Jazeera reported that it had obtained a letter written by al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, addressed to both leaders, in which he ruled against the merger and appointed an emissary to oversee relations between them and put an end to tensions.[287] In the same month, al-Baghdadi released an audio message rejecting al-Zawahiri's ruling and declaring that the merger was going ahead.[288] In October 2013, al-Zawahiri ordered the disbanding of ISIS, putting Al-Nusra Front in charge of jihadist efforts in Syria.[289] Al-Baghdadi, however, contested al-Zawahiri's ruling on the basis of Islamic jurisprudence,[288] and the group continued to operate in Syria. In February 2014, after an eight-month power struggle, al-Qaeda disavowed any relations with ISIS.[84]
According to journalist Sarah Birke, there are "significant differences" between Al-Nusra Front and ISIS. While Al-Nusra actively calls for the overthrow of the Assad government, ISIS "tends to be more focused on establishing its own rule on conquered territory". ISIS is "far more ruthless" in building an Islamic state, "carrying out sectarian attacks and imposing sharia law immediately", she said. While Al-Nusra has a "large contingent of foreign fighters", it is seen as a home-grown group by many Syrians; by contrast, ISIS fighters have been described as "foreign 'occupiers'" by many Syrian refugees.[290] It has a strong presence in mid- and northern Syria, where it has instituted sharia in a number of towns.[120] The group reportedly controlled the four border towns of Atmeh, al-Bab, Azaz and Jarablus, allowing it to control the exit and entrance from Syria into Turkey.[120] Foreign fighters in Syria include Russian-speaking jihadists who were part of Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar (JMA).[291] In November 2013, the JMA's ethnic Chechen leader Abu Omar al-Shishani swore an oath of allegiance to al-Baghdadi;[292] the group then split between those who followed al-Shishani in joining ISIS and those who continued to operate independently in the JMA under a new leadership.[13]
In May 2014, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri ordered Al-Nusra Front to stop attacks on its rival ISIS.[25] In June 2014, after continued fighting between the two groups, Al-Nusra's branch in the Syrian town of al-Bukamal pledged allegiance to ISIS.[293][294]
Conflicts with other groups
In Syria, rebels affiliated with the Islamic Front and the Free Syrian Army launched an offensive against ISIS militants in and around Aleppo in January 2014.[295][296]Relations with the Syrian government
The group has special relations with the Syrian government's mukhabarat—intelligence agency—and its bases within Syria are exempt from being targeted by the Syrian air force under the condition that ISIS continues to pump oil to army installations from oilfields that they have captured.[297] The Syrian government did not begin to fight ISIS until June 2014 despite its having a presence in Syria since April 2013, according to Kurdish officials.[298]As Islamic State (2014–present)
On 29 June 2014, ISIS removed "Iraq and the Levant" from its name and began to refer to itself as the Islamic State, declaring the territory under its control a new caliphate and naming Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as its caliph.[5]On the first night of Ramadan, Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Adnani al-Shami, spokesperson for ISIS, described the establishment of the caliphate as "a dream that lives in the depths of every Muslim believer" and "the abandoned obligation of the era". He said that the group's ruling Shura Council had decided to establish the caliphate formally and that Muslims around the world should now pledge their allegiance to the new caliph.[299][300]
The declaration of a caliphate has been criticized and ridiculed by Muslim scholars and rival Islamists inside and outside the occupied territory.[301][302][303][304][305][306]
Analysts observed that dropping the reference to region reflected a widening of the group's scope, and Laith Alkhouri, a terrorism analyst, thought that after capturing many areas in Syria and Iraq, ISIS felt this was a suitable opportunity to take control of the global jihadist movement.[307] A week before its change of name to the Islamic State, ISIS had captured the Trabil crossing on the Jordan–Iraq border,[308] the only border crossing between the two countries.[309]
ISIS has received some public support in Jordan, albeit limited, partly owing to state repression there,[310] but the group undertook a recruitment drive in Saudi Arabia,[168] where tribes in the north are linked to those in western Iraq and eastern Syria.[311]
In June and July 2014, Jordan and Saudi Arabia moved troops to their borders with Iraq after Iraq lost control of, or withdrew from, strategic crossing points, which were thence under ISIS's command.[51][309] There was speculation that al-Maliki had ordered a withdrawal of troops from the Iraq–Saudi crossings in order "to increase pressure on Saudi Arabia and bring the threat of Isis over-running its borders as well".[311]
After the group captured Kurdish-controlled territory[312] and massacred Yazidis,[313] the US launched a humanitarian mission and aerial bombing campaign against ISIS.[314][315]
In July 2014, Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau declared support for the new Calpihate and Caliph Ibrahim.[20] In August, Abubakar Shekau announced that Boko Haram had captured the Nigerian town of Gwoza in the name of the Caliphate. Shekau announced: "Thanks be to Allah who gave victory to our brothers in Gwoza and made it part of the Islamic caliphate".[316] This announcement appears to be unilateral.
The moderate Free Syrian Army rebels have been backed by the United States with weapons and training.[317][318] However, as of August 2014, according to the high-level commander of the Islamic State, "In the East of Syria, there is no Free Syrian Army any longer. All Free Syrian Army people [there] have joined the Islamic State".[319]
Human rights abuses
ISIS compels people in the areas it controls, under the penalty of death, torture or mutilation, to declare Islamic creed, and live according to its interpretation of Sunni Islam and sharia law.[320][71] It directs violence against Shia Muslims, indigenous Assyrian, Chaldean, Syriac and Armenian Christians, Yazidis, Druze, Shabaks and Mandeans in particular.[127]Treatment of civilians
During the Iraqi conflict in 2014, ISIS released dozens of videos showing its ill treatment of civilians, many of whom had apparently been targeted on the basis of their religion or ethnicity. Navi Pillay, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, warned of war crimes occurring in the Iraqi war zone, and disclosed one UN report of ISIS militants murdering Iraqi Army soldiers and 17 civilians in a single street in Mosul. The United Nations reported that in the 17 days from 5 to 22 June, ISIS killed more than 1,000 Iraqi civilians and injured more than 1,000.[321][322][323] After ISIS released photographs of its fighters shooting scores of young men, the United Nations declared that cold-blooded "executions" said to have been carried out by militants in northern Iraq almost certainly amounted to war crimes.[324]ISIS's advance in Iraq in mid-2014 was accompanied by continuing violence in Syria. On 29 May, a village in Syria was raided by ISIS and at least 15 civilians were killed, including, according to Human Rights Watch, at least six children.[325] A hospital in the area confirmed that it had received 15 bodies on the same day.[326] The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that on 1 June, a 102-year-old man was killed along with his whole family in a village in Hama.[327]
ISIS has recruited to its ranks Iraqi children, who can be seen with masks on their faces and guns in their hands patrolling the streets of Mosul.[328]
Sexual violence allegations
According to one report, ISIS's capture of Iraqi cities in June 2014 was accompanied by an upsurge in crimes against women, including kidnap and rape.[329][330][331] The Guardian reported that ISIS's extremist agenda extended to women's bodies and that women living under their control were being captured and raped.[332] Hannaa Edwar, a leading women’s rights advocate in Baghdad who runs an NGO called al-Amal, said that none of her contacts in Mosul were able to confirm any cases of rape; however, another Baghdad-based women's rights activist, Basma al-Khateeb, said that a culture of violence existed in Iraq against women generally and felt sure that sexual violence against women was happening in Mosul involving not only ISIS but all armed groups.[333] During a meeting with Nouri al-Maliki, British Foreign Minister William Hague said with regard to ISIS: "Anyone glorifying, supporting or joining it should understand that they would be assisting a group responsible for kidnapping, torture, executions, rape and many other hideous crimes".[334] According to Martin Williams in The Citizen, some hard-line Salafists apparently regard extramarital sex with multiple partners as a legitimate form of holy war and it is "difficult to reconcile this with a religion where some adherents insist that women must be covered from head to toe, with only a narrow slit for the eyes".[335] Yezidi girls in Iraq were allegedly raped by ISIS fighters, and subsequently committed suicide, as described in a witness statement recorded by Rudaw.[336]War crimes accusations
The BBC reported the UN's chief investigator as stating: "Fighters from the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Isis) may be added to a list of war crimes suspects in Syria".[337]Guidelines for civilians
After the self-proclaimed Islamic State captured cities in Iraq, ISIS issued guidelines on how to wear clothes and veils. ISIS warned women in the city of Mosul to wear full-face veils or face severe punishment.[338][339] A cleric told Reuters in Mosul that ISIS gunmen had ordered him to read out the warning in his mosque when worshippers gathered.[338] ISIS also banned naked mannequins and ordered the faces of both male and female mannequins to be covered.[340] ISIS released 16 notes labeled "Contract of the City", a set of rules aimed at civilians in Nineveh. One rule stipulated that women should stay at home and not go outside unless necessary. Another rule said that stealing would be punished by amputation.[137][341]Christians living in areas under ISIS control who wanted to remain in the "caliphate" faced three options, converting to Islam, paying a religious levy—jizya—or death. "We offer them three choices: Islam; the dhimma contract – involving payment of jizya; if they refuse this they will have nothing but the sword", ISIS said.[342] ISIS had already set similar rules for Christians in Ar-Raqqah, Syria, once one of the nation's most liberal cities.[343][344]
Timeline of events
2003–06 events
- The group was founded in 2003 as a reaction to the American-led invasion and occupation of Iraq. Its first leader was the Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who declared allegiance to Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network on 17 October 2004.[345] Foreign fighters from outside Iraq were thought to play a key role in its network.[346] The group became a primary target of the Iraqi government and its foreign supporters, and attacks between these groups resulted in more than 1,000 deaths every year between 2004 and 2010.[347]
- The Islamic State of Iraq made clear its belief that targeting civilians was an acceptable strategy and it has been responsible for thousands of civilian deaths since 2004.[348] In September 2005, al-Zarqawi declared war on Shia Muslims and the group used bombings—especially suicide bombings in public places—massacres and executions to carry out terrorist attacks on Shia-dominated and mixed sectarian neighbourhoods.[349] Suicide attacks by the ISI also killed hundreds of Sunni civilians, which engendered widespread anger among Sunnis.
2007 events
- Between late 2006 and May 2007, the ISI brought the Dora neighborhood of southern Baghdad under its control. Numerous Christian families left, unwilling to pay the jizya tax.[citation needed] US efforts to drive out the ISI presence stalled in late June 2007, despite streets being walled off and the use of biometric identification technology. By November 2007, the ISI had been removed from Dora, and Assyrian churches could be re-opened.[350][not in citation given] In 2007 alone the ISI killed around 2,000 civilians, making that year the most violent in its campaign against the civilian population of Iraq.[348]
- 9 March: The Interior Ministry of Iraq said that Abu Omar al-Baghdadi had been captured in Baghdad,[351] but it was later said that the person in question was not al-Baghdadi.[352]
- 19 April: The organization announced that it had set up a provisional government termed "the first Islamic administration" of post-invasion Iraq. The "emirate" was stated to be headed by Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and his "cabinet" of ten "ministers".[353]
- 3 May: Iraqi sources claimed that Abu Omar al-Baghdadi had been killed a short time earlier. According to the The Long War Journal, no evidence was provided to support this and US sources remained skeptical.[357] The Islamic State of Iraq released a statement later that day which denied his death.[358]
- 12 May: In what was apparently the same incident, it was announced that "Minister of Public Relations" Abu Bakr al-Jabouri had been killed on 12 May 2007 near Taji.[verification needed] The exact circumstances of the incident remain unknown. The initial version of the events at Taji, as given by the Iraqi Interior Ministry, was that there had been a shoot-out between rival Sunni militias. Coalition and Iraqi government operations were apparently being conducted in the same area at about the same time and later sources implied that they were directly involved, with al-Jabouri being killed while resisting arrest. (See Abu Omar al-Baghdadi for details.)
- 12 May: The ISI issued a press release claiming responsibility for an ambush at Al Taqa, Babil on 12 May 2007, in which one Iraqi soldier and four US 10th Mountain Division soldiers were killed. Three soldiers of the US unit were captured and one was found dead in the Euphrates 11 days later. After a 4,000-man hunt by the US and allied forces ended without success, the ISI released a video in which it was claimed that the other two soldiers had been killed and buried, but no direct proof was given. Their bodies were found a year later.[359][360]
- 18 June: The US launched Operation Arrowhead Ripper, as "a large-scale effort to eliminate Al-Qaeda in Iraq terrorists operating in Baquba and its surrounding areas".[361] (See also Diyala province campaign.)
- 25 June: The suicide bombing of a meeting of Al Anbar tribal leaders and officials at Mansour Hotel, Baghdad[362] killed 13 people, including six Sunni sheikhs[363] and other prominent figures. This was proclaimed by the ISI to have been in retaliation for the rape of a Sunni woman by Iraqi police.[364] Security at the hotel, which is 100 meters outside the Green Zone, was provided by a British contractor[365] which had apparently hired guerrilla fighters to provide physical security.[366][not in citation given] There were allegations that an Egyptian Islamist group may have been responsible for the bombing, but this has never been proven.[367]
- In July, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi released an audio tape in which he issued an ultimatum to Iran. He said: "We are giving the Persians, and especially the rulers of Iran, a two-month period to end all kinds of support for the Iraqi Shia government and to stop direct and indirect intervention ... otherwise a severe war is waiting for you." He also warned Arab states against doing business with Iran.[368] Iran supports the Iraqi government which many see as anti-Sunni.[citation needed]
- Resistance to coalition operations in Baqubah turned out to be less than anticipated. In early July, US Army sources suggested that any ISI leadership in the area had largely relocated elsewhere in early June 2007, before the start of Operation Arrowhead Ripper.[369]
2009–12 events
- In the 25 October 2009 Baghdad bombings 155 people were killed and at least 721 were injured,[370] and in the 8 December 2009 Baghdad bombings at least 127 people were killed and 448 were injured.[371] The ISI claimed responsibility for both attacks.
- The ISI claimed responsibility for the 25 January 2010 Baghdad bombings that killed 41 people, and the 4 April 2010 Baghdad bombings that killed 42 people and injured 224. On 17 June 2010, the group claimed responsibility for an attack on the Central Bank of Iraq that killed 18 people and wounded 55.[372] On 19 August 2010, in a statement posted on a website often used by Islamist radicals, the ISI claimed responsibility for the 17 August 2010 Baghdad bombings.[373] It also claimed responsibility for the bombings in October 2010.[verification needed]
- According to the SITE Institute,[374] the ISI claimed responsibility for the 2010 Baghdad church attack that took place during a Sunday Mass on 31 October 2010.[375]
- 8 February 2011: According to the SITE Institute, a statement of support for Egyptian protesters—which appears to have been the first reaction of any group affiliated with al-Qaeda to the protests in Egypt during the 2011 Arab Spring Movement—was issued by the Islamic State of Iraq on jihadist forums. The message addressed to the protesters was that the "market of jihad" had opened in Egypt, that "the doors of martyrdom had opened", and that every able-bodied man must participate. It urged Egyptians to ignore the "ignorant deceiving ways" of secularism, democracy and "rotten pagan nationalism". "Your jihad", it went on, is in support of Islam and the weak and oppressed in Egypt, for "your people" in Gaza and Iraq, and "for every Muslim" who has been "touched by the oppression of the tyrant of Egypt and his masters in Washington and Tel Aviv".[376]
- In a four-month process ending in October 2011, the Syrian government reportedly released imprisoned Islamic radicals and provided them with arms "in order to make itself the least bad choice for the international community."[377]
- 23 July 2012: About 32 attacks occurred across Iraq, killing 116 people and wounding 299. The ISI claimed responsibility for the attacks, which took the form of bombings and shootings.[378]
- In August 2012, two Iraqi refugees who have resided in Kentucky were accused of assisting AQI by sending funds and weapons; one has pleaded guilty.[379]
2013 events
- Starting in April 2013, the group made rapid military gains in controlling large parts of Northern Syria, where the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights described them as "the strongest group".[380]
- 11 May: Two car bombs exploded in the town of Reyhanlı in Hatay Province, Turkey. At least 51 people were killed and 140 injured in the attack.[381] The attack was the deadliest single act of terrorism ever to take place on Turkish soil.[382] Along with the Syrian intelligence service, ISIS was suspected of carrying out the bombing attack.[383]
- By 12 May, nine Turkish citizens, who were alleged to have links with Syria's intelligence service, had been detained.[384] On 21 May 2013, the Turkish authorities charged the prime suspect, according to the state-run Anatolia news agency. Four other suspects were also charged and 12 people had been charged in total. [clarification needed] All suspects were Turkish nationals whom Ankara believed were backed by the Syrian government.[385]
- In July, Free Syrian Army battalion chief Kamal Hamami—better known by his nom de guerre Abu Bassir Al-Jeblawi—was killed by the group's Coastal region emir after his convoy was stopped at an ISIS checkpoint in Latakia's rural northern highlands. Al-Jeblawi was traveling to visit the Al-Izz Bin Abdulsalam Brigade operating in the region when ISIS members refused his passage, resulting in an exchange of fire in which Al-Jeblawi received a fatal gunshot wound.[386]
- Also in July, ISIS organised a mass break-out of its members being held in Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison. British newspaper The Guardian reported that over 500 prisoners escaped, including senior commanders of the group.[387][388] ISIS issued an online statement claiming responsibility for the prison break, describing the operation as involving 12 car bombs, numerous suicide bombers and mortar and rocket fire.[387][388] It was described as the culmination of a one-year campaign called "destroying the walls", which was launched on 21 July 2012 by ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi; the aim was to replenish the group's ranks with comrades released from the prison.[389]
- In early August, ISIS led the final assault in the Siege of Menagh Air Base.[390]
- In September, members of the group kidnapped and killed the Ahrar ash-Sham commander Abu Obeida Al-Binnishi, after he had intervened to protect members of a Malaysian Islamic charity; ISIS had mistaken their Malaysian flag for that of the United States.[391][392]
- Also in September, ISIS overran the Syrian town of Azaz, taking it from an FSA-affiliated rebel brigade.[393] ISIS members had attempted to kidnap a German doctor working in Azaz.[394] In November 2013, Today's Zaman, an English-language newspaper in Turkey, reported that Turkish authorities were on high alert, with the authorities saying that they had detailed information on ISIS's plans to carry out suicide bombings in major cities in Turkey, using seven explosive-laden cars being constructed in Ar-Raqqah.[395]
- From 30 September, several Turkish media websites reported that ISIS had accepted responsibility for the attack and had threatened further attacks on Turkey.[396][397][398][399]
- In November, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights stated: "ISIS is the strongest group in Northern Syria—100%—and anyone who tells you anything else is lying."[380]
- In December, there were reports of fighting between ISIS and another Islamic rebel group, Ahrar ash-Sham, in the town of Maskana, Aleppo in Syria.[400]
2014 events
Controlled by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
Controlled by other Syrian rebels
Controlled by Syrian government
Controlled by Iraqi government
Controlled by Syrian Kurds
Controlled by Iraqi Kurds
- January 2014
- 3 January: ISIS is proclaimed an Islamic state in Fallujah.[401] After prolonged tensions, the newly formed Army of Mujahedeen, the Free Syrian Army and the Islamic Front launched an offensive against ISIS-held territory in the Syrian provinces of Aleppo and Idlib. A spokesman for the rebels said that rebels had attacked ISIS in up to 80% of all ISIS-held villages in Idlib and 65% of those in Aleppo.[402]
- 4 January: ISIS claimed responsibility for the car-bomb attack on 2 January that killed four people and wounded dozens in the southern Beirut suburb of Haret Hreik, a Hezbollah bastion.[15][16]
- By 6 January, Syrian rebels had managed to expel ISIS forces from the city of Ar-Raqqah, ISIS's largest stronghold and capital of Ar-Raqqah province. Several weeks later ISIS took the city back.[403]
- 8 January: Syrian rebels expelled most ISIS forces from the city of Aleppo.[404] However, ISIS reinforcements from Deir ez-Zor province managed to retake several neighborhoods of the city of Ar-Raqqah.[405] By mid-January ISIS fighters had retaken the entire city of Ar-Raqqah, while rebels expelled ISIS fighters fully from Aleppo city and the villages west of it.[citation needed]
- 25 January: ISIS announced the creation of its new Lebanese arm, pledging to fight the Shia militant group Hezbollah and its supporters in Lebanon.[406]
- 29 January: Turkish aircraft near the border fired on an ISIS convoy inside Aleppo province in Syria, killing 11 ISIS fighters and one ISIS emir.[407][408]
- 30 January: ISIS fired on border patrol soldiers in Turkey. The Turkish Army retaliated with Panter howitzers and destroyed the ISIS convoy.[47][48][49]
- In late January, it was confirmed that Syrian rebels had assassinated ISIS's second-in-command, Haji Bakr, who was al-Qaeda's military council head and a former military officer in Saddam Hussein's army.[409]
- February 2014
- 3 February: Al-Qaeda's general command broke off its links with ISIS, reportedly to concentrate the Islamist effort on unseating President Bashar al-Assad.[109]
- By mid-February, Al-Nusra Front had joined the battle in support of rebel forces, and expelled ISIS forces from Deir ez-Zor province in Syria.[410]
- March 2014
- By March, ISIS forces had fully retreated from Syria's Idlib province after battles against the Syrian rebels.[411][412]
- 4 March: ISIS retreated from the Aleppo province–Turkey border town of Azaz and nearby villages, choosing instead to consolidate around Ar-Raqqah in anticipation of an escalation of fighting with Al-Nusra.[413]
- 8 March: During an interview with French television channel France 24, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki accused Saudi Arabia and Qatar of openly funding ISIS.[164][414]
- 20 March: In Niğde city in Turkey, three ethnic Albanian[415] members of ISIS[416]—Benjamin Xu, Çendrim Ramadani and Muhammed Zakiri—opened fire while hijacking a truck which killed one police officer and one gendarmerie officer and wounded five people.[417][418] Shortly after their arrest, Polis Özel Harekat teams launched a series of operations against ISIS in İstanbul. Police found documents and an ISIS flag in one place and two Azerbaijanis were arrested.[419]
- April 2014
- 27 April: Iraqi military helicopters reportedly attacked and destroyed an ISIS convoy of eight vehicles inside Syria. This may be the first time that Iraqi forces have struck outside their country since the Gulf War.[420]
- May 2014
- 1 May: ISIS carried out a total of seven public executions in the city of Ar-Raqqah, northern Syria.[421] Pictures that emerged from the city show how ISIS had been carrying out public crucifixions in areas under its control.[422] In most of these crucifixions, the victims were shot first and their bodies then displayed,[423] but there were also reports of crucifixions preceding the victims being shot or decapitated.[424] In one case a man was said to have been "crucified alive for eight hours", but there was no indication of whether he died.[423]
- June 2014
- In early June, following its large-scale offensives in Iraq, ISIS was reported to have seized control of most of Mosul, the second most populous city in Iraq, a large part of the surrounding Nineveh province, and the city of Fallujah.[425] ISIS also took control of Tikrit, the administrative center of the Salah ad Din Governorate,[426] with the ultimate goal of capturing Baghdad, the Iraqi capital.[427] ISIS was believed to have only 2,000–3,000 fighters up until the Mosul campaign, but during that campaign it became evident that this number was a gross underestimate.[428]
- Also in June, there were reports that a number of Sunni groups in Iraq that were opposed to the predominantly Shia government had joined ISIS, thus bolstering the group's numbers.[429][not in citation given][430] However, the Kurds—who are mostly Sunnis—in the northeast of Iraq were unwilling to be drawn into the conflict, and there were clashes in the area between ISIS and the Kurdish Peshmerga.[431][432]
- 5 June: ISIS militants stormed the city of Samarra, Iraq, before being ousted from the city by airstrikes mounted by the Iraqi military.[433]
- 6 June: ISIS militants carried out multiple attacks in the city of Mosul, Iraq.[434][435]
- 7 June: ISIS militants took over the University of Anbar in Ramadi, Iraq and held 1,300 students hostage before being ousted by the Iraqi military.[436][437]
- 9 June: Mosul fell to ISIS control. The militants seized control of government offices, the airport and police stations.[438] Militants also looted the Central Bank in Mosul, reportedly absconding with US$429 million.[439] More than 500,000 people fled Mosul to escape ISIS.[440] Mosul is a strategic city as it is at a crossroad between Syria and Iraq, and poses the threat of ISIS seizing control of oil production.[428]
- 11 June: ISIS seized the Turkish consulate in the Iraqi city of Mosul and kidnapped the head of the diplomatic mission and several staff members. ISIS seized the Iraqi city of Tikrit.[441]
- 12 June: Human Rights Watch, an international human rights advocacy organization, issued a statement about the growing threat to civilians in Iraq.[442]
- 13 June: Navi Pillay, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, expressed alarm at reports that ISIS fighters "have been actively seeking out—and in some cases killing—soldiers, police and others, including civilians, whom they perceive as being associated with the government".[443]
- 15 June: ISIS militants captured the Iraqi city of Tal Afar in the province of Nineveh.[444] ISIS claimed that 1,700 Iraqi soldiers who had surrendered in the fighting had been killed, and released many images of mass executions via its Twitter feed and various websites.[445]
- 22 June: ISIS militants captured two key crossings in Anbar, a day after seizing the border crossing at Al-Qaim, a town in a province which borders Syria. According to analysts, capturing these crossings could aid ISIS in transporting weapons and equipment to different battlefields.[446]
- 24 June: The Syrian Air Force bombed ISIS positions in Iraq. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stated: "There was no coordination involved, but we welcome this action. We welcome any Syrian strike against Isis because this group targets both Iraq and Syria."[447]
- 25 June: Al-Nusra Front's branch in the Syrian town of al-Bukamal pledged loyalty to ISIS, thus bringing to a close months of fighting between the two groups.[293][294]
- 25 June: In an interview with the BBC Arabic service, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said that Iraq had purchased used Sukhoi fighter jets from Russia and Belarus to battle ISIS militants after delays in the delivery of F-16 fighters purchased from the US.[448] "[If] we had air cover, we would have averted what happened", he said.[449][450]
- 26 June: Iraq launched its first counterattack against ISIS's advance with an airborne assault designed to seize back control of Tikrit University.[451]
- 28 June: The Jerusalem Post reported that the Obama administration had requested US$500 million from the US Congress to use in the training and arming of "moderate" Syrian rebels fighting against the Syrian government, in order to counter the growing threat posed by ISIS in Syria and Iraq.[452]
- 29 June: ISIS announced the establishment of a new caliphate. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was appointed its caliph, and the group formally changed its name to the Islamic State.[5]
- July 2014
- 2 July: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self-proclaimed caliph of the new Islamic State, said that Muslims should unite to capture Rome in order to "own the world".[453][454] He called on Muslims the world over to unite behind him as their leader.[455]
- 3 July: ISIS captured Syria's largest oilfield from rival Islamist fighters, Al-Nusra Front, who put up no resistance to the attack. Taking control of the al-Omar oilfield gave ISIS access to potentially useful crude oil reserves.[456]
- 17 July: Syria's Shaer gas field in the Homs Governorate was seized by the Islamic State. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, at least 90 National Defence Force guards defending the field were killed, as were 21 ISIS fighters.[457] The SOHR later put the death toll from the fighting and executions at 270 soldiers, militiamen and staff, and at least 40 ISIS fighters.[458]
- 19 July: ISIS claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing which killed 33 people and left more than 50 wounded. The explosion occurred in Baghdad's Kadhimiya district, which is the site of a major Shia shrine.[459]
- 24 July: ISIS blew up the Mosque and tomb of the Prophet Yunus (Jonah) in Mosul,[460] with no reported casualties.[461] Residents in the area said that ISIS had erased a piece of Iraqi heritage.[462] Johah's tomb was also an important holy site in the Jewish heritage as well.[463]
- 26 July: ISIS blew up the Nabi Shiyt (Prophet Seth) shrine in Mosul. Sami al-Massoudi, deputy head of the Shia endowment agency which oversees holy sites, confirmed the destruction and added that ISIS had taken artifacts from the shrine to an unknown location.[464]
- 28 July: To mark the Muslim holy festival of Eid al-Fitr, which ends the period of Ramadan, ISIS released and circulated a 30-minute video showing graphic scenes of mass executions.[465][466]
- The UN reported that of the 1,737 fatal casualties of the Iraq conflict during July, 1,186 were civilians.[467]
- August 2014
- 1 August: The Indonesian BNPT (id) declared ISIS a terrorist organization.[69][70][71][72][73][66]
- 2 August: The Iraqi Army confirmed that 37 loyalist fighters had died during combat with Islamic State militants south of Baghdad and in Mosul. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) claimed that "hundreds" of IS militiamen had died in the action.[469]
- 2 August: ISIS and its Al-Nusra Front allies invade Lebanon in and around the town of Arsal, sparking a five day battle between them and the Lebanese army, who push them back across the border into Syria. Over a hundred fighters are killed and scores of civilians are killed or wounded.
- 3 August: IS fighters occupied the city of Zumar and an oilfield in the north of Iraq, after a battle against Kurdish forces.[470]
- 5 August: Al Jazeera reported that an IS offensive in the Sinjar area of northern Iraq had forced 30,000–50,000 Yazidis to flee into the mountains fearing they would be killed by the IS. They had been threatened with death if they refused conversion to Islam. A UN representative said that "a humanitarian tragedy is unfolding in Sinjar".[471]
- 6 August: The Islamic State kidnapped 400 Yazidi women in Sinjar to sell them as sex slaves.[472]
- 7 August: IS fighters took control of the town of Qaraqosh in the province of Nineveh in northern Iraq, which forced its large Christian population to flee.[473]
- 7 August: President Obama authorized targeted airstrikes in Iraq against ISIS, along with airdrops of aid.[474] The UK offered the US assistance with surveillance and refuelling, and planned humanitarian airdrops to Iraqi refugees.[475]
- 8 August: The US asserted that the systematic destruction of the Yazidi people by the Islamic State was genocide.[476] The US military launched indefinite airstrikes targeting Islamic State fighters, equipment and installations, with humanitarian aid support from the UK and France, in order to protect civilians in northern Iraq.[477][478] The Islamic State had advanced to within 30 km of Erbil in northern Iraq.[479][480] The UK is also considering joining the US in airstrikes.[481]
- 10 August: France's Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius said that Iraq's Kurds must be equipped to fight against ISIS and indicated that France would consider providing arms aid "in liaison with the Europeans".[482] Islamic State militants buried alive an undefined number of Yazidi women and children, in an attack that killed 500 people, in what has been described as ongoing genocide in northern Iraq.[483][484]
- 11 August: The Arab League accused the Islamic State of committing crimes against humanity.[485][486] The UK decided not to join the US in airstrikes and instead stepped up its humanitarian aid to refugees.[487]
- 12 August: The parents of kidnapped American journalist James Foley received an email from his captors.[488] The US announced that it would not extend its airstrikes against the Islamic State to areas outside northern Iraq, emphasizing that the objective of the airstrikes was to protect US diplomats in Erbil.[489] The US and the UK airdropped 60,000 litres of water and 75,000 meals for stranded refugees. The Vatican called on religious leaders of all denominations, particularly Muslim leaders, to unite and condemn the IS for what it described as "heinous crimes" and the use of religion to justify them.[490]
- 13 August: The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that Islamic State jihadists had seized control of six villages near the Turkish border in the northern province of Aleppo in Syria.[491]
-
- 15 August: The United Nations Security Council issued a resolution which "deplores and condemns in the strongest terms the terrorist acts of ISIL (Islamic State) and its violent extremist ideology, and its continued gross, systematic and widespread abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law".[492]
- 16 August: The Islamic State massacred 80 Yazidis.[493] The EU agreed to supply Kurdish forces with arms,[494] and US military forces continued to attack Islamic State fighters in the area around Iraq’s crucial Mosul Dam.[495]
- 17 August: The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that the Islamic State had killed 700 members of the Syrian al-Sheitaat tribe, mostly civilians, after two weeks of clashes over the control of two oilfields in the region.[496] Peshmerga troops, aided by the US air campaign, began an offensive to take back the strategic Mosul Dam from the Islamic State, amid fears that the destruction of the dam might unleash a 65-foot wave of water that could engulf the northern city of Mosul, and even flood Baghdad.[497][498]
- 18 August: Pope Francis, leader of the world's 1.2 billion Roman Catholics, said that the international community would be justified in stopping Islamist militants in Iraq. He also said that it should not be up to a single nation to decide how to intervene in the conflict.[499]
- 19 August: According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, the Islamic State now has an army of more than 50,000 fighters in Syria.[17] American journalist James Foley was beheaded by the Islamic State on video tape.[500]
- 20 August: US President Obama denounced the "brutal murder of Jim Foley by the terrorist group ISIL".[501]
- 21 August: The US military admitted that a covert rescue attempt involving dozens of US Special Operations forces had been made to rescue James Foley and other Americans held captive in Syria by Islamic State militants. The air and ground assault, involving the first known US military ground action inside Syria, had the authorization of President Barack Obama. The ensuing gunfight resulted in one US soldier being injured. The rescue was unsuccessful as Foley and the other captives were not in the location targeted. This was the first known engagement by US ground forces with suspected Islamic State militants.[502] US Defense Secretary warned that the Islamic State are tremendously well-funded, "they have no standard of decency, of responsible human behavior", and are an imminent threat to the US. [503]
- 22 August: The US is considering airstrikes on ISIS in Syria, which would draw US military forces directly into the Syrian Civil War, as President Obama develops a long-term strategy to defeat the Islamic State.[504]
Notable members
- Leaders
- Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (killed in 2006)
- Abu Ayyub al-Masri (killed in 2010)
- Abu Abdullah al-Rashid al-Baghdadi (killed in 2010)
- Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (caliph of the self-declared Islamic State)
- Other personnel
- Abu Anas al-Shami (killed in 2004)
- Abu Azzam (killed in 2005)
- Abu Suleiman al-Naser
- Abu Omar al-Kurdi (captured in 2005)
- Abu Omar al-Shishani
- Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi (captured in 2006)
- Abu Yaqub al-Masri (killed in 2007)
- Abu Waheeb
- Haitham al-Badri (killed in 2007)
- Hamid Juma Faris Jouri al-Saeedi (captured in 2006)
- Khaled al-Mashhadani (captured in 2007)
- Mahir al-Zubaydi (killed in 2008)
- Mohamed Moumou (killed in 2008)
- Sheik Abd-Al-Rahman (killed in 2006)
- Huthaifa al-Batawi (killed in 2011)
Designation as a terrorist organization
| Country | Date | References |
|---|---|---|
 United States |
17 December 2004 | [62] |
 Australia |
2 March 2005 | [64] |
 Canada |
20 August 2012 | [65] |
 Saudi Arabia |
7 March 2014 | [67] |
 United Kingdom |
20 June 2014 | [63] |
 Indonesia |
1 August 2014 | [66] |
Sexual jihad
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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Publicity first arose in 2013, and the veracity of the alleged practice became the subject of greater debate in September 2013 after the Interior Minister of Tunisia made a public statement as a significant issue.[3][4]
Contents
Reports and allegations
The concept originated in a fatwa titled Jihad ul Nikaah and attributed to Saudi Wahhabi cleric Sheikh Mohamad al-Arefe around 2013, that called for Sunni women supporters to come forward for sex jihad and boost the mujaheddin fighting the Bashar al Assad regime in Syria.[5] Sources close to Sheikh Mohammad al-Arefe denied issuing the fatwa.[6] Sheikh al-Arefe himself has denied allegations that he issued such a fatwa, dismissing it on his Twitter account as a "fabrication."[7]The Tunisian allegation is that this practice is based on the concept that "the Law of Necessity allows forbidden things in exceptional circumstances."[citation needed] On the basis of the fatwa, it was reported in Tunisian media that young Tunisian Sunni Muslim girls traveled to Syria to comfort jihadis. At least thirteen Tunisian girls were reported to have traveled to the rebel-held north Syria for sex jihad.[6] Interviews of worried parents were published in the Internet. One girl, who was interviewed by Egyptian news agency Masrawy, regretted her action when she realized that she was exploited.[citation needed]
In July 2013, on a Facebook page claiming to be connected to the Muslim Brotherhood, a commentator allegedly promoted "sexual jihad". The page has been deemed a "hoax," and a senior Muslim Brotherhood supported called the page a "smear campaign".[8][9]
On September 19, 2013, Lofti bin Jeddou, the Interior Minister of Tunisia stated in the National Constituent Assembly that Sunni Tunisian women traveling to Syria for sex jihad were having sex with 20, 30 and even up to 100 rebels, and that some of the women had returned home pregnant.[10]
On October 6, 2013, a Tunisian official downplayed this prior claim, saying at most 15 Tunisian women traveled to Syria, though some were forced to have sex with several Islamist militants.[11]
On October 7, 2013, the German magazine Der Spiegel reported that "sex jihad" to Syria was "an elaborate disinformation campaign by the Assad regime to distract international attention from its own crimes."[12]
The Tunisian Jihadist Abu Qusay who was interviewed by Tunisian TV after his return from Syria confirmed that stories about "Jihad al-Nikah" or what is also referred to as "sexual Jihad" are not just a rumors but are real, as he himself had experienced it firsthand. He also confirmed the nationalities of the girls who travel to Syria to partake in this kind of Jihad.[13]
According to some media outlets, after this supposed fatwa ISIL fighters allegedly told families to "hand over [their] daughters for sex". Despite Sheikh Mohamad al-Arefe's denial, the Daily Mirror reported that "leaflets in the captured cities of Mosul and Tikrit claim the women—virgins or not—must join jihad (...) and cleanse themselves by sleeping with militants. Those that refuse to do so are violating God’s will, it is claimed, and will be beaten or killed. ISIL fighters have been taking women captive in Syria since last year [2013] when a Saudi-based cleric issued a fatwa (...) telling them to."[14][15] It has also been suggested that Sunni women from Australia, the United Kingdom and Malaysia have voluntarily joined ISIL as comfort women.[16]
In June 2014, it was reported by the Egyptian Daily newspaper Al-Masry Al-Youm that the Islamist group ISIL (the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) put up posters calling on the people of Mosul to bring them their unmarried girls to participate in “jihad al-nikah” or sex jihad.[17]
In December 2014 the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights announced that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant had killed over 150 women and girls in Fallujah who refused to participate in sexual jihad.[18][19]
Adultery, sexual slavery, and marriage in Islam
Jihad Al-Nikah is apparently related to the following concepts in Islam:- Zina (Adultery), forming sexual relations with persons one is not legally married to;
- Nikah Misyar ("traveler's marriage") is a Sunni nikah (marriage contract) carried out via the normal contractual procedure, with the specificity that the husband and wife give up several rights by their own free will, such as living together, equal division of nights between wives in cases of polygyny, the wife's rights to housing, and maintenance money ("nafaqa"), and the husband's right of homekeeping, and access etc.
- Nikah 'urfi is a Sunni nikah (marriage contract) that is not registered with state authorities. The relationship is often kept secret from family members and women often become pregnant but are unable to prove they are married or get a divorce.
Moreover Quran 7:33 says:
"Say, 'Verily, my Lord has prohibited the shameful deeds, be it open or secret, sins and trespasses against the truth and reason."[21]Adultery, that is a married person having sex with anybody except a spouse or a female slave (not to be confused with fornication), is strictly prohibited for Muslims and such sin commands punishment such as 100 lashes or stoning to death.[22] There is a distinct difference between spouses and Ma malakat aymanukum ("those whom one's right hands possess"). During war normal prohibitions may be lifted and sex is allowed with captives.[23][24]
See also
Syrian Civil War
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
"War in Syria" redirects here. For other wars in Syria, see Syrian War (disambiguation)
The armed opposition consists of various groups that were formed during the course of the conflict, primarily the Free Syrian Army, which was the first to take up arms in 2011, and the Islamic Front formed in 2013. In 2013, Hezbollah entered the war in support of the Syrian army.[60][61] In the east, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), a jihadist militant group originating from Iraq, made very rapid military gains in both Syria and Iraq, eventually conflicting with the other rebels. In July 2014, ISIL controlled a third of Syria's territory and most of its oil and gas production, thus establishing itself as the major opposition force.[62]
By July 2013, the Syrian government was in control of approximately 30–40% of the country's territory and 60% of the Syrian population.[63] A United Nations report in late 2012 described the conflict as being "overtly sectarian in nature", between mostly Alawite government forces, militias and other Shia groups[64] fighting largely against Sunni-dominated rebel groups,[65][66] although both opposition and government forces have denied it.[67][68] Due to foreign involvement this conflict has been called a proxy war.[69]
As of April 2014 the death toll had risen above 190,000.[70] International organizations have accused forces on all sides of severe human rights violations, with many massacres occurring.[71][72] Chemical weapons have been used many times during the conflict as well.[73][74] Government forces are reportedly responsible for the majority of civilian casualties, often through bombings.[75] In addition, tens of thousands of protesters and activists have been imprisoned and there are reports of torture in state prisons.[76]
The severity of the humanitarian disaster in Syria has been outlined by the UN and many international organizations. More than 6.5 million Syrians have been displaced, more than 3 million Syrians have fled the country to countries such as Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, and Iraq and become refugees, and millions more have been left in poor living conditions with shortages of food and drinking water. At the end of August 2014, 35,000 refugees were awaiting registration, while estimates of several hundred thousand more were not included in official figures as they were unregistered.[77]
Contents
- 1 Background
- 2 Course of events
- 2.1 Protests, civil uprising, and defections (January 2011 – July 2011)
- 2.2 Protests and armed insurgency (July 2011 – October 2011)
- 2.3 Escalation (November 2011 – March 2012)
- 2.4 Ceasefire attempt (April 2012 – May 2012)
- 2.5 Renewed fighting (June 2012 – July 2012)
- 2.6 Battles of Damascus and Aleppo (July 2012 – October 2012)
- 2.7 Rebel offensives (November 2012 – April 2013)
- 2.8 Government and Hezbollah offensives (April 2013 – June 2013)
- 2.9 Continued fighting (July 2013 – October 2013)
- 2.10 Government and Hezbollah offensives (October 2013 – December 2013)
- 2.11 Fighting between ISIL and other rebel groups (January 2014 – March 2014)
- 2.12 Continued government and Hezbollah offensive (March 2014)
- 2.13 Continued fighting (March 2014 – May 2014)
- 2.14 Presidential election (June 2014)
- 2.15 ISIL offensive and continued fighting (June 2014 – August 2014)
- 2.16 ISIL offensives and U.S. airstrikes (August 2014 – present)
- 3 Advanced weaponry and tactics
- 4 Belligerents
- 5 Reporting, censoring and propaganda
- 6 International reaction
- 7 Humanitarian help
- 8 Foreign involvement
- 9 Impact
- 10 Spillover
- 11 See also
- 12 References
- 13 Further reading
- 14 External links
Background
Main article: Modern history of Syria
Assad government
Main article: Al-Assad family
Syria became an independent republic in 1946, although democratic
rule was ended by a coup in March 1949, followed by two more coups that
same year.[78][79] A popular uprising against military rule in 1954 saw the army transfer power to civilians; from 1958 to 1961 a brief union with Egypt replaced Syria's parliamentary system with a highly centralized presidential regime.[80] The Ba'ath Syrian Regional Branch government came to power in 1963 after a successful coup d'état. In 1966, another coup overthrew the traditional leaders of the party, Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar.[81] General Hafez al-Assad, the Minister of Defense, seized power in a "corrective revolution" in November 1970, becoming Prime Minister. In March 1971, Assad declared himself President,
a position that he held until his death in 2000. Since then, the
secular Syrian Regional Branch has remained the dominant political
authority in what is virtually a single-party state in Syria; Syrian citizens may only approve the President by referendum and – until the government-controlled multi-party 2012 parliamentary election – could not vote in multi-party elections for the legislature.[82]Bashar al-Assad, the President of Syria and Asma al-Assad, his wife – who is a British-born and British-educated Sunni Muslim,[83] initially inspired hopes for democratic and state reforms and a "Damascus Spring" of intense social and political debate took place between July 2000 and August 2001.[84] The period was characterized by the emergence of numerous political forums or salons, where groups of like-minded people met in private houses to debate political and social issues. Political activists such as Riad Seif, Haitham al-Maleh, Kamal al-Labwani, Riyad al-Turk and Aref Dalila were important in mobilizing the movement.[85] The most famous of the forums were the Riad Seif Forum and the Jamal al-Atassi Forum. The Damascus Spring largely ended in August 2001 with the arrest and imprisonment of ten leading activists who had called for democratic elections and a campaign of civil disobedience.[86] From 2001 even reformists in Parliament had begun to criticize the legacy of stagnation since the rule of former President Hafez al-Assad; Bashar al-Assad has talked about reform but carried out very little, and he has failed to deliver on promised reforms since 2000, analysts say.[87]
Demographics
Main article: Demographics of Syria
Socio-economics
Discontent against the government was strongest in Syria's poorer areas, predominantly among conservative Sunnis.[95] These included cities with high poverty rates, such as Daraa and Homs, rural areas hit hard by a drought in early 2011, and the poorer districts of large cities. Socio-economic inequality increased significantly after free market policies were initiated by Hafez al-Assad in his later years, and accelerated after Bashar al-Assad came to power. With an emphasis on the service sector, these policies benefited a minority of the nation's population, mostly people who had connections with the government, and members of the Sunni merchant class of Damascus and Aleppo.[95] By 2011, Syria was facing a deterioration in the national standard of living and steep rises in the prices of commodities.[96] The country also faced particularly high youth unemployment rates.[97]Human rights
Main article: Human rights in Syria
The state of human rights in Syria has long been the subject of harsh criticism from global organizations.[98] The country was under emergency rule from 1963 until 2011, banning public gatherings of more than five people,[99] and effectively granting security forces sweeping powers of arrest and detention.[100] Bashar al-Assad is widely regarded as having been unsuccessful in implementing democratic change, with a 2010 report from Human Rights Watch
stating that he had failed to substantially improve the state of human
rights since taking power, although some minor aspects had seen
improvement.[101]In December 2010, mass anti-government protests began in Tunisia and later spread across other parts of the Arab world, including Syria. By February 2011, revolutions occurred in Tunisia and Egypt, while Libya began to experience its own civil war. Numerous other Arab countries also faced protests, with some attempting to calm the masses by making concessions and governmental changes. The uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt are supposed to have inspired the mid-March 2011 protests in Syria.[102]
Rights of free expression, association and assembly were strictly controlled in Syria even before the uprising.[103] The authorities harass and imprison human rights activists and other critics of the government, who are often indefinitely detained and tortured in poor prison conditions.[103] Women and ethnic minorities have faced discrimination in the public sector.[103] Thousands of Syrian Kurds were denied citizenship in 1962 and their descendants continued to be labeled as "foreigners".[104] A number of riots in 2004 prompted increased tension in Syria's Kurdish areas,[105][106] and there have been occasional clashes between Kurdish protesters and security forces ever since.
Course of events
Main article: Syrian Civil War Course of events
Protests, civil uprising, and defections (January 2011 – July 2011)
Main article: Civil uprising phase of the Syrian Civil War
Protests and armed insurgency (July 2011 – October 2011)
Main articles: Timeline of the Syrian Civil War (May–August 2011) and Timeline of the Syrian Civil War (September–December 2011)
See also: List of Syrian defectors
Escalation (November 2011 – March 2012)
Main articles: Timeline of the Syrian Civil War (September–December 2011) and Timeline of the Syrian Civil War (January–April 2012)
Ceasefire attempt (April 2012 – May 2012)
Main articles: Kofi Annan peace plan for Syria, Timeline of the Syrian Civil War (January–April 2012) and Timeline of the Syrian Civil War (May–August 2012)
Renewed fighting (June 2012 – July 2012)
Main article: Timeline of the Syrian Civil War (May–August 2012)
Battles of Damascus and Aleppo (July 2012 – October 2012)
Main articles: Timeline of the Syrian Civil War (May–August 2012), Timeline of the Syrian Civil War (September–December 2012), Battle of Damascus (2012), Battle of Aleppo (2012–present) and Rif Dimashq offensive (August–October 2012)
Rebel offensives (November 2012 – April 2013)
Main articles: Timeline of the Syrian Civil War (September–December 2012) and Timeline of the Syrian Civil War (January–April 2013)
Further information: Battle of Aleppo (2012–present), Rif Dimashq offensive (November 2012–February 2013), 2012 Hama offensive, Damascus offensive (2013), Battle of Shadadeh and Battle of Raqqa
Government and Hezbollah offensives (April 2013 – June 2013)
Main articles: Timeline of the Syrian Civil War (January–April 2013) and Timeline of the Syrian Civil War (from May 2013)
Further information: Al-Qusayr offensive and Battle of al-Qusayr (2013)
Continued fighting (July 2013 – October 2013)
Main article: Timeline of the Syrian Civil War (from May 2013)
Further information: 2013 Syrian Kurdish–Islamist conflict and 2013 Ghouta attacks
Government and Hezbollah offensives (October 2013 – December 2013)
Further information: Aleppo offensive (October–December 2013) and Battle of Qalamoun
Fighting between ISIL and other rebel groups (January 2014 – March 2014)
Continued government and Hezbollah offensive (March 2014)
Main article: Syrian Civil War Course of events § Continued government and Hezbollah offensive (March 2014))
Continued fighting (March 2014 – May 2014)
Presidential election (June 2014)
Main article: Syrian presidential election, 2014
ISIL offensive and continued fighting (June 2014 – August 2014)
Main article: Syrian Civil War Course of events § ISIL offensive and continued fighting (June 2014 – August 2014)
ISIL offensives and U.S. airstrikes (August 2014 – present)
Main articles: Timeline of the Syrian Civil War (August 2014–present) and American-led intervention in Syria
Advanced weaponry and tactics
See also: Equipment of the Syrian Army and List of military equipment used by Syrian opposition forces
Chemical weapons
Main articles: Syria and weapons of mass destruction and Use of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war
See also: Syria chemical weapons program
Map of the August 2013 Ghouta chemical attacks.
Cluster bombs
The Syrian army began using cluster bombs in September 2012. Steve Goose, director of the Arms division at Human Rights Watch said "Syria is expanding its relentless use of cluster munitions, a banned weapon, and civilians are paying the price with their lives and limbs,” "The initial toll is only the beginning because cluster munitions often leave unexploded bomblets that kill and maim long afterward."[108]Scud missile attacks
In December 2012, the Syrian government began using Scud missiles on rebel-held towns, primarily targeting Aleppo.[109] On 19 February, four Scud missiles were fired, three landed in Aleppo city and one on Tell Rifaat town, Aleppo governorate. Between December and February, at least 40 Scud missile landings were reported.[110] Altogether, Scud missiles killed 141 people in the month of February.[111] The United States condemned the Scud missile attacks.[112] On 1 March, a Scud missile landed in Iraq. It is believed that the intention was to hit the Deir Ezzor governorate.[113] On 29 March, a Scud missile landed on Hretan, Aleppo, killing 20 and injuring 50.[114] On 28 April, a Scud missile landed on Tell Rifaat, killing four, two of them women and two of them children, SOHR reported.[115] On 3 June, a surface to surface missile, not confirmed as a Scud, hit the village of Kafr Hamrah around midnight killing 26 people including six women and eight children according to SOHR.[116]Suicide bombings
Further information: List of bombings during the Syrian Civil War
Rebel suicide bombings began in December 2011; the Al-Nusra Front has claimed responsibility for 57 out of 70 similar attacks through April 2013.[61][117]
The bombings have claimed numerous civilian casualties - leading to a
drop in support for the armed terror gangs. Salah, 31, who gave only a
first name, said he was not an Assad supporter, nor, for that matter, an
Alawite, though he stressed that attacking those groups was not
justified. The bombing convinced him that Western-backed rebels aimed to
destroy Syria because its army is one of the few in the region not
“funded, trained and controlled by the United States”.[118] Such bombing led to 47 - mainly Alawite - children being killed in Homs on October 1, 2014.[119]Barrel bombs
Main article: Barrel bomb
A barrel bomb is a type of improvised explosive device used by the Syrian Air Force. Typically, a barrel is filled with a large amount of TNT, and possibly shrapnel (such as nails) and oil, and dropped from a helicopter. The resulting detonation can be devastating.[120][121][122]SOHR estimated that rebel forces, using improvised mortar bombs made of cooking gas canisters, caused 311 civilian deaths by inaccurate bombing in second half of 2014.[123]
Thermobaric and incendiary weapons
Thermobaric weapons, also known as "fuel-air bombs," have been used by the government side during the Syrian civil war. Since 2012, rebels have said that the Syrian Air Force (government forces) is using thermobaric weapons against residential areas occupied by the rebel fighters, such as during the Battle of Aleppo and also in Kafr Batna.[124][125] A panel of United Nations human rights investigators reported that the Syrian government used thermobaric bombs against the strategic town of Qusayr in March 2013.[126] In August 2013, the BBC reported on the use of napalm-like incendiary bombs on a school in northern Syria.[127]Belligerents
Main article: List of armed groups in the Syrian Civil War
Syrian government and affiliated parties
Syrian Army
Main article: Syrian Army
Two destroyed Syrian Army tanks in Azaz, August 2012
National Defense Force
Main article: National Defense Force (Syria)
The Syrian NDF was formed out of pro-government militias. They
receive their salaries, and their military equipment from the
government,[128][129] and numbers around 100,000.[130][131]
The force acts in an infantry role, directly fighting against rebels on
the ground and running counter-insurgency operations in coordination
with the army, which provides them logistical and artillery support. The
force has a 500-strong women's wing called "Lionesses of National Defense" which operates checkpoints.[132] NDF soldiers are allowed to take loot from battlefields, which can then be sold for extra money.[128]Shabiha
Main article: Shabiha
The Shabiha are unofficial pro-government militias drawn largely from Assad's Alawite minority group.[citation needed] Since the uprising, the Syrian government has frequently used shabiha to break up protests and enforce laws in restive neighborhoods.[133] As the protests escalated into an armed conflict, the opposition started using the term shabiha to describe any civilian Assad supporter taking part in the government's crackdown on the uprising.[134] The opposition blames the shabiha for the many violent excesses committed against anti-government protesters and opposition sympathizers,[134] as well as looting and destruction.[135][136] In December 2012, the shabiha were designated a terrorist organization by the United States.[137]Bassel al-Assad is reported to have created the shabiha in the 1980s for government use in times of crisis.[138] Shabiha have been described as "a notorious Alawite paramilitary, who are accused of acting as unofficial enforcers for Assad's regime";[139] "gunmen loyal to Assad",[140] and, according to the Qatar-based Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, "semi-criminal gangs comprised of thugs close to the regime".[140] Despite the group's image as an Alawite militia, some shabiha operating in Aleppo have been reported to be Sunnis.[141] In 2012, the Assad government created a more organized official militia known as the Jaysh al-Sha'bi, allegedly with help from Iran and Hezbollah. As with the shabiha, the vast majority of Jaysh al-Sha'bi members are Alawite and Shi'ite volunteers.[142][143]
Hezbollah
Main article: Hezbollah
General Secretary Hassan Nasrallah
denied Hezbollah had been fighting on behalf of the Syrian government,
stating in a 12 October 2012 speech that "right from the start the
Syrian opposition has been telling the media that Hezbollah sent 3,000
fighters to Syria, which we have denied".[144] However, according to the Lebanese Daily Star
newspaper, Nasrallah said in the same speech that Hezbollah fighters
helped the Syrian government "retain control of some 23 strategically
located villages [in Syria] inhabited by Shiites of Lebanese
citizenship". Nasrallah said that Hezbollah fighters have died in Syria
doing their "jihadist duties".[145] In 2012, Hezbollah fighters crossed the border from Lebanon and took over eight villages in the Al-Qusayr District of Syria.[146] The former secretary general of Hezbollah, Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli, confirmed in February 2013 that Hezbollah was fighting for the Syrian army.[147]On 12 May, Hezbollah, with the Syrian army, attempted to retake part of Qusayr.[148] By the end of the day, 60 percent of the city, including the municipal office building, were under pro-Assad forces.[148] In Lebanon, there have been "a recent increase in the funerals of Hezbollah fighters" and "Syrian rebels have shelled Hezbollah-controlled areas."[148] As of 14 May, Hezbollah fighters were reported to be fighting alongside the Syrian army, particularly in the Homs Governorate.[149] Hassan Nasrallah has called on Shiites and Hezbollah to protect the shrine of Sayida Zeinab.[149] President Bashar al-Assad denied in May 2013 that there were foreign fighters, Arab or otherwise, fighting for the government in Syria.[150]
On 25 May, Nasrallah announced that Hezbollah was fighting in the Syria against Islamic extremists and "pledged that his group will not allow Syrian militants to control areas that border Lebanon".[151] He confirmed that Hezbollah was fighting in the strategic Syrian town of Qusayr on the same side as Assad's forces.[60] In the televised address, he said, "If Syria falls in the hands of America, Israel and the takfiris, the people of our region will go into a dark period."[60] According to independent analysts, by the beginning of 2014, approximately 500 Hezbollah fighters had died in the Syrian conflict.[152]
Iran
Main article: Iranian support for Syria in the Syrian Civil War
Since the start of the civil war, Iran has expressed its support for
the Syrian government and has provided it with financial, technical, and
military support, including training and some combat troops.[153] Iran and Syria are close strategic allies. Iran sees the survival of the Syrian government as being crucial to its regional interests.[154][155] Iran's supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, was reported in September 2011 to be vocally in favor of the Syrian government.[156] In the civil uprising phase of the Syrian civil war, Iran provided Syria with technical support based on Iran's capabilities developed following the 2009–2010 Iranian election protests.[156] As the uprising developed into the Syrian civil war,
there were increasing reports of Iranian military support, and of
Iranian training of NDF (National Defence Forces) both in Syria, and in
Iran.[157]Iranian security and intelligence services are advising and assisting the Syrian military to preserve Bashar al-Assad's hold on power.[154] Those efforts include training, technical support, combat troops.[153][154] By December 2013 Iran was thought to have approximately 10,000 operatives in Syria.[155] Lebanese Hezbollah fighters backed by Tehran has taken direct combat roles since 2012.[155][158] In the summer of 2013, Iran and Hezbollah provided important battlefield support for Assad, allowing it to make advances on the opposition.[158] In 2014, coinciding with the peace talks at Geneva II, Iran has stepped up support for Syrian President Assad.[155][158] Syrian Minister of Finance and Economy announced that the "Iranian government has given more than 15 billion dollars" to Syria.[159] Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force commander Qasem Suleimani is in charge of Syrian President Assad's security portfolio and has overseen the arming and training of thousands of pro-government Shi'ite fighters.[160][161]
Opposition parties
Hizb ut-Tahrir
Main article: Hizb ut-Tahrir
Formed in 1953 at Jerusalem, Hizb ut-Tahrir soon expanded its work
for the reestablishment of Islamic Caliphate in Syria. Hizb ut-Tahrir
members were persecuted in Syria from the 1950s and up to the Syrian
Uprising of 2011 in which they played a role of igniting and supporting
the revolution and guiding rebels to unite under an Islamic Umbrella and
a clear Islamic political agenda and vision.Syrian National Council
Main article: Syrian National Council
Formed on 23 August 2011, the National Council is a coalition of
anti-government groups, based in Turkey. The National Council seeks the
end of Bashar al-Assad's rule and the establishment of a modern, civil,
democratic state. SNC has links with the Free Syrian Army. In November 2012, the council agreed to unify with several other opposition groups to form the Syrian National Coalition. The SNC has 22 out of 60 seats of the Syrian National Coalition.[162]Syrian National Coalition
On 11 November 2012 in Doha, the National Council and other opposition forces united as the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces.[163] The following day, it was recognized as the legitimate government of Syria by numerous Persian Gulf states. Delegates to the Coalition's leadership council are to include women and representatives of religious and ethnic minorities, including Alawites. The military council will reportedly include the Free Syrian Army.[164] The main aims of the National Coalition are replacing the Bashar al-Assad government and "its symbols and pillars of support", "dismantling the security services", unifying and supporting the Free Syrian Army, refusing dialogue and negotiation with the al-Assad government, and "holding accountable those responsible for killing Syrians, destroying [Syria], and displacing [Syrians]".[165]Free Syrian Army
Main article: Free Syrian Army
Free Syrian Army fighters being transported by pick up truck
Many Syrian soldiers subsequently deserted to join the FSA.[167] By December 2011, the estimated number of soldiers who had defected to the FSA was ranging from 1,000 to over 25,000.[168] The FSA functions more as an umbrella organization than a traditional military chain of command, and was first "headquartered" in Turkey, but moved its command headquarters to northern Syria in September 2012.
In April 2013, the US announced it would transfer $123 million in nonlethal aid to Syrian rebels through defected general Salim Idriss, leader of the FSA.[170]
In May 2013, Salim Idriss, the FSA leader, acknowledged that "the rebels" were badly fragmented and lacked the military skill needed to topple the government of President Bashar al-Assad. Idriss said he was working on a countrywide command structure, but that a lack of material support was hurting that effort. “Now it is very important for them to be unified. But unifying them in a manner to work like a regular army is still difficult", Idriss said. He acknowledged common operations with Islamist group Ahrar ash-Sham but denied any cooperation with Islamist group al-Nusra Front.[170]
Abu Yusaf, a commander of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), said in August 2014 that many of the FSA members who had been trained by United States’ and Turkish and Arab military officers were now actually joining IS.[171] On the contrary to the ISIL commander's claims, by September 2014 the Free Syrian Army was joining an alliance and a common front with Kurdish militias including the YPG to fight ISIS.[172][173]
Islamic Front
Main article: Islamic Front (Syria)
The Islamic Front (Arabic: الجبهة الإسلامية, al-Jabhat al-Islāmiyyah) is a merger of seven rebel groups involved in the Syrian civil war[15] that was announced on 22 November 2013.[174] The group has between 40,000[175] and 60,000 fighters. An anonymous spokesman for the group has stated that it will not have ties with the Syrian National Coalition,[176] though a member of the political bureau of the group, Ahmad Musa, has stated that he hopes for recognition from the Syrian National Council in cooperation for what he suggested "the Syrian people want. They want a revolution and not politics and foreign agendas."[177] The group is widely seen as backed and armed by Saudi Arabia.[178][179][180]Mujahideen
Further information: Foreign rebel fighters in the Syrian Civil War
In September 2013, US Secretary of State John Kerry stated that extremist groups make up 15–25% of rebel forces.[181] According to Charles Lister, about 12% of rebels are part of groups linked to al-Qaeda, 18% belong to Ahrar ash-Sham, and 9% belong to Suqour al-Sham Brigade.[182][183] These numbers contrast with a report by Jane's Information Group, a defence outlet, claiming almost half of all rebels being affiliated to Islamist groups.[184] Foreign fighters have joined the conflict in opposition to Assad. While most of them are jihadists, some individuals, such as Mahdi al-Harati, have joined to support the Syrian opposition.[185]The ICSR estimates that 2,000–5,500 foreign fighters have gone to Syria since the beginning of the protests, about 7–11 percent of whom came from Europe. It is also estimated that the number of foreign fighters does not exceed 10 percent of the opposition armed forces.[186] Another estimate puts the number of foreign jihadis at 15,000 by early 2014[187]), The European Commission expressed concerns that some of the fighters might use their skills obtained in Syria to commit acts of terrorism back in Europe in the future.[188]
Islamic campaign in support of Syrian opposition
In September 2013, leaders of 13 powerful rebel brigades rejected Syrian National Coalition and called Sharia law "the sole source of legislation". In a statement they declared that "the coalition and the putative government headed by Ahmad Tomeh does not represent or recognize us". Among the signatory rebel groups were Al-Nusra Front, Ahrar ash-Sham and Al-Tawheed.[190] In November 2013, seven Islamist groups combined to form the Islamic Front.
al-Nusra Front
Main article: al-Nusra Front
The al-Nusra Front, being one of the most effective jihadist groups in Syria, is often considered to be the most aggressive and violent part of the opposition.[191] Being responsible for over 50 suicide bombings, including several deadly explosions in Damascus in 2011 and 2012,
it is recognized as a terrorist organization by Syrian government and
was designated as such by United States in December 2012.[61] In April 2013, the leader of the Islamic state of Iraq released an audio statement announcing that al-Nusra Front is its branch in Syria.[192]
The leader of al-Nusra, Abu Mohammad al-Golani, said that the group
will not merge with the Islamic State of Iraq, but still maintain
allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda.[193]The relationship between the al-Nusra Front and the indigenous Syrian opposition is tense, even though the al-Nusra Front has fought alongside the FSA in several battles, and some FSA fighters defected to the al-Nusra Front.[194] The Mujahideen's strict religious views and willingness to impose sharia law disturbed many Syrians.[195] Some rebel commanders have accused foreign jihadists of "stealing the revolution", robbing Syrian factories, and displaying religious intolerance.[196] al-Nusra has been accused of mistreating religious and ethnic minorities since its formation.[197] The estimated manpower of al-Nusra Front is approximately 6,000–10,000 people, including many foreign fighters.[198] However, in early 2014, their estimated forces dropped to 5,000–6,000 fighters, as al-Nusra lost fighters in combat and in defections to ISIL.[199] On 10 March 2014, al-Nusra released 13 Christian nuns captured from Malouula, Damascus, in exchange for the release of 150 women from the Syrian government's prisons. The nuns reported that they were treated well by al-Nusra during their captivity, adding that they "were giving us everything we asked for" and that "no one bothered us".[200]
Syrian Kurds
Main articles: 2012 Syrian Kurdistan conflict and Syrian Kurdistan
Kurds showing their support for the PYD in Afrin during the conflict
Since the outset of the civil war, most Kurdish political parties organised themselves into the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change (NCC), holding a more moderate stance regarding the Assad government. However, in October 2011, all but the Democratic Union Party (PYD) left the NCC to form their own umbrella organisation, the Kurdish National Council.
The Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), first entered this Syrian Civil War as belligerent in July 2012, by capturing a town, Kobanê, that until then was under control of the Syrian Assad-government (see Syrian Kurdistan campaign (2012–present)).
The conflict between the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) and Islamists groups such as al-Nusra Front have escalated since a group of Kurds expelled Islamists from the border town of Ras al-Ain.[204]
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
Main article: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
Called Dā'ash or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (abbrv. ISIL or ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] or self styled "Islamic State")
made rapid military gains in Northern Syria starting in April 2013 and
as of Mid 2014 controls large parts of that region, where the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights describes it as "the strongest group".[205] It has imposed strict Sharia law over land that it controls. The group was, until 2014, affiliated with al-Qaeda, led by the Iraqi fighter Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,
and has an estimated 7,000 fighters in Syria, including many
non-Syrians. It has been praised as less corrupt than other militia
groups, and criticized for abusing human rights[206]
and for not tolerating non-Islamist militia groups, foreign journalists
or aid workers, whose members it has expelled, imprisoned.[207]
or executed. According to Michael Weiss, ISIL has not been targeted by
the Syrian government "with quite the same gusto" as other rebel
factions.[160]In summer 2014 the ISIL controlled a third of Syria. It established itself as the dominant force of Syrian opposition, defeating Jabhat al-Nusra in Deir Ezzor province and claiming control over most of Syria's oil and gas production.[62]
The Syrian government did not begin to fight ISIL until June 2014 despite its having a presence in Syria since April 2013, according to Kurdish officials.[208]
ISIL has recruited more than 6,300 fighters in July 2014 alone.[209] In September 2014, reportedly some Syrian rebels and ISIL signed a "non-aggression" agreement in a suburb of Damascus, citing inability to deal with both ISIL and the Syrian army's attacks at once.[210] Some Syrian rebels have, however, decried the news on the "non-aggression" pact.
Reporting, censoring and propaganda
Reporting on this war is difficult and dangerous: journalists are being attacked, detained, reportedly tortured, over hundred reportedly killed already by October 2012. Technical facilities (internet, telephone etc.) are being sabotaged by the Syrian government. Both sides in this war try to disqualify their opponent by framing or indicating them with negative labels and terms (‘terrorists’, ‘propaganda’, ‘biased’, ‘US conspiracy’, 'Syrian regime'), or by presenting false on-line evidence.[211]International reaction
Main article: International reactions to the Syrian Civil War
Esther Brimmer (U.S.) speaks at a United Nations Human Rights Council urgent debate on Syria, February 2012
Humanitarian help
Main article: Humanitarian aid during the Syrian civil war
The international humanitarian response to the conflict in Syria is coordinated by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 46/182.[215] The primary framework for this coordination is the Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP) which appealed for USD $1.41 billion to meet the humanitarian needs of Syrians affected by the conflict.[216] Official United Nations data on the humanitarian situation and response is available at http://syria.unocha.org/;
an official website managed by UNOCHA Syria (Amman). UNICEF is also
working alongside these organizations to provide vaccinations and care
packages to those in need. It has launched a vaccination campaign to
eradicate polio from the region, as 17 cases have come up since the war
broke over three years ago.
US non-lethal aid to Syrian opposition forces, May 2013
Other countries in the region have also contributed various levels of aid. Iran has been exporting between 500 and 800 tonnes of flour daily to Syria.[220] Israel has provided treatment to 750 Syrians in a field hospital located in the Golan Heights. Rebels say that 250 of their fighters received medical treatment there.[221] On 26 April 2013, a humanitarian convoy, inspired by Gaza Flotilla, departed from Turkey to Syria. Called Hayat ("Life"), it is set to deliver aid items to IDPs inside Syria and refugees in neighboring countries: Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt. Syrian refugees make up one quarter of Lebanon's population, mostly consisting of women and children.[222]
The World Health Organization has reported that 35% of the country's hospitals are out of service and, depending upon the region, up to 70% of health care professionals have fled. Cases of diarrhoea and hepatitis A have increased by more than twofold since the beginning of 2013. Due to fighting, the normal vaccination programs cannot be undertaken. The displaced refugees may also pose a risk to countries to which they have fled.[223]
Foreign involvement
Main articles: Foreign involvement in the Syrian Civil War and Foreign rebel fighters in the Syrian Civil War
The main Syrian opposition body – the Syrian coalition – receives political, logistic and military support from the United States, Britain and France.[226][227][228] Some Syrian rebels get training from the CIA at bases in Qatar, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.[229][230][231] The Syrian coalition also receives logistic and political support from Sunni states, most notably Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia; all the three major supporting states however have not contributed any troops for direct involvement in the war, though Turkey was involved in border incidents with the Syrian Army. The Financial Times and The Independent reported that Qatar had funded the Syrian rebellion by as much as $3 billion.[232][233] It reported that Qatar was offering refugee packages of about $50,000 a year to defectors and family.[233] Saudi Arabia has emerged as the main group to finance and arm the rebels.[234] According to confessions of a captured FSA commander, the opposition also received minor military support from Israel.[235] Israeli military doctors treat wounded rebels who appeal for aid.
French television France 24 reported that the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, with perhaps 3,000 foreign jihadists among its ranks,[236] "receives private donations from the Gulf states."[237] The major Syrian Kurdish opposition group, the PYD, was reported to get logistic and training support from Iraqi Kurdistan.
On 21 August 2014, two days after U.S. photojournalist James Foley was beheaded, the U.S. military admitted a covert rescue attempt involving dozens of U.S. Special Operations forces had been made to rescue Americans and other foreigners held captive in Syria by ISIL militants. The rescue attempt is the first known U.S. military ground action inside Syria. The resultant gunfight resulted in one U.S. soldier being injured. The rescue was unsuccessful as the captives were not in the location targeted.
On September 11, 2014 Congress expressed support to give President Obama the $500 million he wants to arm and train moderate Syrian rebels. The question of whether the president has authority to continue airstrikes beyond the 60-day window granted by the War Powers Resolution remained unresolved.[238]
On September 12, US Secretary of State John Kerry met Turkish leaders to secure backing for U.S.-led action against ISIL, but Ankara showed reluctance to play a frontline role. Kerry stated that it was "not appropriate" for Iran to join talks on confronting ISIL.[239]
The plans revealed in September also involve Iraq in targeting ISIL. U.S. warplanes have launched 158 strikes in Iraq over the past five weeks while emphasizing a relatively narrow set of targets. The Pentagon's press secretary, John Kirby, said the air campaign in Iraq, which began Aug. 8, will enter a more aggressive phase.[240]
Impact
Deaths
Main article: Casualties of the Syrian Civil War
Total deaths over the course of the conflict in Syria (18 March 2011 – 18 October 2013)
One problem has been determining the number of "armed combatants" who have died, due to some sources counting rebel fighters who were not government defectors as civilians.[249] At least half of those confirmed killed have been estimated to be combatants from both sides, including 52,290 government fighters and 29,080 rebels, with an additional 50,000 unconfirmed combatant deaths.[45] In addition, UNICEF reported that over 500 children had been killed by early February 2012,[250] and another 400 children have been reportedly arrested and tortured in Syrian prisons;[251] both of these claims have been contested by the Syrian government. Additionally, over 600 detainees and political prisoners are known to have died under torture.[252] In mid-October 2012, the opposition activist group SOHR reported the number of children killed in the conflict had risen to 2,300,[253] and in March 2013, opposition sources stated that over 5,000 children had been killed.[241] In January 2014, a report was released detailing the systematic killing of more than 11,000 detainees of the Syrian government.[254]
On 20 August 2014, a new U.N. study concludes at least 191,369 people have died in Syrian conflict. <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/22/world/meast/syria-conflict/index.html?hpt=imi_c2>
Illness
Once-rare infectious diseases have spread in rebel held areas, primarily affecting children, brought on by the collapse of sanitation and deteriorating living conditions. These include measles, typhoid, hepatitis, dysentery, tuberculosis, diphtheria, whooping cough, leishmaniasis, (a disfiguring parasitic skin disease). Of particular concern is the contagious and crippling Poliomyelitis which as of late 2013 doctors and international public health agencies report more than 90 cases of. Critics of the government complain that it has brought on the spread of disease by cutting off vaccination, sanitation and safe-water services to "areas considered politically unsympathetic" even before the uprising.[255]Refugees
Main article: Refugees of the Syrian Civil War
Syrian refugees in Lebanon living in cramped quarters (6 August 2012).
Human rights violations
Main article: Human rights violations during the Syrian Civil War
According to various human rights organizations and United Nations,
human rights violations have been committed by both the government and
the rebels, with the 'vast majority of the abuses having been committed
by the Syrian government'.[262][263][264][265] The U.N. commission
investigating human rights abuses in Syria confirms at least 9
intentional mass killings in the period 2012 to mid-July 2013,
identifying the perpetrator as Syrian government and its supporters in
eight cases, and the opposition in one.[266][267]
Syria's civil war victims
According to three international lawyers,[271] Syrian government officials could face war crimes charges in the light of a huge cache of evidence smuggled out of the country showing the "systematic killing" of about 11,000 detainees. Most of the victims were young men and many corpses were emaciated, bloodstained and bore signs of torture. Some had no eyes; others showed signs of strangulation or electrocution.[272] Experts say this evidence is more detailed and on a far larger scale than anything else that has yet emerged from the 34-month crisis.[273][274] On 30 January 2014, Human Rights Watch released a report detailing, between June 2012 and July 2013, government forces razing to the ground seven anti-government districts in the cities of Damascus and Hama, equating to an area the size of 200 football fields. Witnesses spoke of explosives and bulldozers being used to knock down buildings.[275] Satellite imagery was provided as part of the report and the destruction was characterized as collective punishment against residents of rebel-held areas.[276]
UN reported also that "siege warfare is employed in a context of egregious human rights and international humanitarian law violations. The warring parties do not fear being held accountable for their acts." Armed forces of both sides of the conflict blocked access of humanitarian convoys, confiscated food, cut off water supplies and targeted farmers working their fields. The report pointed to four places besieged by the government forces: Muadamiyah, Daraya, Yarmouk camp and Old City of Homs, as well as two areas under siege of rebel groups: Aleppo and Hama.[277][278] In Yarmouk Camp 20,000 residents are facing death by starvation due to blockade by the Syrian government forces and fighting between the army and Jabhat al-Nusra, which prevents food distribution by UNRWA.[277][279] The UN further stated that government sieges have left more than 250,000 subjected to relentless shelling and bombardment. "They are denied humanitarian aid, food and such basic necessities as medical care, and must choose between surrender and starvation,” the members of the UN Commission of Inquiry said.[280]
ISIL forces have been accused by UN of using public executions, amputations and lashings in a campaign to instill fear. "Forces of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant have committed torture, murder, acts tantamount to enforced disappearance and forced displacement as part of attacks on the civilian population in Aleppo and Raqqa provinces, amounting to crimes against humanity", said the report from 27 August 2014.[281]
Enforced disappearances and arbitrary detentions have also been a feature since the Syrian uprising began.[282]
Threats against Syrian sects and minorities
Main article: Sectarianism and minorities in the Syrian Civil War
Map of Syria's ethno-religious composition in 1976
Many Syrian Christians reported to have fled after they were targeted by the anti-government rebels.[284][285] (See: Sectarianism and minorities in the Syrian Civil War#Christians.)
Economy
By July 2013, the Syrian economy had shrunk 45 percent since the start of the conflict. Unemployment increased fivefold, the value of the Syrian currency decreased to one-sixth its pre-war value, and the public sector lost USD $15 billion.[286][287] By the end of 2013, the UN estimated total economic damage of the Syrian civil war at $143 billion.[288]Crime wave
Doctors and medical staff treating injured rebel fighters and civilians in Aleppo
By July 2012, the human rights group Women Under Siege had documented over 100 cases of rape and sexual assault during the conflict, with many of these crimes believed to be perpetrated by the Shabiha and other pro-government militias. Victims included men, women, and children, with about 80% of the known victims being women and girls.[290]
Criminal networks have been used by both the government and the opposition during the conflict. Facing international sanctions, the Syrian government relied on criminal organizations to smuggle goods and money in and out of the country. The economic downturn caused by the conflict and sanctions also led to lower wages for Shabiha members. In response, some Shabiha members began stealing civilian properties, and engaging in kidnappings.[133]
Rebel forces sometimes relied on criminal networks to obtain weapons and supplies. Black market weapon prices in Syria's neighboring countries have significantly increased since the start of the conflict. To generate funds to purchase arms, some rebel groups have turned towards extortion, stealing, and kidnapping.[133]
Cultural heritage
Main article: List of heritage sites damaged during Syrian civil war
The civil war has caused significant damage to Syria's cultural heritage, including World Heritage Sites. Destruction of antiquities has been caused by shelling, army entrenchment, and looting at various tells, museums, and monuments.[291] A group called Syrian Archaeological Heritage Under Threat
is monitoring and recording the destruction in an attempt to create a
list of heritage sites damaged during the war and gain global support
for the protection and preservation of Syrian archaeology and architecture.[292]UNESCO listed all six Syria's World Heritage sites as endangered but direct assessment of damage is not possible. It is known that the Old City of Aleppo was heavily damaged during battles being fought within the district, while Palmyra and Crac des Chevaliers suffered minor damage. Illegal digging is considered a grave danger, and hundreds of Syrian antiquities, including some from Palmyra, appeared in Lebanon. Three archeological museums are known to have been looted; in Raqqa some artifacts seem to have been destroyed by foreign Islamists due to religious objections.[293]
The war has produced its own particular artwork. A late Summer 2013 exhibition in London at the P21 Gallery was able to show some of this work.[294]
Spillover
Main article: Spillover from the Syrian Civil War
With porous borders with most of its neighbors, the fighting has
spilled over them, causing fears of a regional war. In June 2014,
members of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) crossed the border from Syria into northern Iraq, and have taken control of large swaths of Iraqi territory as the Iraqi Army abandoned its positions. The Syrian Civil War has led to incidents of sectarian violence in northern Lebanon between supporters and opponents of the Syrian government, and armed clashes between Sunnis and Alawites in Tripoli.[295] Fighting between rebels and government forces has spilled into Lebanon on several occasions.The fight between ISIL and the Kurds in the town of Kobani on the Turkish border has led to rioting throughout Turkey and to brief [296] occupations of a number of parliament buildings in Western Europe.
Spillover of the Syrian Civil War
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Syrian Civil War has impacted every country sharing a land border with Syria. Since the first small protests during the Arab Spring, the increasingly violent Syrian Civil War has been both a proxy for the major Arab powers and Iran, and a potential launching point for a wider regional war. Fears of the latter were realized when the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, a Sunni Muslim militant group and former al-Qaeda affiliate, established itself in Syria in 2013, and by mid-2014, had combined both the Syrian Civil War and the Iraqi insurgency into a single conflict.[23][24][25]
Contents
Iraq
Main articles: Anbar campaign (2013–14), Northern Iraq offensive (June 2014) and Northern Iraq offensive (August 2014)
For much of 2012, the Iraqi government had turned a blind eye to the Sunni and Salafist militias crossing the border into Syria. This toleration ended when Salafist militias connected to al-Qaeda ambushed a convoy filled with unarmed Syrian soldiers at Akashat on the Syrian side of the border. This led to greater fighting throughout the country, Operation al-Shabah in May 2013 in which the Iraqi Army failed to wipe these militias out and the consolidation of several of them with ISIL. Anbar Province became a battle zone and an airstrike
in April 2014 was of little use, because in June 2014 ISIL launched an
offensive in northern Iraq, taking large swaths of the country and
threatening Baghdad itself. In response, Iran reportedly deployed its Quds force in Iraq,[26] thus turning the conflict into a full-scale war.Lebanon
Further information: Syrian Civil War spillover in Lebanon
The Syrian Civil War has led to incidents of sectarian violence in northern Lebanon between supporters and opponents of the Syrian government, and armed clashes between Sunnis and Alawites in Tripoli.[27]
Fighting between rebels and government forces has spilled into Lebanon
on several occasions. The Syrian Air Force has conducted air strikes on
targets in Lebanon, while rebels have launched rockets on Hezbollah
targets.[28] Fighting between supporters of the Sunni sheikh Ahmed Al-Assir, who is against Hezbollah's involvement in Syria, and the Lebanese army has killed at least 15 of its soldiers.[29]Lebanese–Syrian border
Main articles: Lebanese–Syrian border clashes, 2013 Iranian embassy bombing and Battle of Sidon (2013)
At the beginning of summer 2012, two Hezbollah fighters were killed
in a clash with Syrian rebels who were on Lebanese territory.[30] On 17 September, Syrian Ground-attack aircraft fired three missiles 500 metres (1,600 ft) over the border into Lebanese territory near Arsal. It was suggested that the jets were chasing rebels in the vicinity. The attack prompted Lebanese president Michel Sleiman to launch an investigation, whilst not publicly blaming Syria for the incident.[31]On 22 September 2012, a group of armed members of the Free Syrian Army attacked a border post near Arsal. This was reported to be the second incursion within a week. The group were chased off into the hills by the Lebanese Army, who detained and later released some rebels due to pressure from dignified locals. Michel Sleiman praised the actions taken by the military as maintaining Lebanon's position being "neutral from the conflicts of others". He called on border residents to "stand beside their army and assist its members." Syria has repeatedly called for an intensified crackdown on rebels that it claims are hiding in Lebanese border towns.[32][33]
On 11 October 2012, four shells fired by the Syrian military hit Masharih al-Qaa, where previous shelling incidents have caused fatalities. Lebanon's position of ignoring the attacks and dissociating itself from the conflict remained unchanged.[citation needed] In October 2012 Hassan Nasrallah denied Hezbollah members were fighting alongside the Syrian army, but that Lebanese in Syria were only protecting Lebanese inhabited villages from the Free Syrian Army.[34]
In August 2014, the Syrian air force bombed the Lebanese side of the border.[35] In December of that year, they used barrel bombs on suspected rebel installations northwest of Arsal.[36]
Lebanon vs. ISIL and al-Nusra Front
Main article: Battle of Arsal
Starting in June 2014, Hezbollah began battling with Islamists along
the Lebanese border, who had crossed into Lebanon several times and
threatened to throw the country into full-scale war.From 2–5 August 2014, the Lebanese Army clashed with Syrian gunmen in the town of Arsal, which left over a hundred soldiers on both sides dead.[37]
On 21 August, the al-Nusra Front invaded Lebanon near Arsal and the Bekaa Valley town of Al-Fakiha, following a battle between them and Hezbullah seven Hezbollah fighters and 32 Syrian rebels died in clashes around the Syrian village of Nahleh, just over the border from Arsal.[38]
Dozens of hostages were taken back to Syria during the abovementioned battle of Arsal. After fruitless negotiations, the Lebanese cabinet voted to authorize the army to invade Syria to free them on 4 September 2014,[39] something that they have yet to do. There was another attempted invasion of Lebanon by a joint ISIL-Nusra force in early October, which was beaten back by Hezbullah.[40]
Turkey
With a thousand mile border with Syria and Iraq, There have been a number of incidents involving this nation with various factions in the conflicts south of the border.Turkey vs Syrian Government
Openly supporting the overthrow of Bashir al-Assad Turkey permitted the establishment of a "jihadist highway" where rebels of all stripes, including ISIL, were permitted to cross both supplies and personnel South of the border.[41] There were various incidents including the shooting down of a Syrian Air Force jet by Turkey.Turkey and ISIL
Main article: Turkish Intervention in Syria and Iraq, 2014-present
Turkey had been allegedly supporting ISIL throughout its many incarnations as a lesser evil against the Assad regime.[citation needed] This to some extent began to change with the 2013 Reyhanlı bombings
and a retaliatory airstrike in January 2014. ISIL shook this off and
began its conquest of northern Iraq, followed by consolidation of
territories in Northern Syria. In the summer of 2014 it began taking
over the border area with Turkey, leading to hundreds of thousands of
refugees coming north along the border, riots,[42] the use of teargas, rubber bullets, and live ammunition, as well the end of the truce with the PKK.A vote to authorize military action was passed by the Turkish parliament on October 2, 2014. However, it had no follow-through and further rioting[43] ensued through much of Turkey's cities as the government demanded more and more conditions to join in the war. The riots intensified and several dozen protesters have been killed.[citation needed]
ISIL has also conducted operations within Turkish territory. On October 17, 2014, in Urfa, they kidnapped Abu Issa, a top Syrian rebel commander; however, they failed to smuggle him to Syria.[44] Press TV reporter Serena Shim also claimed that Islamist fighters had been smuggled from Turkey to Syria in trucks belonging to the World Food Programme and other aid groups. She was accused of spying by Turkish officials and died in a car accident days later.[45] On November 28, 2014 ISIL troops allegedly launched a raid on Kobani from a base in Turkey.[46]
Kurdish protests in Turkey and Western Europe
Main article: 2014 Kurdish riots in Turkey
As Turkish inaction during the siege of Kobani
became more evident, thousands of Kurds staged protests in Turkey that
lead to over 30 deaths, and protests in Europe that included occupying
parts of the European parliament and all of the Dutch one.[47]Israeli-Syrian cease fire line and neutral zone
There have been clashes with Israeli soldiers on the ceasefire line in the Golan Heights,[48] leading the UN Security Council to express "grave concern at all violations of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement."[49] and generating fears of a Hezbollah invasion of Israel from there.[50][51] In late 2012, ceasefire line tensions between Israel and Syria escalated. On 25 September 2012, several mortar shells landed in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, landing in an open area adjacent to the ceasefire line fence.[52] Overall, throughout October and early November, several Syrian mortar and light artillery shells hit the Golan Heights. One mortar round may have been responsible for a brushfire that erupted in the area. On 3 November, three Syrian tanks entered the demilitarized zone in the central Golan Heights as a number of mortar shells were fired into the area.[53] On 5 November, an Israeli army jeep was damaged by Syrian army gunfire as it patrolled the ceasefire line.[54] On 11 November, after a Syrian 120mm mortar round hit the eastern Golan Heights, the Israeli army responded by firing an electro-optic anti-tank missile in the direction of a Syrian mortar crew, but they deliberately missed them, intending it as a warning shot.[55] On 12 November, another Syrian mortar shell struck the Golan Heights, and Israeli tanks deployed along the ceasefire line responded by targeting two Syrian mortar launchers. A direct hit was confirmed.[56]On March 2014, an Israeli patrol jeep landed on an explosive cargo near Majdal Shams during a daily patrol. In response, the IDF fired 155mm artillery shells on a Syrian outpost, and later that day, the Israeli air force bombed more Syrian settlements. This had happened a few days after another similar clash near the border of Lebanon that had also been responded in artillery and tanks fire by Israel. Israel blamed Hezbollah for both incidents.
On Sunday, July 14, 2013, a shell fired from Syria, where insurgents and government troops are locked in fierce fighting, exploded in the Israeli-occupied part of the Golan Heights plateau.
In late August, Islamic militants began shelling the Golan Heights from Syria,[57] and fierce fighting along the Syrian/Golan front resulted in gunfire and rockets piercing the de facto border, sparking Israeli involvement.[58] The UN-only border crossing was captured by Islamist troops, injuring two Israeli officers with mislead shootings. In the aftermath, UN troops fled their posts and crossed into Israel.[59]
On September 23, 2014, an errant Syrian Air Force jet strayed over the Golan Heights, and was shot down by Israeli forces, the first time this has happened since the 1973 Yom Kippur War.[60]
Jordan
Main article: October 2012 Jordanian–Syrian border clash
There have been a few incidents.[61] Jordan hosts nearly 600,000 registered Syrian refugees—although Jordanian officials say the real number is far higher.On 22 October 2012, a Jordanian soldier died in a gunfight between Jordanian troops and Islamic militants attempting to cross the border into Syria. Sameeh Maaytah, the Information Minister of Jordan, said the soldier was the first member of the Jordanian military to be killed in clashes connected to the civil war in Syria.[62]
In April 2014, the Jordanian Air Force launched an airstrike on soldiers trying to illegally cross the border from Syria. Since then, attempted militant infiltration into Jordan has become commonplace.[63] Some of this was due to the return of Jordanian citizens who, as Jihadists, went to fight in Syria for a while and decided to go home for various reasons.[64] According to reports, there are over 2000 Jordanian Jihadis fighting in Syria. Over a hundred have been arrested and charged for crossing the border to fight, which is illegal in Jordan.
Heavy shelling aimed at Daraa in Syria has accidentally hit the Jordanian side of the border, causing light damage.[65]
Jordan Vs. ISIL
From at least the 2014 June Blitzkrieg in Iraq, ISIL Leadership has been threatening to overthrow the monarchy of Jordan and to invade Jordan once it takes Baghdad.[66] The Jordanian Air Force joined in the US-led bombing of ISIL in Syria.[67] Jihadist troops have retaliated by firing into Jordan and there has been increased sniping at the border.[68]Egypt (Sinai peninsula)
Main article: Sinai insurgency
Libya (Derna)
Main article: 2014 ISIL takeover of Derna
The takeover of the city of Derna in Cyrenaica, Libya by the self-declared Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) took place in late 2014. On November 2014, Wilayat Darnah (the province of Darnah)[69] or Wilayat Barqah
(Province of Eastern Libya) was declared an integral part the so-called
"Islamic State". ISIL has now taken complete control of the eastern
Libyan coastal city with a population of 100,000.[70]Management of Savagery
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The real identity of Abu Bakr Naji is claimed by the Al Arabiya Institute for Studies to be Muhammad Khalil al-Hakaymah.[3][4] His known works are this piece and some contributions to the al-Qaeda online magazine Sawt al-Jihad. National Public Radio has described Naji as a "top al-Qaida insider" and characterized the work as "al-Qaida's playbook".[5]
Themes
Management of Savagery discusses the need to create and manage nationalist and religious resentment and violence in order to create long-term propaganda opportunities for jihadist groups. Notably, Naji discusses the value of provoking military responses from superpowers in order to recruit and train guerilla fighters and to create martyrs. Naji suggests that a long-lasting strategy of attrition will reveal fundamental weaknesses in the ability of superpowers to defeat committed jihadists.[6]Management of Savagery argues that carrying out a campaign of constant violent attacks in Muslim states will eventually exhaust their ability and will to enforce their authority, and that as the writ of the state withers away, chaos—or "savagery"—will ensue. Jihadists can take advantage of this savagery to win popular support, or at least acquiescence, by implementing security, providing social services, and imposing Sharia. As these territories increase, they can become the nucleus of a new caliphate.[2][6] Naji nominated Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, North Africa, Nigeria and Pakistan as potential targets, due to their geography, weak military presence in remote areas, existing jihadist presence, and easy accessibility of weapons.[7]
Naji professes to have been inspired by Ibn Taymiyya, the influential 14th century Islamic scholar and theologian. His book displays a thoughtful understanding of western institutions and value systems, and the role and history of Islamist movements in Egypt, Afghanistan and the Middle East, particularly the activities of Islamic Jihad in Egypt during the 1990s.[6]
In Practice
A number of media outlets have compared the attempts by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant to establish territorial control in Iraq and Syria with the strategy outlined in Management of Savagery.[6][8][9][10] The premier issue of the Islamic State's online magazine, Dabiq, contained discussion of guerilla warfare and tactics that closely resembled the writings and terminology used in Management of Savagery, although the book is not mentioned directly.[11]Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has been described by The Jamestown Foundation as following Naji's guidelines in Yemen,[1] while the book has been mentioned positively in interviews with members of Somalia's Al-Shabaab.[12]
See also
Al Qaeda HandbookA war crime is a serious violation of the laws and customs of war (also known as international humanitarian law) giving rise to individual criminal responsibility. Examples of war crimes include:[1]
- murdering, mistreating, or deporting civilian residents of an occupied territory to slave labor camps
- doing summary executions of prisoners or civilians
- murdering or mistreating prisoners of war or civilian internees
- forcing protected persons to serve in the forces of a hostile power
- killing hostages
- killing or punishing spies or other persons convicted of war crimes without a fair trial
- wantonly destroying cities, towns, villages, or other objects not warranted by military necessity
Article 22 of The Hague IV ("Laws of War: Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV); October 18, 1907") states that: "The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited."[2] Over the last century, many other treaties have introduced positive laws that place constraints on belligerents. Some of the provisions, such as those in the The Hague and the Geneva Conventions and the Genocide Convention, are considered to be part of customary international law, and are binding on all.[3][4] Others are only binding on individuals if the belligerent power to which they belong is a party to the treaty which introduced the constraint.
Contents
History
Early examples
The trial of Peter von Hagenbach by an ad hoc tribunal of the Holy Roman Empire in 1474, was the first "international" war crimes trial, and also of command responsibility.[6][7] He was convicted and beheaded for crimes that "he as a knight was deemed to have a duty to prevent", although he had argued that he was only "following orders".In 1654 a Major Connaught (Royalist) was tried at Chester Assizes and hanged for his part in the massacre of villagers in the church at the village of Boughton, Cheshire in 1643. Twelve villagers were smoked out, stripped naked and had their throats cut. He was hanged at the scene of the crime having been convicted of striking a blow to the head of John Fowler with an axe.[8]
In 1865, Henry Wirz, a Confederate officer, was held accountable by a military tribunal and hanged for appalling conditions at Andersonville Prison where many Union POWs died during the American Civil War.
Hague Conventions
Main article: Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907)
The Hague Conventions were international treaties negotiated at the First and Second Peace Conferences at The Hague,
Netherlands, in 1899 and 1907, respectively, and were, along with the
Geneva Conventions, among the first formal statements of the laws of war and war crimes in the nascent body of secular international law.Geneva Conventions
Main article: Geneva Conventions
The Geneva Conventions
are four related treaties adopted and continuously expanded from 1864
to 1949 that represent a legal basis and framework for the conduct of
war under international law. Every single member state of the United
Nations has currently ratified the conventions, which are universally
accepted as customary international law,
applicable to every situation of armed conflict in the world. However,
the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions adopted in 1977
containing the most pertinent, detailed and virulent protections of international humanitarian law
for persons and objects in modern warfare are still not ratified by a
number of States continuously engaged in armed conflicts, namely the
United States, Israel, India, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, and others.
Accordingly, states retain different codes and values with regard to
wartime conduct. Some signatories have routinely violated the Geneva
Conventions in a way which either uses the ambiguities of law or
political maneuvering to sidestep the laws' formalities and principles.Three conventions were revised and expanded with the fourth one added in 1949:
- First Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field was adopted in 1864, significantly revised and replaced by the 1906 version,[9] the 1929 version, and later the First Geneva Convention of 1949[10]).
- Second Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea was adopted in 1906,[11] significantly revised and replaced by the Second Geneva Convention of 1949).
- Third Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War was adopted in 1929, significantly revised and replaced by the Third Geneva Convention of 1949).
- Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (first adopted in 1949, based on parts of the 1907 Hague Convention IV).
- Protocol I (1977) relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts.
- Protocol II (1977) relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts.
- Protocol III (2005) relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem.
Leipzig War Crimes Trial
Main article: Leipzig War Crimes Trials
A small number of German military personnel of the First World War were tried in 1921 by the German Supreme Court for alleged war crimes.London Charter / Nuremberg Trials 1945
Main articles: London Charter of the International Military Tribunal and Nuremberg Trials
The modern concept of war crime was further developed under the auspices of the Nuremberg Trials based on the definition in the London Charter that was published on August 8, 1945. (Also see Nuremberg Principles.)
Along with war crimes the charter also defined crimes against peace and
crimes against humanity, which are often committed during wars and in
concert with war crimes.International Military Tribunal for the Far East 1946
Main article: International Military Tribunal for the Far East
Also known as the Tokyo Trial, the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal or
simply as the Tribunal, it was convened on May 3, 1946 to try the
leaders of the Empire of Japan for three types of crimes: "Class A"
(crimes against peace), "Class B" (war crimes), and "Class C" (crimes
against humanity), committed during World War II.International Criminal Court 2002
Bodies of some of the hundreds of Vietnamese villagers who were murdered by U.S. soldiers during the My Lai Massacre.
War crimes are defined in the statute that established the International Criminal Court, which includes:
- Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, such as:
- Willful killing, or causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health
- Torture or inhumane treatment
- Unlawful wanton destruction or appropriation of property
- Forcing a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of a hostile power
- Depriving a prisoner of war of a fair trial
- Unlawful deportation, confinement or transfer
- Taking hostages
- The following acts as part of an international conflict:
- Directing attacks against civilians
- Directing attacks against humanitarian workers or UN peacekeepers
- Killing a surrendered combatant
- Misusing a flag of truce
- Settlement of occupied territory
- Deportation of inhabitants of occupied territory
- Using poison weapons
- Using civilians as shields
- Using child soldiers
- Firing upon a Combat Medic with clear insignia.
- The following acts as part of a non-international conflict:
- Murder, cruel or degrading treatment and torture
- Directing attacks against civilians, humanitarian workers or UN peacekeepers
- Taking hostages
- Summary execution
- Pillage
- Rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution or forced pregnancy
Prominent indictees
Main articles: List of war crimes and List of people indicted in the International Criminal Court
Heads of state and government
To date, the present and former heads of state and heads of government that have been charged with war crimes include:- German Großadmiral and President Karl Dönitz and Japanese Prime Ministers and Generals Hideki Tōjō and Kuniaki Koiso in the aftermath of World War II.
- Former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević was brought to trial for alleged war crimes, but died in custody in 2006 before the trial could be concluded after more than 4 years of proceedings.
- Former Liberian President Charles G. Taylor was also brought to The Hague charged with war crimes; his trial stretched from 2007 to March 2011. He was convicted in April 2012.[14]
- Omar al-Bashir, current head of state of Sudan, for actions in Darfur.
- Former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi was indicted for allegedly ordering the killings of protesters and civilians during the 2011 Libyan civil war, however he was killed before he could stand trial in October 2011.
Other prominent indictees
- Yoshijirō Umezu, a general in the Imperial Japanese Army
- Seishirō Itagaki, War minister of the Empire of Japan
- Hermann Göring, Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe.
- Ernst Kaltenbrunner and Adolf Eichmann—high-ranking members of the SS.
- Wilhelm Keitel—Generalfeldmarschall, head of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht.
- Erich Raeder—Großadmiral, Commander in Chief of the Kriegsmarine.
- Albert Speer—Minister of Armaments and War Production in Nazi Germany 1942–45.
- William Calley-former U.S. Army officer found guilty of murder for his role in the My Lai Massacre
- Ali Hassan Abd al-Majid al-Tikriti, more commonly known by his nickname "Chemical Ali", executed by post-Ba'athist Iraq for his leadership of the gassing of Kurdish villages during the Iran-Iraq War; also governor of illegally-occupied Kuwait during the First Gulf War
- Ratko Mladić, indicted for genocide amongst other violations of humanitarian law during the Bosnian War; he was captured in Serbia in May 2011 and has been extradited to face trial in The Hague,[15]
- Joseph Kony, leader of the Lord's Resistance Army, guerrilla group which used to operate in Uganda.
Definition
War crimes are significant in international humanitarian law[28] because it is an area where international tribunals such as the Nuremberg Trials and Tokyo Trials have been convened. Recent examples are the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which were established by the UN Security Council acting under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.
Under the Nuremberg Principles, war crimes are different from crimes against peace which is planning, preparing, initiating, or waging a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements, or assurances. Because the definition of a state of "war" may be debated, the term "war crime" itself has seen different usage under different systems of international and military law. It has some degree of application outside of what some may consider to be a state of "war", but in areas where conflicts persist enough to constitute social instability.
The legalities of war have sometimes been accused of containing favoritism toward the winners ("Victor's justice"),[29] as some controversies have not been ruled as war crimes. Some examples include the Allies' destruction of Axis cities during World War II, such as the firebombing of Dresden, the Operation Meetinghouse raid on Tokyo (the most destructive single bombing raid in history) and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki;[30] and the mass killing of Biharies by Kader Siddique and Mukti Bahini[31] before or after victory of Bangladesh Liberation War in Bangladesh between 1971 and 1972.
Controversy aroused when the Allies re-designated German POWs (under the protection of the 1929 Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War) as Disarmed Enemy Forces (allegedly unprotected by the 1929 Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War), many of which then were used for forced labor such as clearing minefields.[34] By December 1945, six months after the war had ended, it was estimated by French authorities that 2,000 German prisoners were still being killed or maimed each month in mine-clearing accidents.[34] The wording of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention was intentionally altered from that of the 1929 convention so that soldiers who "fall into the power" following surrender or mass capitulation of an enemy are now protected as well as those taken prisoner in the course of fighting.[35][36]
Sunni and Shia Islam are the two major denominations of Islam. The demographic breakdown between the two denominations is difficult to assess and varies by source, but a good approximation is that 75–80% of the world's Muslims are Sunni[1] and 15% are Shia,[2][3] with most Shias belonging to the Twelver tradition and the rest divided between many other groups.[2]
Sunnis are a majority in most Muslim communities: in Southeast Asia, China, South Asia, Africa, and most of the Arab world. Shia make up the majority of the citizen population in Iran, Iraq, and Bahrain, as well as being a politically significant minority in Lebanon. Azerbaijan is predominantly Shia; however, practicing adherents are much fewer.[4] Indonesia has the largest number of Sunni Muslims, while Iran has the largest number of Shia Muslims (Twelver) in the world. Pakistan has the second-largest Sunni as well as the second-largest Shia Muslim (Twelver) population in the world.
The historic background of the Sunni–Shia split lies in the schism that occurred when the Islamic prophet Muhammad died in the year 632, leading to a dispute over succession to Muhammad as a caliph of the Islamic community spread across various parts of the world, which led to the Battle of Siffin. The dispute intensified greatly after the Battle of Karbala, in which Hussein ibn Ali and his household were killed by the ruling Umayyad Caliph Yazid I, and the outcry for revenge divided the early Islamic community. Today, there are differences in religious practice, traditions, and customs, often related to jurisprudence. Although all Muslim groups consider the Quran to be divine, Sunni and Shia have different opinions on hadith.
Over the years, Sunni–Shia relations have been marked by both cooperation and conflict. Sectarian violence persists to this day from Pakistan to Yemen and is a major element of friction throughout the Middle East.[5][6] Tensions between communities have intensified during power struggles, such as the Bahraini uprising, the Iraq War, and most recently the Syrian Civil War[7][8][9] and the formation of the self-styled Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and its advancement on Syria and Northern Iraq.
Contents
Numbers
Sunnis are a majority in most Muslim communities in Southeast Asia, China, South Asia, Africa, most of the Arab World, and among Muslims in the United States (of which 85-90% are Sunnis).[10][11] Shias make up the majority of the Muslim population in Iran (around 90–95%), Azerbaijan (around 85%),[12] Iraq (around 60-65%) and Bahrain (around 65%). Minority communities are also found in Yemen where over 45% of the population are Shia (mostly of the Zaidi sect), according to the UNHCR.[13] Others put the numbers of Shias at 30%.[14][15] About 10-15% of Turkey's population belong to the Alevi sect. The Shia constitute around 30-40% of Kuwait,[16][17] 45-55% of the Muslim population in Lebanon, 10% of Saudi Arabia, 15% of Syria, and 10-15% of Pakistan. Around 10-15% of Afghanistan, less than 5% of the Muslims in Nigeria, and around 3% of population of Tajikistan are Shia.[18]...Shias are about 10-to-15 percent of the entire Muslim world. We don't have accurate statistics because in much of the Middle East it is not convenient to have them, for ruling regimes in particular. But the estimates are that they are about 10 to 15 percent of the Muslim world, which puts them somewhere between 165 and 190 million people....The overwhelming majority of that population lives between Pakistan and Lebanon. Iran always had been a Shia country, the largest one, with a population of about 60 million. Pakistan is the second-largest Shia country in the world, with about 30 million population. Also potentially, there are as many Shias in India as there are in Iraq.[19][20]
—Vali Nasr, October 18, 2006
Historical beliefs and leadership
Successors of Muhammad
Sunnis believe that Abu Bakr, the father of Muhammad's wife Aisha, was Muhammad's rightful successor and that the method of choosing or electing leaders (Shura) endorsed by the Quran is the consensus of the Ummah (the Muslim community).Shias believe that Muhammad divinely ordained his cousin and son-in-law Ali Ibn Abi Talib (the father of his grandsons Hasan ibn Ali and Hussein ibn Ali) in accordance with the command of God to be the next caliph, making Ali and his direct descendants Muhammad's successors. Shias believe that Muhammad quoted this, in Hadith of the pond of Khumm. Ali was married to Fatimah, Muhammad's daughter by his wife Khadijah bint Khuwaylid.
Aisha endorsed her father Abu Bakr as the successor to Muhammad. In the Battle of the Camel (656), Aisha opposed her step son-in-law Ali outside the city of Basra, because she wanted justice on the assassins of the previous caliph, Uthman. Aisha's forces were defeated and Muhammad's widow was respectfully escorted back to Medina.
Sunnis follow the Rashidun "rightly guided Caliphs", who were the first four caliphs who ruled after the death of Muhammad: Abu Bakr (632-634), Umar ibn al-Khattab (634-644), Uthman ibn Affan (644-656), and the aforementioned Ali Ibn Abi Talib (656-661).
Shia theology discounts the legitimacy of the first three caliphs and believes that Ali is the second-most divinely inspired man (after Muhammad) and that he and his descendants by Fatimah, the Imams, are the sole legitimate Islamic leaders.
The Imamate of the Shia encompasses far more of a prophetic function than the Caliphate of the Sunnis. Unlike Sunni, Shias believe special spiritual qualities have been granted not only to Muhammad but also to Ali and the other Imams. Twelvers believe the imams are immaculate from sin and human error (ma'sūm), and can understand and interpret the hidden inner meaning of the teachings of Islam. In this way the Imams are trustees (wasi) who bear the light of Muhammad (Nūr Muhammadin).[21][22]
Mahdi
While Shias and Sunnis differ on the nature of the Mahdi, many members of both groups, especially Sufis,[23] believe that the Mahdi will appear at the end of the world to bring about a perfect and just Islamic society.In Shia Islam "the Mahdi symbol has developed into a powerful and central religious idea."[24] Twelvers believe the Mahdi will be Muhammad al-Mahdi, the twelfth Imam returned from the Occultation, where he has been hidden by God since 874. In contrast, mainstream Sunnis believe the Mahdi will be named Muhammad, be a descendant of Muhammad, and will revive the faith, but will not necessarily be connected with the end of the world.[25]
Hadith
The Shias accept some of the same hadiths used by Sunnis as part of the sunnah to argue their case. In addition, they consider the sayings of Ahl al-Bayt that are not attributed directly to Muhammad as hadiths. Shias do not accept many Sunni hadiths unless they are also recorded in Shia sources or the methodology can be proven of how they were recorded. Also, some Sunni-accepted hadith are less favored by Shias; one example is that because of Aisha's opposition to Ali, hadiths narrated by Aisha are not given the same authority as those by other companions. Another example is hadith narrated by Abu Hurairah, who is considered by Shias as the enemy of Ali. The Shia argument is that Abu Hurairah was only a Muslim four years of his life before Muhammad's death. Although he accompanied Muhammad for four years only, he managed to record ten times as many hadiths as Abu Bakr and Ali each.Emphasis
Mainstream Sunnism has been said[by whom?] to be "about" Sharia, sacred law. In contrast, the Shia also follow Islamic law with great "vigilance", but their belief is added with Ijtihad "Research" in the light of teachings of the Quran.Shiism and Sufism
Shiism and Sufism are said to share a number of hallmarks: Belief in an inner meaning to the Quran, special status for some mortals (saints for Sufi, Imams for Shias), as well as veneration of Ali and Muhammad's family.[26]Practices
Many distinctions can be made between Sunnis and Shiaīs through observation alone:Salat
When prostrating during ritual prayer (salat), Shias place their forehead onto a piece of naturally occurring material, often a clay tablet (mohr), soil (turbah) at times from Karbala, the place where Hussein ibn Ali was martyred, instead of directly onto a prayer rug. There is precedence for this in Sunni thought too, as it is recommended to prostrate on earth, or upon something that grows from the earth.[27][28]Some Shia perform prayers back to back, sometimes worshipping two times consecutively (1+2+2 i.e. fajr on its own Dhuhr with Asr and Maghrib with Isha'), thus praying five times a day but with a very small break in between the prayer, a tradition followed by Muslims all over the world while performing Hajj, instead of five prayers with at least one hour gap between them as required by Sunni schools of law.[29]
Shias and the followers of the Sunni Maliki school hold their hands at their sides during prayer; Sunnis of other schools cross their arms (right over left) and clasp their hands;[30] it is commonly held by Sunni scholars especially of Maliki school that either is acceptable.[31][32][Nail al-Awtar 1][Nail al-Awtar 2][33]
Mutah
See also: Islamic marital practices
The Twelver Shia permit Nikah mut‘ah—fixed-term
temporary marriage— which is not acceptable within the Sunni community
or the Ismaili Shia or the Zaidi Shia and is believed a planned and
agreed fornication. Mutah is not the same as Misyar marriage or 'Arfi marriage, which has no date of expiration and is permitted by some Sunnis. A Misyar marriage differs from a conventional Islamic marriage
in that the man does not have financial responsibility over the woman
by her own free will. The man can divorce the woman whenever he wants to
in a Misyar marriage.[34]Hijab and dress
See also: Islam and clothing
Both Sunni and Shia women wear the hijab.
Devout women of the Shia traditionally wear black and yellow as do some
Sunni women in the Gulf. Some Shia religious leaders also wear a black
robe. Mainstream Shia and Sunni women wear the hijab
differently. Some Sunni scholars emphasize covering of all body
including the face in public whereas some scholars exclude the face from
hijab. Shias believe that the hijab must cover around the perimeter of
the face and up to the chin.[citation needed] Like Sunnis, some Shia women, such as those in Iran and Iraq, use their hand to hold the black chador, in order to cover their faces when in public.Given names
Shia are sometimes recognizable by their names, which are often derived from the proper names or titles of saints. In particular, the names Ali, Hussein, and Hasan are disproportionately common among Shias, though they may also be used by Sunnis.[30] Umar and Uthman, being the names of caliphs recognized by Sunnis but not Shias, are commonly used as names for Sunnis but are rare for Shias.Theology
Sunni theology
The Five Pillars of Islam (Arabic: أركان الإسلام) is the term given to the five duties incumbent on every Muslim. These duties are Shahada (profession of faith), salat (prayers), Zakāt (giving of alms), Sawm (fasting, specifically during Ramadan) and Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca). These five practices are essential to Sunni Muslims.Shia theology
The Five Pillars are also accepted as essential rituals and practiced by Shias. Shia theology has two concepts that define religion as a whole. There are Roots of Religion (Usūl al-Dīn) and Branches of Religion (Furu al Din).History
Abbasid era
Ja'far al-Sadiq, the sixth Shia Imam, died during al-Mansur's reign, and there were claims that he was murdered on the orders of the caliph.[36] (However, Abbasid persecution of Islamic lawyers was not restricted to the Shia. Abū Ḥanīfa, for example was imprisoned by al-Mansur and tortured.)
Shia sources further claim that by the orders of the tenth Abassid caliph, al-Mutawakkil, the tomb of the third Imam, Hussein ibn Ali in Karbala, was completely demolished,[37] and Shias were sometimes beheaded in groups, buried alive, or even placed alive within the walls of government buildings still under construction.[38]
The Shia believe that their community continued to live for the most part in hiding and followed their religious life secretly without external manifestations.[39]
Shia–Sunni in Iraq
Many Shia Iranians migrated to what is now Iraq in the 16th century. "It is said that when modern Iraq was formed, some of the population of Karbala was Iranian". In time, these immigrants adopted the Arabic language and Arab identity, but their origin has been used to "unfairly cast them as lackeys of Iran".[40] Other Iraqi Shias are ethnic Arabs with roots in Iraq as deep as those of their Sunni counterparts.[41]Shia–Sunni in Persia
Main article: Islam in Iran
Shafi'i Sunnism was the dominant form of Islam in most of Iran until rise of the Safavid Empire although a significant undercurrent of Ismailism
and a very large minority of Twelvers were present all over Persia.
Many illustrious scholars and scientists who lived before the Safavid
era, such as Avicenna, Jābir ibn Hayyān, Alhazen, Al-Farabi, Ferdowsi and Nasir al-Din al-Tusi and the poet Hafez
were Shia Muslims of both the Ismaili and Twelver traditions (some
indistinguishably so, such as al-Tusi), as was most of Iran's elite.
There were many Sunni scientists and scholars as well, such as Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, philosopher-theologian Al-Ghazali, and poet Saadii.Nezamiyehs were the medieval institutions of Islamic higher education established by Nizam al-Mulk in the 11th century. Nizamiyyah institutes were the first well-organized universities in the Muslim world. The most famous and celebrated of all the nizamiyyah schools was Al-Nizamiyya of Baghdad (established 1065), where Nizam al-Mulk appointed the distinguished philosopher and theologian, Ghazali, as a professor. Other Nizamiyyah schools were located in Nishapur, Balkh, Herat and Isfahan.
The Sunni hegemony did not undercut the Shia presence in Iran. The writers of the Shia Four Books were Iranian, as were many other great scholars. According to Morteza Motahhari:[42]
The majority of Iranians turned to Shi'ism from the Safawid period onwards. Of course, it cannot be denied that Iran's environment was more favourable to the flourishing of the Shi'ism as compared to all other parts of the Muslim world. Shi'ism did not penetrate any land to the extent that it gradually could in Iran. With the passage of time, Iranians' readiness to practise Shi'ism grew day by day. Had Shi`ism not been deeply rooted in the Iranian spirit, the Safawids (907‑1145/ 1501‑1732) would not have succeeded in converting Iranians to the Shi'i creed and making them follow the Prophet's Ahl al-Bayt sheerly by capturing political power.
Yavuz Sultan Selim who delivered a devastating blow to the Shia Safavids and Ismail I in the Battle of Chaldiran, a battle of historical significance.
The Shia in Persia before the Safavids
The domination of the Sunni creed during the first nine Islamic centuries characterizes the religious history of Iran during this period. There were however some exceptions to this general domination which emerged in the form of the Zaidis of Tabaristan, the Buwayhid, the rule of the Sultan Muhammad Khudabandah (r. 1304-1316) and the Sarbedaran. Nevertheless, apart from this domination there existed, firstly, throughout these nine centuries, Shia inclinations among many Sunnis of this land and, secondly, Twelver and Zaidi Shiism had prevalence in some parts of Iran. During this period, the Shia in Iran were nourished from Kufa, Baghdad and later from Najaf and Al Hillah.[43] Shia were dominant in Tabaristan, Qom, Kashan, Avaj and Sabzevar. In many other areas the population of Shias and Sunni was mixed.The first Zaidi state was established in Daylaman and Tabaristan (northern Iran) in 864 by the Alavids;[44] it lasted until the death of its leader at the hand of the Samanids in 928. Roughly forty years later the state was revived in Gilan (north-western Iran) and survived under Hasanid leaders until 1126. After which from the 12th-13th centuries, the Zaidis of Daylaman, Gilan and Tabaristan then acknowledge the Zaidi Imams of Yemen or rival Zaidi Imams within Iran.[45]
The Buyids, who were Zaidi and had a significant influence not only in the provinces of Persia but also in the capital of the caliphate in Baghdad, and even upon the caliph himself, provided a unique opportunity for the spread and diffusion of Shia thought. This spread of Shiism to the inner circles of the government enabled the Shia to withstand those who opposed them by relying upon the power of the caliphate.
Twelvers came to Iran from Arab regions in the course of four stages. First, through the Asharis tribe[clarification needed] at the end of the 7th and during the 8th century. Second through the pupils of Sabzevar, and especially those of Al-Shaykh Al-Mufid, who were from Rey and Sabzawar and resided in those cities. Third, through the school of Hillah under the leadership of Al-Hilli and his son Fakhr al-Muhaqqiqin. Fourth, through the scholars of Jabal Amel residing in that region, or in Iraq, during the 16th and 17th centuries who later migrated to Iran.[46]
On the other hand, the Ismaili da‘wah ("missionary institution") sent missionaries (du‘āt, sg. dā‘ī) during the Fatimid Caliphate to Persia. When the Ismailis divided into two sects, Nizaris established their base in northern Persia. Hassan-i Sabbah conquered fortresses and captured Alamut in 1090. Nizaris used this fortress until the Mongols finally seized and destroyed it in 1256.
After the Mongols and the fall of the Abbasids, the Sunni Ulama suffered greatly. In addition to the destruction of the caliphate there was no official Sunni school of law. Many libraries and madrasahs were destroyed and Sunni scholars migrated to other Islamic areas such as Anatolia and Egypt. In contrast, most Shia were largely unaffected as their center was not in Iran at this time. For the first time, the Shia could openly convert other Muslims to their movement.
Several local Shia dynasties like the Marashi and Sarbadars were established during this time. The kings of the Kara Koyunlu dynasty ruled in Tabriz with a domain extending to Fars and Kerman. In Egypt the Fatimid government ruled.[47]
Muhammad Khudabandah, the famous builder of Soltaniyeh, was among the first of the Mongols to convert to Shiaism, and his descendants ruled for many years in Persia and were instrumental in spreading Shī‘ī thought.[48] Sufism played a major role in spread of Shiism in this time.
After the Mongol invasion Shiims and Sufism once again formed a close association in many ways. Some of the Ismailis whose power had broken by the Mongols, went underground and appeared later within Sufi orders or as new branches of already existing orders. In Twelve-Imam Shiism, from the 13th to the 16th century, Sufism began to grow within official Shiite circles.[49] The extremist sects of the Hurufis and Shasha'a grew directly out of a background that is both Shiite and Sufi. More important in the long run than these sects were the Sufi orders which spread in Persia at this time and aided in the preparing the ground for the Shiite movement of Safavids. Two of these orders are of particular significance in this question of the relation of Shiism and Sufism: The Nimatullahi order and Nurbakhshi order.
Shiism in Persia after Safavids
Ismail I initiated a religious policy to recognize Shiism as the official religion of the Safavid Empire, and the fact that modern Iran remains an officially Shia state is a direct result of Ismail's actions.
Shah Ismail I of Safavid dynasty destroyed the tombs of Abū Ḥanīfa and the Sufi Abdul Qadir Gilani in 1508.[51] In 1533, Ottomans restored order, reconquered Iraq and rebuilt Sunni shrines.[52]
Immediately following the establishment of Safavid power the migration of scholars began and they were invited to Iran ... By the side of the immigration of scholars, Shi'i works and writings were also brought to Iran from Arabic-speaking lands, and they performed an important role in the religious development of Iran ... In fact, since the time of the leadership of Shaykh Mufid and Shaykh Tusi, Iraq had a central academic position for Shi'ism. This central position was transferred to Iran during the Safavid era for two-and-a-half centuries, after which it partly returned to Najaf. ... Before the Safavid era Shi'i manuscripts were mainly written in Iraq, with the establishment of the Safavid rule these manuscripts were transferred to Iran.[46]This led to a wide gap between Iran and its Sunni neighbors, particularly the Ottoman Empire in the wake of the Battle of Chaldiran. This gap continued until the 20th century.
During the early days of the Iranian Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini endeavored to bridge the gap between Shiites and Sunnis by declaring it permissible for Twelvers to pray behind Sunni imams and by forbidding criticizing the Caliphs who preceded Ali—an issue that had caused much animosity between the two groups.[54]
-
The declaration of Shi'ism as the state religion of the realm by Shah Ismail - 1501 Tabriz central mosque. -
Monument commemorating the Battle of Chaldiran, which was fought between the Sunni Ottoman Empire and the Shia Safavid dynasty.
Shia–Sunni in Levant
Rashid ad-Din Sinan the Grand Master of the Ismaili Shia at Masyaf successfully deterred Saladin, not to assault the minor territories under the control of their sect.
Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi was another eminent scholar, killed in Aleppo on charges of cultivating Batini teachings and philosophy.[47]
Shia–Sunni in South Asia
Main article: Islam in Asia
Sunni–Shia clashes also occurred occasionally in the 20th century in
South Asia. There were many between 1904 and 1908, especially in the United Provinces (Uttar Pradesh)
area. These clashes revolved around the public cursing of the first
three caliphs by Shias and the praising of them by Sunnis. To put a stop
to the violence, public demonstrations were banned in 1909 on the three
most sensitive days: Ashura, Chehlum
and Ali's death on 21 Ramadan. Intercommunal violence resurfaced in
1935-36 and again in 1939 when many thousands of Sunni and Shias defied
the ban on public demonstrations and took to the streets.[55]
Shia are estimated to be 21-35% of the Muslim population in South Asia,
although the total number is difficult to estimate due to the
intermingling between the two groups and practice of taqiyya by Shia [56]Sunni razzias which came to be known as Taarajs virtually devastated the community. History records 10 such Taarajs also known as Taraj-e-Shia between the 15th and 19th centuries in 1548, 1585, 1635, 1686, 1719, 1741, 1762, 1801, 1830, 1872 during which the Shia habitations were plundered, people slaughtered, libraries burnt and their sacred sites desecrated.[57]
Shia-Sunni Relations in the Mughal Empire
Shia in South Asia faced persecution by some Sunni rulers and Mughal Emperors which resulted in the killings of Shia scholars like Qazi Nurullah Shustari[58] (also known as Shaheed-e-Thaalis, the third Martyr) and Mirza Muhammad Kamil Dehlavi[59] (also known as Shaheed-e- Rabay, the fourth Martyr) who are two of the five martyrs of Shia Islam. Shias in Kashmir in subsequent years had to pass through the most atrocious period of their history.Modern Sunni–Shia relations
In addition to Iran, Iraq has emerged as a major Shia government when the Twelvers achieved political dominance in 2005 under American occupation. The two communities have often remained separate, mingling regularly only during the Hajj pilgrimage in Mecca. In some countries like Iraq, Syria, Kuwait and Bahrain, communities have mingled and intermarried. Some Shia have complained of mistreatment in countries dominated by Sunnis, especially in Saudi Arabia,[60] while some Sunnis have complained of discrimination in the Twelver-dominated states of Iraq and Iran.[61]Some tension developed between Sunnis and Shia as a result of clashes over Iranian pilgrims and Saudi police at the hajj.[62]
According to some reports, as of mid-2013, the Syrian Civil War has become "overtly sectarian" with the "sectarian lines fall most sharply" between Alawites and Sunnis.[63] With the involvement of Lebanese Shia paramilitary group Hezbollah, the fighting in Syria has reignited "long-simmering tensions between Sunnis and Shi’ites" spilling over into Lebanon and Iraq.[64]
1919-1970
At least one scholar sees the period from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire through the decline of Arab nationalism as a time of relative unity and harmony between traditionalist Sunni and Shia Muslims—unity brought on by a feeling of being under siege from a common threat, secularism, first of the European colonial variety and then Arab nationalist.[7]A remarkable example of Sunni–Shia cooperation was the Khilafat Movement which swept South Asia following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, the seat of the Caliphate, in World War I. Shia scholars "came to the caliphate's defence" by attending the 1931 Caliphate Conference in Jerusalem. This was despite the fact they were theologically opposed to the idea that non-Imams could be Caliphs or successors to Muhammad, and that the Caliphate was "the flagship institution" of Sunni, not Shia, authority. This has been described as unity of traditionalists in the face of the twin threats of "secularism and colonialism."[7]
Another example of unity was a fatwā issued by the rector of Al-Azhar University, Mahmud Shaltut, recognizing Shia Islamic law as the fifth school of Islamic law. In 1959, al-Azhar University in Cairo, the most influential center of Sunni learning, authorized the teaching of courses of Shia jurisprudence as part of its curriculum.[65]
Post-1980
See also: Iran–Iraq War
Others lay the blame for the strife at a very different source, the unintended effects of the Islamic revival. According to scholar Vali Nasr, as the Muslim world was decolonialised and Arab nationalism lost its appeal, fundamentalism blossomed and reasserted the differences and conflicts between the two movements, particularly in the strict teachings of Sunni scholar Ibn Taymiyyah.[69] The Iranian Islamic revolution changed the Shia–Sunni power equation in Muslim countries "from Lebanon to India" arousing the traditionally subservient Shia to the alarm of traditionally dominant and very non-revolutionary Sunni.[70] "Where Iranian revolutionaries saw Islamic revolutionary stirrings, Sunnis saw mostly Shia mischief and a threat to Sunni predominance."[71]
Although the Iranian revolution's leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, was very much in favor of Shia–Sunni unity, he also challenged Saudi Arabia, in his view an "unpopular and corrupt dictatorship" and an "American lackey" ripe for revolution. In part because Saudi Arabia was the world's major international funder of Islamic schools, scholarships, fellowships, etc., this angered not only Saudi Arabia but its many fundamentalist allies and benefactors throughout the Arab world.[72]
Olivier Roy, research director at the French National Centre for Scientific Research, sees the "Shia awakening and its instrumentalisation by Iran" as leading to a "very violent Sunni reaction", starting first in Pakistan before spreading to "the rest of the Muslim world, without necessarily being as violent." According to Roy, "two events created a sea change in the balance of power between Shia and Sunnis: the Islamic revolution in Iran and the American military intervention in Iraq" in 2003. "Today, Azerbaijan is probably the only country where there are still mixed mosques and Shia and Sunnis pray together."[73]
Iraq
Main articles: Shia Islam in Iraq and Islam in Iraq
Shia–Sunni discord in Iraq starts with disagreement over the relative
population of the two groups. According to most sources, including the
CIA's World Factbook, the majority of Iraqis are Shia Arab Muslims (around 65%), and Sunni Arab Muslims represent about 17% of the population.[74] However, Sunni are split ethnically between Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen. Many Sunnis hotly dispute their minority status, including ex-Iraqi Ambassador Faruq Ziada,[75] and many believe Shia majority is "a myth spread by America".[76] One Sunni belief shared by Jordan's King Abdullah as well as his then Defense Minister Shaalan is that Shia numbers in Iraq were inflated by Iranian Shias crossing the border.[77] Shia scholar Vali Nasr believes the election turnout in summer and December 2005 confirmed a strong Shia majority in Iraq.[78]The British, having put down a Shia rebellion against their rule in the 1920s, "confirmed their reliance on a corps of Sunni ex-officers of the collapsed Ottoman empire". The British colonial rule ended after the Sunni and Shia united against it.[79]
The Shia suffered indirect and direct persecution under post-colonial Iraqi governments since 1932, erupting into full-scale rebellions in 1935 and 1936. Shias were also persecuted during the Ba'ath Party rule, especially under Saddam Hussein. It is said that every Shia clerical family of note in Iraq had tales of torture and murder to recount.[80] In 1969 the son of Iraq's highest Shia Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim was arrested and allegedly tortured. From 1979-1983 Saddam's regime executed 48 major Shia clerics in Iraq.[81] They included Shia leader Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr and his sister. Tens of thousands of Iranians and Arabs of Iranian origin were expelled in 1979 and 1980 and a further 75,000 in 1989.[82]
The Shias openly revolted against Saddam following the Gulf War in 1991 and were encouraged by Saddam's defeat in Kuwait and by simultaneous Kurdish uprising in the north. However, Shia opposition to the government was brutally suppressed, resulting in some 50,000 to 100,000 casualties and successive repression by Saddam's forces. The governing regimes of Iraq were composed mainly of Sunnis for nearly a century until the 2003 Iraq War.
Iraq War
Some of the worst sectarian strife ever has occurred after the start of the Iraq War, steadily building up to the present.[8] Deaths from American and allied military collateral damage[83] have become overshadowed by the cycle of Sunni–Shia revenge killing—Sunni often used car bombs, while Shia favored death squads.[84]According to one estimate, as of early 2008, 1,121 suicide bombers have blown themselves up in Iraq.[85] Sunni suicide bombers have targeted not only thousands of civilians,[86] but mosques, shrines,[87] wedding and funeral processions,[88] markets, hospitals, offices, and streets.[89] Sunni insurgent organizations include Ansar al-Islam.[90] Radical groups include Al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad, Jeish al-Taiifa al-Mansoura, Jeish Muhammad, and Black Banner Organization.[91]
Takfir motivation for many of these killings may come from Sunni insurgent leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Before his death Zarqawi was one to quote Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, especially his infamous statement urging followers to kill the Shia of Iraq,[92] and calling the Shias "snakes".[93] An al-Qaeda-affiliated website posted a call for "a full-scale war on Shiites all over Iraq, whenever and wherever they are found."[94] Wahhabi suicide bombers continue to attack Iraqi Shia civilians,[95] and the Shia ulama have in response declared suicide bombing as haraam:
حتی كسانی كه با انتحار میآيند و میزنند عدهای را میكشند، آن هم به عنوان عملیات انتحاری، اینها در قعر جهنم هستندSome believe the war has strengthened the takfir thinking and may spread Sunni–Shia strife elsewhere.[97]
Even those who kill people with suicide bombing, these shall meet the flames of hell.
—Ayatollah Yousef Saanei[96]
On the Shia side, in early February 2006 militia-dominated government death squads were reportedly "tortur[ing] to death or summarily" executing "hundreds" of Sunnis "every month in Baghdad alone," many arrested at random.[98][99][100] According to the British television Channel 4, from 2005 through early 2006, commandos of the Ministry of the Interior which is controlled by the Badr Organization, and
...who are almost exclusively Shia Muslims — have been implicated in rounding up and killing thousands of ordinary Sunni civilians.[101]The violence shows little sign of getting opposite sides to back down. Iran's Shia leaders are said to become "more determined" the more violent the anti-Shia attacks in Iraq become.[102] One Shia Grand Ayatollah, Yousef Saanei, who has been described as a moderate, reacted to the 2005 suicide bombings of Shia targets in Iraq by saying the bombers were "wolves without pity" and that "sooner rather than later, Iran will have to put them down".[103]
Egypt
Almost all of Egypt's Muslims are Sunni,[104] but the Syrian Civil War has brought on an increase in anti-Shia rhetoric,[105] and what Human Rights Watch states is "anti-Shia hate speech by Salafis".[106] In 2013 a mob of several hundred attacked a house in the village of Abu Musallim near Cairo, dragging four Shia worshipers through the street before lynching them.[106] Eight other Shia were injured.[105]Jordan
Main article: Islam in Jordan
Although the country of Jordan is 95% Sunni and has not seen any
Shia–Sunni fighting within, it has played a part in the recent
Shia-Sunni strife. It is the home country of anti-Shia insurgent Raed Mansour al-Banna,
who died perpetrating one of Iraq's worst suicide bombings in the city
of Al-Hillah. Al-Banna killed 125 Shia and wounded another 150 in the 2005 Al Hillah bombing of a police recruiting station and adjacent open air market. In March 2005 Salt, al-Banna's home town, saw a three-day wake for al-Banna who Jordanian newspapers and celebrants proclaimed a martyr
to Islam, which by definition made the Shia victims "infidels whose
murder was justified." Following the wake Shia mobs in Iraq attacked the
Jordanian embassy on March 20, 2005. Ambassadors were withdrawn from
both countries.[107][108]
All this resulted despite the strong filial bonds, ties of commerce,
and traditional friendship between the two neighboring countries.[108]Pakistan
Pakistan's citizens have had serious Shia-Sunni discord. Almost 80% of Pakistan's Muslim population is Sunni, with 20% being Shia, but this Shia minority forms the second largest Shia population of any country,[109] larger than the Shia majority in Iraq.Until recently Shia–Sunni relations have been cordial, and a majority of people of both sects participated in the creation the state of Pakistan in 1940s.[110] Despite the fact that Pakistan is a Sunni majority country, Shias have been elected to top offices and played an important part in the country's politics. Several top Pakistani Generals such as General Muhammad Musa. Pakistan's President Yahya Khan were Shia. Former President Asif Ali Zardari is a Shia. There are many intermarriages between Shia and Sunnis in Pakistan.
Unfortunately, from 1987–2007, "as many as 4,000 people are estimated to have died" in Shia-Sunni sectarian fighting in Pakistan", 300 being killed in 2006.[111] Amongst the culprits blamed for the killing are Al-Qaeda working "with local sectarian groups" to kill what they perceive as Shia apostates, and "foreign powers ... trying to sow discord."[111] Most violence takes place in the largest province of Punjab and the country's commercial and financial capital, Karachi.[112] There have also been conflagrations in the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan and Azad Kashmir,[112] with several hundreds of Shia Hazara killed in Balochistan killed since 2008.[113]
Arab states especially Saudi Arabia and GCC states have been funding extremist Deobandi Sunnis and Wahhabis in Pakistan, since the Afghan Jihad.[114] Whereas Iran has been funding Shia militant groups such as Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan, resulting in tit-for-tat attacks on each other.[112] Pakistan has become a battleground between Saudi Arabia-funded Deobandi Sunni and Wahhabis and Iran-funded Shia resulting in the deaths of thousands of innocent Muslims.
Background
Some see a precursor of Pakistani Shia–Sunni strife in the April 1979 execution of deposed President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on questionable charges by Islamic fundamentalist General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq. Ali Bhutto was Shia, Zia ul-Haq a Sunni.[115]Zia-ul-Haq's Islamization that followed was resisted by Shia who saw it as "Sunnification" as the laws and regulations were based on Sunni fiqh. In July 1980, 25,000 Shia protested the Islamization laws in the capital Islamabad. Further exacerbating the situation was the dislike between Shia leader Imam Khomeini and General Zia ul-Haq.[116]
Shia formed student associations and a Shia party, Sunni began to form sectarian militias recruited from Deobandi and Ahl al-Hadith madrasahs. Preaching against the Shia in Pakistan was radical cleric Israr Ahmed. Muhammad Manzour Numani, a senior Indian cleric with close ties to Saudi Arabia published a book entitled Iranian Revolution: Imam Khomeini and Shiism. The book, which "became the gospel of Deobandi militants" in the 1980s, attacked Khomeini and argued the excesses of the Islamic revolution were proof that Shiism was not the doctrine of misguided brothers, but beyond the Islamic pale.[117]
Anti-Shia groups in Pakistan include the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, offshoots of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI). The groups demand the expulsion of all Shias from Pakistan and have killed hundreds of Pakistani Shias between 1996 and 1999.[118] As in Iraq they "targeted Shia in their holy places and mosques, especially during times of communal prayer." [119] From January to May 1997, Sunni terror groups assassinated 75 Shia community leaders "in a systematic attempt to remove Shias from positions of authority."[120] Lashkar-e-Jhangvi has declared Shia to be "American agents" and the "near enemy" in global jihad.[121]
An example of an early Shia–Sunni fitna shootout occurred in Kurram, one of the tribal agencies of the Northwest Pakistan, where the Pushtun population was split between Sunnis and Shia. In September 1996 more than 200 people were killed when a gun battle between teenage Shia and Sunni escalated into a communal war that lasted five days. Women and children were kidnapped and gunmen even executed out-of-towners who were staying at a local hotel.[122]
Afghanistan
Main articles: Shia Islam in Afghanistan and Islam in Afghanistan
Shia–Sunni strife in Pakistan is strongly intertwined with that in Afghanistan. Though now deposed, the anti-Shia Afghan Taliban
regime helped anti-Shia Pakistani groups and vice versa.
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, have sent thousands of
volunteers to fight with the Taliban regime and "in return the Taliban
gave sanctuary to their leaders in the Afghan capital of Kabul." [123]"Over 80,000 Pakistani Islamic militants have trained and fought with the Taliban since 1994. They form a hardcore of Islamic activists, ever-ready to carry out a similar Taliban-style Islamic revolution in Pakistan.", according to Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid.[118]
Shia–Sunni strife inside of Afghanistan has mainly been a function of the puritanical Sunni Taliban's clashes with Shia Afghans, primarily the Hazara ethnic group.
In 1998 more than 8,000 noncombatants were killed when the Taliban attacked Mazar-i-Sharif and Bamiyan where many Hazaras live.[124] Some of the slaughter was indiscriminate, but many were Shia targeted by the Taliban. Taliban commander and governor Mullah Niazi banned prayer at Shia mosques[125] and expressed takfir of the Shia in a declaration from Mazar's central mosque:
Last year you rebelled against us and killed us. From all your homes you shot at us. Now we are here to deal with you. The Hazaras are not Muslims and now we have to kill Hazaras. You must either accept to be Muslims or leave Afghanistan. Wherever you go, we will catch you. If you go up we will pull you down by your feet; if you hide below, we will pull you up by your hair.[126]Assisting the Taliban in the murder of Iranian diplomatic and intelligence officials at the Iranian Consulate in Mazar were "several Pakistani militants of the anti-Shia, Sipah-e-Sahaba party."[127]
Iran and Shia statehood
Main articles: Islam in Iran and Freedom of religion in Iran
Iran is unique in the Muslim world because its population is
overwhelmingly more Shia than Sunni (Shia constitute 92% of the
population) and because its constitution is theocratic republic based on rule by a Shia jurist.Although the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, supported good Sunni–Shia relations, there have been complaints by Sunni of discrimination, particularly in important government positions.[128] In a joint appearance with former Iranian president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani calling for Shia-Suni unity, Sunni Shiekh Yusuf al-Qaradawi complained that no ministers in Iran have been Sunni for a long time, that Sunni officials are scarce even in the regions with majority of Sunni population (such as Kurdistan, or Balochistan).[129] Sunnis cite the lack of a Sunni mosque in Tehran, Iran's capital and largest city, despite the presence of over 1 million Sunnis there,[130] and despite the presence of Christian churches, as a prominent example of this discrimination. Although reformist President Mohammad Khatami promised during his election campaign to build a Sunni mosque in Tehran, none was built during his eight years in office. The president explained the situation by saying Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei would not agree to the proposal.[131] As in other parts of the Muslim world, other issues may play a part in the conflict, since most Sunnis in Iran are also ethnic minorities.[130]
Soon after the 1979 revolution, Sunni leaders from Kurdistan, Balouchistan, and Khorassan, set up a new party known as Shams, which is short for Shora-ye Markaz-e al Sunaat, to unite Sunnis and lobby for their rights. But six months after that they were closed down, bank accounts suspended and had their leaders arrested by the government on charges that they were backed by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.[128]
A UN human rights report states that:
...information indicates Sunnis, along with other religious minorities, are denied by law or practice access to such government positions as cabinet minister, ambassador, provincial governor, mayor and the like, Sunni schools and mosques have been destroyed, and Sunni leaders have been imprisoned, executed and assassinated. The report notes that while some of the information received may be difficult to corroborate there is a clear impression that the right of freedom of religion is not being respected with regard to the Sunni minority.[132][133]Members of the 'Balochistan Peoples Front' claim that Sunnis are systematically discriminated against educationally by denial of places at universities, politically by not allowing Sunnis to be army generals, ambassadors, ministers, prime minister, or president, religiously insulting Sunnis in the media, economic discrimination by not giving import or export licenses for Sunni businesses while the majority of Sunnis are left unemployed.[134]
There has been a low level resistance in mainly Sunni Iranian Balouchistan against the regime for several years. Official media refers to the fighting as armed clashes between the police and "bandits," "drug-smugglers," and "thugs," to disguise what many believe is essentially a political-religious conflict. Revolutionary Guards have stationed several brigades in Balouchi cities, and have allegedly tracked down and assassinated Sunni leaders both inside Iran and in neighboring Pakistan. In 1996 a leading Sunni, Abdulmalek Mollahzadeh, was gunned down by hitmen, allegedly hired by Tehran, as he was leaving his house in Karachi.[135]
Members of Sunni groups in Iran however have been active in what the authorities describe as terrorist activities. Balochi Sunni Abdolmalek Rigi continue to declare the Shia as Kafir and Mushrik.[136] These Sunni groups have been involved in violent activities in Iran and have waged terrorist[137] attacks against civilian centers, including an attack next to a girls' school[138] according to government sources. The "shadowy Sunni militant group Jundallah" has reportedly been receiving weaponry from the United States for these attacks according to the semi-official Fars News Agency.[139][140] The United Nations[141] and several countries worldwide have condemned the bombings. (See 2007 Zahedan bombings for more information)
Non-Sunni Iranian opposition parties, and Shia like Ayatollah Jalal Gange’i have criticised the regime's treatment of Sunnis and confirmed many Sunni complaints.[142]
Following the 2005 elections, much of the leadership of Iran has been described as more "staunchly committed to core Shia values" and lacking Ayatollah Khomeini's commitment to Shia–Sunni unity.[143] Polemics critical of Sunnis were reportedly being produced in Arabic for dissemination in the Arab Muslim world by Hojjatieh-aligned elements in the Iranian regime.[144]
Syria
Main article: Islam in Syria
Syria is approximately three quarters Sunni,[145] but its government is predominately Alawite, a Shia sect that makes up less than 15% of the population. Under Hafez al-Assad, Alawites dominated the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party,
a secular Arab nationalist party which had ruled Syria under a state of
emergency from 1963 to 2011. Alawites are often considered a form of
Shia Islam, that differs somewhat from the larger Twelver Shia sect.[146]During the 20th century, an Islamic uprising in Syria occurred with sectarian religious overtones between the Alawite-dominated Assad government and the Islamist Sunni Muslim Brotherhood, culminating with the 1982 Hama massacre. An estimated 10,000 to 40,000 Syrians, mostly civilians, were killed by Syrian military in the city. During the uprising, the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood attacked military cadets at an artillery school in Aleppo, performed car bomb attacks in Damascus, as well as bomb attacks against the government and its officials, including Hafez al-Assad himself, and had killed several hundred.
How much of the conflict was sparked by Sunni versus Shia divisions and how much by Islamism versus secular-Arab-nationalism, is in question, but according to scholar Vali Nasr the failure of the Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic Republic of Iran to support the Muslim Brotherhood against the Baathists "earned [Khomeini] the Brotherhood's lasting contempt." It proved to the satisfaction of the Brotherhood that sectarian loyalty trumped Islamist solidarity for Khomeini and eliminated whatever appeal Khomeini might have had to the MB movement as a pan-Islamic leader.[147]
The Syrian Civil War has reawakened the sectarian tensions in Syria, gradually becoming a full-blown sectarian strife between the Alawite-dominated Army and government against the mainly Sunni rebels and former members of the regular army.
Lebanon
Though sectarian tensions in Lebanon were at their height during the Lebanese Civil War, the Shia–Sunni relations were not the main conflict of the war. The Shia party/militia of Hizbullah emerged in Lebanon during the Lebanese Civil War as one of the strongest forces following the Israeli withdrawal in the year 2000, and the collapse of the South Lebanese Army in the South. The tensions blew into a limited warfare between Shia dominated and Sunni dominated political alliances in 2008.With the eruption of the Syrian Civil War, tensions increased between the Shia-affiliated Alawites and Sunnis of Tripoli, erupting twice into deadly violence - on June 2011, and the second time on February 2012. The Syrian war has affected Hizbullah, which was once lauded by both Sunnis and Shi'ites for its battles against Israel, but now has lost support from many Sunnis for its military assistance to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
Hezbollah has been blamed for bombings of two mosques (Taqwa and al-Salam) frequented by Sunnis in Tripoli on August 23, 2013 that killed at least 42 and wounded hundreds.[148] The bombings are thought to be in retaliation[149] for a large car bomb which detonated on August 15 and killed at least 24 and wounded hundreds in a part of Beirut controlled by the Hizbullah[150]
Yemen
Main article: Islam in Yemen
See also: Human rights in Yemen and Religion in Yemen
Muslims in Yemen include the majority Shafi'i (Sunni) and the
minority Zaidi (Shia). Zaidi are sometimes called "Fiver Shia" instead
of Twelver Shia because they recognize the first four of the Twelve
Imams but accept Zayd ibn Ali as their "Fifth Imām" rather than his brother Muhammad al-Baqir. Shia–Sunni conflict in Yemen involves the Shia insurgency in northern Yemen.[6]Both Shia and Sunni dissidents in Yemen have similar complaints about the government—cooperation with the American government and an alleged failure to following Sharia law[151]—but it's the Shia who have allegedly been singled out for government crackdown.
During and after the US-led invasion of Iraq, members of the Zaidi-Shia community protested after Friday prayers every week outside mosques, particularly the Grand Mosque in Sana'a, during which they shouted anti-US and anti-Israeli slogans, and criticised the government's close ties to America.[152] These protests were led by ex-parliament member and Imam, Bader Eddine al-Houthi.[153] In response the Yemeni government has implemented a campaign to crush to the Zaidi-Shia rebellion"[154] and harass journalists.[155]
These latest measures come as the government faces a Sunni rebellion with a similar motivation to the Zaidi discontent.[156][157][158]
Bahrain
Main articles: Al Bandar report and Islam in Bahrain
The small Persian Gulf island state of Bahrain has a Shia majority but is ruled by Sunni Al Khalifa family as a constitutional monarchy, with Sunni dominating the ruling class and military and disproportionately represented in the business and landownership.[159] According to the CIA World Factbook, Al Wefaq
the largest Shia political society, won the largest number of seats in
the elected chamber of the legislature. However, Shia discontent has
resurfaced in recent years with street demonstrations and occasional
low-level violence."[160] Bahrain has many disaffected unemployed youths and many have protested Sheikh Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa's efforts to create a parliament as merely a "cooptation of the effendis",
i.e. traditional elders and notables. Bahrain's 2002 election was
widely boycotted by Shia. Mass demonstrations have been held in favor of
full-fledged democracy in March and June 2005, against an alleged
insult to Ayatollah Khamenei in July 2005.[161]Nigeria
Main articles: Islam in Nigeria and Shia Islam in Nigeria
An example of governments working "to drive wedges between Sunnism
and Shiism" was found in Nigeria in 1998 when the Nigerian government of
General Sani Abacha accused Muslim Brotherhood leader Sheikh Ibrahim al-Zak Zaki
of being a Shia. This was despite the fact that there are few if any
Shia among Nigerias Muslims and the Muslim Brotherhood is a Sunni
organization.[162]Indonesia
Islam is the dominant religion in Indonesia, which also has a larger Muslim population than any other country in the world, with approximately 202.9 million identified as Muslim (88.2% of the total population) as of 2009.[163]The majority adheres to the Sunni Muslim tradition mainly of the Shafi'i madhhab.[164] Around one million are Shias, who are concentrated around Jakarta.[165] In general, the Muslim community can be categorized in terms of two orientations: "modernists," who closely adhere to orthodox theology while embracing modern learning; and "traditionalists," who tend to follow the interpretations of local religious leaders (predominantly in Java) and religious teachers at Islamic boarding schools (pesantren).
Saudi Arabia
Main articles: Islam in Saudi Arabia, Shia Islam in Saudi Arabia and Freedom of religion in Saudi Arabia
While Shia make up roughly 15% of Saudi Arabia's population,[166] they form a large portion of the residents of the eastern province of Hasa—by some estimates a majority[167]—where much of the petroleum industry is based. Between 500,000 and a million Shia live there,[168] concentrated especially around the oases of Qatif and Al-Hasa. The Majority of Saudi Shia belong to the sect of the Twelvers.[169]Relations between the Shia and the Wahhabis are inherently strained because the Wahhabis consider the rituals of the Shia to be the epitome of shirk, or polytheism. In the late 1920s, the Ikhwan (Ibn Saud's fighting force of converted Wahhabi Bedouin Muslims) were particularly hostile to the Shia and demanded that Abd al Aziz forcibly convert them. In response, Abd al Aziz sent Wahhabi missionaries to the Eastern Province, but he did not carry through with attempts at forced conversion. In recent decades the late leading Saudi cleric, Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd Allah ibn Baaz, issued fatwa denouncing Shia as apostates, and according to Shia scholar Vali Nasr "Abdul-Rahman al-Jibrin, a member of the Higher Council of Ulama, even sanctioned the killing of Shias,[168] a call that was reiterated by Wahhabi religious literature as late as 2002."[170]
Government policy has been to allow Shia their own mosques and to exempt Shia from Hanbali inheritance practices. Nevertheless, Shia have been forbidden all but the most modest displays on their principal festivals, which are often occasions of sectarian strife in the Persian Gulf region, with its mixed Sunni–Shia populations.[169]
According to a report by the Human Rights Watch:
Shia Muslims, who constitute about eight percent of the Saudi population, faced discrimination in employment as well as limitations on religious practices. Shia jurisprudence books were banned, the traditional annual Shia mourning procession of Ashura was discouraged, and operating independent Islamic religious establishments remained illegal. At least seven Shi'a religious leaders-Abd al-Latif Muhammad Ali, Habib al-Hamid, Abd al-Latif al-Samin, Abdallah Ramadan, Sa'id al-Bahaar, Muhammad Abd al-Khidair, and Habib Hamdah Sayid Hashim al-Sadah-reportedly remained in prison for violating these restrictions."[171]And Amnesty International adds:
Members of the Shi‘a Muslim community (estimated at between 7 and 10 per cent of Saudi Arabia’s population of about 19 million) suffer systematic political, social, cultural as well as religious discrimination.[172]As of 2006 four of the 150 members of Saudi Arabia's "handpicked" parliament were Shia, but no city had a Shia mayor or police chief, and none of the 300 girls schools for Shia in the Eastern Province had a Shia principal. According to scholar Vali Nasr, Saudi textbooks "characterize Shiism as a form of heresy ... worse than Christianity and Judaism."[173]
Forced into exile in the 1970s, Saudi Shia leader Hassan al-Saffar is said to have been "powerfully influenced" by the works of Sunni Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-e-Islami and by their call for Islamic revolution and an Islamic state.[174]
Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Shia in Hasa ignored the ban on mourning ceremonies commemorating Ashura. When police broke them up three days of rampage ensued—burned cars, attacked banks, looted shops—centered around Qatif. At least 17 Shia were killed. In February 1980 disturbances were "less spontaneous" and even bloodier.[175] Meanwhile broadcasts from Iran in the name of the Islamic Revolutionary Organization attacked the monarchy, telling listeners, "Kings despoil a country when they enter it and make the noblest of its people its meanest ... This is the nature of monarchy, which is rejected by Islam."[176]
By 1993, Saudi Shia had abandoned uncompromising demands and some of al-Saffar's followers met with King Fahd with promises made for reform. In 2005 the new King Abdullah also relaxed some restrictions on the Shia.[177] However Shia continue to be arrested for commemorating Ashura as of 2006.[178] In December 2006, amidst escalating tensions in Iraq, 38 high ranking Saudi clerics called on Sunni Muslims around the world to "mobilise against Shiites".[179]
Shia Grand Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi is reported to have responded:
The Wahhabis ignore the occupation of Islam's first Qiblah by Israel, and instead focus on declaring Takfiring fatwas against Shias.[180]
Saudi Sunni
A large fraction of the foreign Sunni extremists who have entered Iraq to fight against Shia and the American occupation are thought to be Saudis. According to one estimate, of the approximately 1,200 foreign fighters captured in Syria between summer 2003 and summer 2005, 85% were Saudis.[103]Another reflection of grassroots Wahhabi or Saudi antipathy to Shia was a statement by Saudi cleric Nasir al-Umar, who accused Iraqi Shias of close ties to the United States and argued that both were enemies of Muslims everywhere.[181]
Al-Qaeda
Some Wahabi groups[which ones?], often labeled[by whom?] as takfiri and sometimes linked[by whom?] to Al-Qaeda, have even advocated the persecution of the Shia as heretics.[182][183] Such groups have been allegedly responsible for violent attacks and suicide bombings at Shi'a gatherings at mosques and shrines, most notably in Iraq during the Ashura mourning ceremonies where hundreds of Shias were killed in coordinated suicide bombings,[184][185][186] but also in Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, in a video message, Al-Qaeda deputy Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri directed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, not to attack civilian targets but to focus on the occupation troops. His call seems to have been ignored, or swept away in the increasing tensions of Iraq under occupation.United States
In late 2006 or early 2007, in what journalist Seymour Hersh called The Redirection, the United States changed its policy in the Muslim world, shifting its support from the Shia to the Sunni, with the goal of "containing" Iran and as a by-product bolstering Sunni extremist groups.[187] Richard Engel, who is an NBC News Chief Foreign Correspondent, wrote an article in late 2011 alleging that the United States Government is pro-Sunni and anti-Shia. During the Iraq War, the United States feared that a Shiite-led, Iran-friendly Iraq could have major consequences for American national security. However, nothing can be done about this as Iraq's Shiite government were democratically elected.[188] Shadi Bushra of Stanford University wrote that the United States’ support of the Sunni monarchy during the Bahraini uprising is the latest in a long history of US support to keep the Shiites in check. The United States fears that Shiite rule in the Gulf will lead to anti-US and anti-Western sentiment as well as Iranian influence in the Arab majority states.[189]One analyst told CNN that the US strategy on putting pressure on Iran by arming its Sunni neighbors is not a new strategy for the United States. "Remember what President Bush tried to do was kind of create a Sunni axis against the Shi’a Iran, by arming our Sunni allies, our so-called moderate Sunni allies...I’m not exactly sure if that’s the best idea going forward, because as you know, this is not the Middle East that we were dealing with during the Bush administration. We no longer have just a handful of dictators that we can tell what to do."[190]
Efforts to foster Sunni–Shia unity
In a special interview broadcast on Al Jazeera on February 14, 2007, former Iranian president and chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council of Iran, Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and highly influential Sunni scholar Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, "stressed the impermissibility of the fighting between the Sunnis and the Shi’is" and the need to "be aware of the conspiracies of the forces of hegemony and Zionism which aim to weaken [Islam] and tear it apart in Iraq."[66]Even on this occasion there were differences, with Rafsanjani openly asking "more than once who started" the inter-Muslim killing in Iraq, and Al-Qaradawi denying claims by Rafsanjani that he knew where "those arriving to Iraq to blow Shi’i shrines up are coming from".[66]
International Islamic Unity Conference
Saudi-Iran summit
In a milestone for the two countries' relations, on March 3, 2007 King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad held an extraordinary summit meeting. They displayed mutual warmth with hugs and smiles for cameras and promised "a thaw in relations between the two regional powers but stopped short of agreeing on any concrete plans to tackle the escalating sectarian and political crises throughout the Middle East."[191]On his return to Tehran, Ahmadinejad declared that:
Both Iran and Saudi Arabia are aware of the enemies' conspiracies. We decided to take measures to confront such plots. Hopefully, this will strengthen Muslim countries against oppressive pressure by the imperialist front.[192]Saudi officials had no comment about Ahmadinejad's statements, but the Saudi official government news agency did say:
The two leaders affirmed that the greatest danger presently threatening the Islamic nation is the attempt to fuel the fire of strife between Sunni and Shiite Muslims, and that efforts must concentrate on countering these attempts and closing ranks,[193]Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud bin Faisal bin Abdul-Aziz said:
The two parties have agreed to stop any attempt aimed at spreading sectarian strife in the region.[194]
See also
Al-Qa‘ida in Iraq (AQI)
Al-Qa‘ida in Iraq (AQI), also known as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and more recently the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), was established in April 2004 by long-time Sunni extremist Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi, who the same year pledged his group’s allegiance to Usama Bin Ladin. AQI targeted Coalition forces and civilians using tactics such as vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), suicide bombers, and executions of hostages by beheading and other means, attempting to pressure countries and foreign companies to leave Iraq, push Iraqis to stop supporting the United States and the Iraqi Government, and attract additional cadre to its ranks.
Al-Zarqawi was killed in a US airstrike on 7 June 2006. The new leader of AQI, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, announced in October 2006 the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq, led by Iraqi national Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, in an attempt to politicize AQI’s terrorist activities and place an “Iraqi face” on their efforts.
In 2007 AQI’s continued targeting and repression of Sunni civilians caused a widespread backlash—known as the Sunni Awakening—against the group. The development of the Awakening
Councils—composed primarily of Sunni tribal and local community leaders—coincided with a surge in Coalition forces and Iraqi Government operations that denied AQI its safehavens, restricting the organization’s freedom of movement and resulting in a decreased attack tempo beginning in mid-2007.
High-profile attacks in 2009 and 2010 demonstrated not just the group’s relevance in the wake of the Coalition withdrawal from Iraqi cities in 2009, but also its efforts to posture itself to take advantage of the changing security environment. Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Umar al-Baghdadi were killed in April 2010, marking a significant loss for the organization.
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi became AQI’s next leader, and the group has continued conducting high-profile attacks in Iraq and has made efforts to expand within the region. Suicide bombers and car bombs during the first half of 2013 caused about 1,000 Iraqi deaths, the highest monthly violent death tolls since 2008. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in April 2013 declared the group was operating in Syria and changed its public name to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. When al-Baghdadi announced the creation of the ISIL, he claimed AQI had founded the al-Nusrah Front in Syria and that the groups were merging. Al-Nusrah Front, however, denied the merger and publicly pledged allegiance to al-Qa‘ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.
AQI expanded its targeting outside of Iraq in August 2005 by attempting a rocket attack on a US Navy ship in the Port of Aqaba, Jordan, and in November 2005 with the bombing of three hotels in Amman that left 67 dead and more than 150 injured. The group’s official spokesperson and its leader in 2012 made vague threats against Americans everywhere. The arrests in May 2011 of two AQI-affiliated Iraqi refugees in Kentucky highlight the potential threat inside the United States from people associated with AQI.
Boko Haram
In July 2010, Boko Haram’s former second-in-command, Abubakar Shekau, appeared in a video claiming leadership of the group and threatening attacks on Western influences in Nigeria. Later that month, Shekau issued a second statement expressing solidarity with al-Qa‘ida and threatening the United States. Under Shekau’s leadership, the group has continued to demonstrate growing operational capabilities, with an increasing use of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against soft targets. The group set off its first vehicle-borne IED in June 2011. On 26 August 2011, Boko Haram conducted its first attack against a Western interest—a vehicle-bomb attack on UN headquarters in Abuja—killing at least 23 people and injuring more than 80. A purported Boko Haram spokesman claimed responsibility for the attack and promised future targeting of US and Nigerian Government interests.
Since late 2011, the group has conducted multiple attacks per week against a wide range of targets, including Christians, Nigerian security and police forces, the media, schools, and politicians. Since late 2012, Boko Haram and its splinter group Ansaru have claimed responsibility for three kidnappings of Westerners, raising their international profile and emphasizing the growing threat they pose to Western and regional interests. As of July 2013 Ansaru was holding a French hostage. Also in 2013, Boko Haram expanded its activity in neighboring countries and continues to clash with Nigerian military forces trying to oust it from northeastern Nigeria.
Boko Haram
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
| جماعة أهل السنة للدعوة والجهاد People Committed to the Prophet's Teachings for Propagation and Jihad |
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|---|---|
 |
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| Active | 2002–present |
| Ideology | |
| Leaders | Abubakar Shekau Mohammed Yusuf † |
| Area of operations | Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad |
| Strength | Up to 9,000+[1] |
| Opponents | |
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Boko Haram killed more than 5,000 civilians between July 2009 and June 2014, including at least 2,000 in the first half of 2014, in attacks occurring mainly in northeast, northcentral and central states of Nigeria.[5][6][7] Corruption in the security services and human rights abuses committed by them have hampered efforts to counter the unrest.[8][9] Since 2009 Boko Haram have abducted more than 500 women and children, including the kidnapping of 276 schoolgirls from Chibok in April 2014.[10] Nearly 650,000 people had fled the conflict zone by August 2014, an increase of 200,000 since May.[11]
After its founding in 2002, Boko Haram's increasing radicalisation led to a violent uprising in July 2009 in which its leader was executed. Its unexpected resurgence, following a mass prison break in September 2010, was accompanied by increasingly sophisticated attacks, initially against soft targets, and progressing in 2011 to include suicide bombings on police buildings and the United Nations headquarters in Abuja. The government's establishment of a state of emergency at the beginning of 2012, extended in the following year to cover the entire northeast of the country, resulted in a marked increase in both security force abuses and militant attacks. The Nigerian military proved ineffective in countering the insurgency, hampered by an entrenched culture of official corruption. Since mid-2014, the militants have been in control of swathes of territory in and around their home state of Borno, but have not captured the capital of the state, Maiduguri, where the group was originally based.
Contents
Name
The official name is جماعة أهل السنة للدعوة والجهاد Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'Awati Wal-Jihad, a.k.a. Jama'atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad, a.k.a. Jama'atu Ahlus-Sunna Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad, meaning "People Committed to the Prophet's Teachings for Propagation and Jihad."[12]The group was originally also known as 'Yusifiyya', after its leader, Mohammed Yusuf, until his death in 2009.[13] The name 'Boko Haram', 'Western education is forbidden', is from the Arabic حَرَام ḥarām, 'forbidden'; and the Hausa word boko [the first vowel is long, the second pronounced in a low tone], 'fake' (defined as "(a) Doing anything to create impression that one is better off, or that thing is of better quality or larger in amount than is the case, (b) anything so treated ... etc.")[14][15]
Western education has always been dismissed as ilimin boko; a school that teaches Western education is makaranta boko. The uncompromising hostility of the northern Nigerian Muslims towards anything remotely perceived as foreign, a mindset of boko haram that has in the past been applied even towards vocal recitation of the Quran, has historically been a source of friction with the Muslims from the middle of the country.[14][15][16]
Boko Haram has also been translated as "non-Moslem education is forbidden,"[17][18] "Western influence is a sin,"[19] and "Westernization is sacrilege."[7]
History
Background
Kano
Main article: Fourth Nigerian Republic
Mohammed Yusuf founded the sect that became known as Boko Haram in 2002 in Maiduguri, the capital of the north-eastern state of Borno, establishing a religious complex with a school which attracted poor Muslim families from across Nigeria and neighbouring countries. The center had the political goal of creating an Islamic state, and became a recruiting ground for jihadis. By denouncing the police and state corruption Yusuf attracted followers from unemployed youths.[21][22][23][24]
He is reported to have used the existing infrastructure in Borno of the Izala Society (Jama'at Izalatil Bidiawa Iqamatus Sunnah), a popular conservative Islamic sect, to recruit members, before breaking away to form his own faction. The Izala were originally welcomed into government, along with people sympathetic to Yusuf. The Council of Ulama advised the government and the Nigerian Television Authority not to broadcast Yusuf's preaching, but their warnings were ignored. Yusuf's arrests elevated him to hero status.[13]
Borno's Deputy Governor Alhaji Dibal has claimed that Al Qaida had ties with Boko Haram, but broke them when they decided that Yusuf was an unreliable person.[13] The violence of Boko Haram has also been linked to the militancy of the Arewa People's Congress, the militia wing of the Arewa Consultative Forum, the main political group representing the interests of northern Nigeria. For decades, Northern politicians and academics have voiced their fundamental opposition to Western education. The ACF is a well-funded group with military and intelligence expertise, and is considered capable of engaging in military action, including covert bombing. Co-founder of the APC, Sagir Mohammed, has stated:
"We believe we have the capacity, the willpower to go to any part of Nigeria to protect our Northern brothers in distress ... If it becomes necessary, if we have to use violence, we have to use it to save our people. If it means jihad, we will launch our jihad."[25]
Ideology
Nigerian states with sharia law
Boko Haram kill people who engage in practices seen as un-Islamic, such as drinking alcohol.[37] In a 2009 BBC interview Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram (whose name means 'Western education is forbidden'), claimed that such education "spoils the belief in one God". He also said, "Like rain. We believe it is a creation of God rather than an evaporation caused by the sun that condenses and becomes rain ... Like saying the world is a sphere. If it runs contrary to the teachings of Allah, we reject it. We also reject the theory of Darwinism."[40]
According to Borno Sufi Imam Sheik Fatahi, Yusuf was trained by Kano Salafi Izala Sheik Ja'afar Mahmud Adamu, who called him the "leader of young people"; the two split some time in 2002-4. They both preached in Maiduguri's Indimi Mosque, which was attended by the deputy governor of Borno.[13][41] Many of the group were reportedly inspired by Mohammed Marwa, known as Maitatsine ('He who curses others'), a self-proclaimed prophet (annabi, a Hausa word usually used only to describe the founder of Islam), born in Northern Cameroon, who condemned the reading of books other than the Quran.[42][43][44][14]
Boko Haram conducted its operations more or less peacefully during the first seven years of its existence, withdrawing from society into remote north-eastern areas. The government repeatedly ignored warnings about the increasingly militant character of the organization.[26][45] In 2009 police began an investigation into the group code-named 'Operation Flush'. On 26 July, security forces arrested nine Boko Haram members and confiscated weapons and bomb-making equipment. Either this, or a clash with police during a funeral procession, led to revenge attacks on police and widespread rioting. A Joint Military Task Force operation was launched in response, and by 30 July more than 700 people had been killed, mostly Boko Haram members, and police stations, prisons, government offices, schools and churches had been destroyed.[7][36]:98–102[46][47] Yusuf was arrested, and died in custody "while trying to escape". He was succeeded as leader by Abubakar Shekau, formerly his second-in-command.[48][49] A classified cable sent from the US Embassy in Abuja in November 2009, available on WikiLeaks, is illuminating:[13]
"[Borno political and religious leaders] ... asserted that the state and federal government responded appropriately and, apart from the opposition party, overwhelmingly supported Yusuf's death without misgivings over the extrajudicial killing. Security remained a concern in Borno, with residents expressing concern about importation of arms and exchanges of religious messages across porous international borders. The government has proposed a preaching board which will certify Muslim preachers, but it has not yet been inaugurated. While most contacts described Borno as a "State of Peace" and did not expect additional attacks, the Northeast remained vulnerable to violence and extremist attacks due to lack of employment opportunities for youth, exasperated by ethnic and religious tensions."
Campaign of violence
Under Shekau's leadership, the group continuously improved its operational capabilities. After launching a string of IED attacks against soft targets, and its first vehicle-borne IED attack in June 2011, killing 6 at the Abuja police HQ, in August Boko Haram bombed the UN HQ in Abuja, the first time they had struck a Western target. A spokesman claiming responsibility for the attack, in which 11 UN staff members died as well as 12 others with more than 100 injured, warned of future planned attacks on US and Nigerian government interests. Speaking soon after the US embassy's announcement of the arrival in the country of the FBI, he went on to announce Boko Haram's terms for negotiation: the release of all imprisoned members. The increased sophistication of the group led observers to speculate that Boko Haram was affiliated with AQIM, which was known to be active in Niger.[50][51][52][53][54][55]
Boko Haram have maintained a steady rate of attacks since 2011, striking a wide range of targets, multiple times per week. They have attacked politicians, religious leaders, security forces and civilian targets. The tactic of suicide bombing, used in the two attacks in the capital on the police and UN HQs, was new to Nigeria, and alien to its mercenary culture. In Africa as a whole, it had only been used by al-Shabab in Somalia and, to a lesser extent, AQIM. Since early 2013 Boko Haram have increasingly operated in Northern Cameroon, and have been involved in skirmishes along the borders of Chad and Niger. They have been linked to a number of kidnappings, often reportedly in association with the splinter group Ansaru, drawing them a higher level of international attention. Beginning in August 2014, they changed their "hit-and-run" tactics, instead occupying swathes of territory in northeast Nigeria from which the increasingly beleaguered Nigerian military were unable or unwilling to expel them.[2][7][53][56][57][58]
Inauguration
Main article: Nigerian presidential election, 2011
Within hours of Goodluck Jonathan's presidential inauguration in May 2011, Boko Haram carried out a series of bombings in Bauchi, Zaria
and Abuja. The most successful of these was the attack on the army
barracks in Bauchi. A spokesman for the group told BBC Hausa that the
attack had been carried out, as a test of loyalty, by serving members of
the military hoping to join the group. This charge was later refuted by
an army spokesman, who claimed, "This is not a banana republic".
However, on 8 January 2012 the President would announce that Boko Haram
had in reality infiltrated both the army and the police, as well as the
executive, parliamentary and legislative branches of government. Boko
Haram's spokesman also claimed responsibility for the killing outside
his home in Maiduguri of the politician Abba Anas Ibn Umar Garbai, the
younger brother of the Shehu of Borno, who was the second most prominent
Muslim in the country after the Sultan of Sokoto.
He added, "We are doing what we are doing to fight injustice, if they
stop their satanic ways of doing things and the injustices, we would
stop what we are doing."[59][60]This was one of several political and religious assassinations Boko Haram carried out that year, with the presumed intention of correcting injustices in the group's home state of Borno. Meanwhile, the trail of massacres continued relentlessly, apparently leading the country towards civil war. By the end of 2011, these conflicting strategies led observers to question the group's cohesion; comparisons were drawn with the diverse motivations of the militant factions of the oil-rich Niger Delta. Adding to the confusion, in November, the State Security Service announced that four criminal syndicates were operating under the name 'Boko Haram'.[56][61][62][63]
The common theme throughout the northeast was the targeting of police, who were regularly massacred at work or in drive-by shootings at their homes, either in revenge for the killing of Yusuf, or as representatives of an illegitimate state apparatus, or for no particular reason. Five officers were arrested for Yusuf's murder, which had no noticeable effect on the level of unrest. Opportunities for criminal enterprise flourished. Hundreds of police were dead and more than 60 police stations had been attacked by mid-2012. The government's response to this self-reinforcing trend towards insecurity was not to restructure or reorientate the security services, but rather to invest heavily in security equipment, spending $5.5 billion, 20% of their overall budget, on bomb detection units, communications and transport; and $470 million on a Chinese CCTV system for Abuja, which has failed in its purpose of detecting or deterring acts of terror.[62][64][65][66][67][68]
The election defeat of former military dictator Muhammadu Buhari increased religious political tension, as it broke the terms of a tacit agreement whereby, after two terms, the presidency was expected to change hands to a northern, Muslim candidate, thus distributing the country's oil wealth more fairly, through the customary corrupt channels. Sectarian riots engulfed the twelve northern states of the country during the three days following the election, leaving more than 800 dead and 65,000 displaced. The subsequent campaign of violence by Boko Haram culminated in a string of bombings across the country on Christmas Day. In the outskirts of Abuja, 37 died in a church which had its roof blown off. "Cars were in flames and bodies littered everywhere," one resident commented, words that were to be repeated in nearly all press reports delivering information about the aftermath of the bombings around the globe. Similar Christmas events had occurred in previous years. Jonathan declared a state of emergency on New Year's Eve in local government areas of Jos, Borno, Yobe, and Niger, and closed the international border in the northeast. On the next day, he announced that he was scrapping fuel subsidies. The IMF had recommended the move, but Nigerians believed that the savings of $8 billion a year would be stolen. Fuel prices quickly doubled, leading to widespread strikes and protests which were quelled a fortnight later, with army checkpoints throughout the commercial capital Lagos and police firing live ammunition and teargas.[69][70][71][72][73][74][75][76][77]
State of emergency
Lagos, sub-Saharan Africa's biggest city
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch published reports in 2012 which were widely quoted by government agencies and the media, based on research conducted over the course of the conflict in the worst affected areas of the country. The NGOs were critical of both security forces and Boko Haram. HRW stated "Boko Haram should immediately cease all attacks, and threats of attacks, that cause loss of life, injury, and destruction of property. The Nigerian government should take urgent measures to address the human rights abuses that have helped fuel the violent militancy." According to the 2012 US Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices,[9]
"... serious human rights problems included extrajudicial killings by security forces, including summary executions; security force torture, rape, and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of prisoners, detainees, and criminal suspects; harsh and life-threatening prison and detention center conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; prolonged pretrial detention; denial of fair public trial; executive influence on the judiciary; infringements on citizens' privacy rights; restrictions on freedom of speech, press, assembly, religion, and movement ..."In late 2013 AI received 'credible' information that over 950 inmates had died in custody, mostly in detention centres in Maiduguri and Damaturu, within the first half of the year. Official state corruption was also documented in December 2013 by the UK Home Office:[85][86]
"On October 9, witnesses in Maiduguri claimed members of the JTF "Restore Order," [a vigilante group] based in Maiduguri, went on a killing spree after a suspected Boko Haram bomb killed an officer. Media reported the JTF killed 20 to 45 civilians and razed 50 to 100 houses in the neighborhood. The JTF commander in Maiduguri denied the allegations. On November 2, witnesses claimed the JTF shot and killed up to 40 people during raids in Maiduguri. The army claimed it dismissed some officers from the military as a result of alleged abuses committed in Maiduguri, but there were no known formal prosecutions in Maiduguri by year's end."
"Credible reports also indicated ... uniformed military personnel and paramilitary mobile police carried out summary executions, assaults, torture, and other abuses throughout Bauchi, Borno, Kano, Kaduna, Plateau, and Yobe states ... The national police, army, and other security forces committed extrajudicial killings and used lethal and excessive force to apprehend criminals and suspects, as well as to disperse protesters. Authorities generally did not hold police accountable for the use of excessive or deadly force or for the deaths of persons in custody. Security forces generally operated with impunity in the illegal apprehension, detention, and sometimes extrajudicial execution of criminal suspects. The reports of state or federal panels of inquiry investigating suspicious deaths remained unpublished."
"There were no new developments in the case of five police officers accused of executing Muhammad Yusuf in 2009 at a state police headquarters. In July 2011 authorities arraigned five police officers in the federal high court in Abuja for the murder of Yusuf. The court granted bail to four of the officers, while one remained in custody."
"Police use of excessive force, including use of live ammunition, to disperse demonstrators resulted in numerous killings during the year. For example, although the January fuel subsidy demonstrations generally remained peaceful, security forces reportedly fired on protesters in various states across the country during those demonstrations, resulting in 10 to 15 deaths and an unknown number of wounded."
"Despite some improvements resulting from the closure of police checkpoints in many parts of the country, states with an increased security presence due to the activities of Boko Haram experienced a rise in violence and lethal force at police and military roadblocks."
"Continuing abductions of civilians by criminal groups occurred in the Niger Delta and Southeast ... Police and other security forces were often implicated in the kidnapping schemes."
"Although the constitution and law prohibit such practices and provide for punishment of such abuses, torture is not criminalized, and security service personnel, including police, military, and State Security Service (SSS) officers, regularly tortured, beat, and abused demonstrators, criminal suspects, detainees, and convicted prisoners. Police mistreated civilians to extort money. The law prohibits the introduction into trials of evidence and confessions obtained through torture; however, police often used torture to extract confessions."[84]
"The NPF, SSS, and military report to civilian authorities; however, these security services periodically act outside of civilian control. The government lack effective mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse and corruption. The NPF remain susceptible to corruption, commit human rights abuses, and generally operate with impunity in the apprehension, illegal detention, and sometimes execution of criminal suspects. The SSS also commit human rights abuses, particularly in restricting freedom of speech and press. In some cases private citizens or the government brought charges against perpetrators of human rights abuses in these units. However, most cases lingered in court or went unresolved after an initial investigation."
State of emergency extended
In April 2014, Boko Haram kidnapped 276 female students from Chibok, Borno. More than 50 of them soon escaped, but the remainder have not been released. Instead, Shekau, who has a reward of $7 million offered by the US DOS since June 2013 for information leading to his capture, announced his intention of selling them into slavery. The incident brought Boko Haram extended global media attention, much of it focused on the pronouncements of the US First Lady. Faced with outspoken condemnation for his perceived incompetence, and detailed accusations from AI of state collusion, Jonathan famously responded by hiring a Washington PR firm.[90][91][92][93][94][95][96][97]
Parents of the missing schoolgirls and those who had escaped were kept waiting until July to meet with the President, which caused them concern. In October, the government announced the girls' imminent release, but the information proved unreliable. The announcement to the media of a peace agreement and the imminent release of all the missing girls was followed, days later by a video message in which Shekau stated that no such meeting had taken place and that the girls had been "married off". The announcement to the media, unaccompanied by any evidence of the reality of the agreement, was thought by analysts to have been a political ploy by the president to raise his popularity before his confirmation of his candidacy in the 2015 general election. Earlier in the year, the girls' plight had featured on "#BringBackOurGirls" political campaign posters on the streets of the capital, which the President denied knowledge of and soon took down after news of criticism surfaced. These posters, which were interpreted, to the dismay of campaigners for the girls' recapture, as being designed to benefit from the fame of the kidnapping, had also been part of Jonathan's "pre-presidential campaign". In September, "#BringBackGoodluck2015" campaign posters again drew criticism.[98] The official announcement of the President's candidacy was made before cheering crowds in Abuja on 11 November.[99]
The US Bureau of Counterterrorism provides the following summary of Boko Haram's 2013 foreign operations:
In February 2013, Boko Haram was responsible for kidnapping seven French tourists in the far north of Cameroon. In November 2013, Boko Haram members kidnapped a French priest in Cameroon. In December 2013, Boko Haram gunmen reportedly attacked civilians in several areas of northern Cameroon. Security forces from Chad and Niger also reportedly partook in skirmishes against suspected Boko Haram members along Nigeria's borders. In 2013, the group also kidnapped eight French citizens in northern Cameroon and obtained ransom payments for their release.[2]Boko Haram has often managed to evade the Nigerian army by retreating into the hills around the border with Cameroon, whose army is apparently unwilling to confront them. Nigeria, Chad and Niger had formed a Multinational Joint Task Force in 1998. In February 2012, Cameroon signed an agreement with Nigeria to establish a Joint Trans-Border Security Committee, which was inaugurated in November 2013, when Cameroon announced plans to conduct "coordinated but separate" border patrols in 2014. It convened again in July 2014 to further improve cooperation between the two countries.[100][101][102][103][104]
In 2014 Boko Haram continued to increase its presence in northern Cameroon. On 16 May, ten Chinese workers were abducted in a raid on a construction company camp in Waza, near the Nigerian border. Vehicles and explosives were also taken in the raid, and one Cameroon soldier was killed. Cameroon's antiterrorist Rapid Intervention Battalion attempted to intervene but were vastly outnumbered.[105] In July, the Vice-President's home village was attacked by around 200 militants; his wife was kidnapped, along with the Sultan of Kolofata and his family. At least 15 people, including soldiers and police, were killed in the raid. The Vice-President's wife was subsequently released in October, along with 26 others including the ten Chinese construction workers who had been captured in May; authorities made no comment about any ransom, which the Cameroon government had previously claimed it never pays.[106] In a separate attack, nine bus passengers and a soldier were shot dead and the son of a local chief was kidnapped. Hundreds of local youths are suspected to have been recruited. In August, the remote Nigerian border town of Gwoza was overrun and held by the group. In response to the increased militant activity, the Cameroonian President sacked two senior military officers and sent his army chief with 1000 reinforcements to the northern border region.[107][108][109]
Between May and July 2014, 8,000 Nigerian refugees arrived in the country, up to 25% suffering from acute malnutrition. Cameroon, which ranked 150 out of 186 on the 2012 UNDP HDI, currently (August 2014) hosts 107,000 refugees fleeing unrest in the CAR, expected to increase to 180,000 by the end of the year.[110][111][112] A further 11,000 Nigerian refugees crossed the border into Cameroon and Chad during August.[113]
Occupation
Current Situation (as of 5 December 2014)
On 17 October, the Chief of the Defence Staff announced that a ceasefire had been brokered, stating "I have accordingly directed the service chiefs to ensure immediate compliance with this development in the field." Despite a lack of confirmation from the militants, the announcement was publicised in newspaper headlines around the world. Within 48 hours, however, the same publications were reporting that Boko Haram attacks had nevertheless continued unabated. It was reported that factionalisation would make such a deal particularly difficult to achieve.[118][119][120]
Mubi in Adamawa
On 13 December, Boko Haram reportedly attacked the village of Gumsuri in Borno, killed 32–35 people, and kidnapped 172–185 women and children.[129][130][131] The incident was not announced for several days, until village survivors reached Maiduguri.[131]
Perception and assessment
International connections
The US State Department designated Boko Haram and Ansaru as terrorist organisations in November 2013, citing various reasons including links with AQIM, "thousands of deaths in northeast and central Nigeria over the last several years, including targeted killings of civilians", and Ansaru's 2013 kidnapping and execution of seven international construction workers. In the statement from the Department it was noted, however, "These designations are an important and appropriate step, but only one tool in what must be a comprehensive approach by the Nigerian government to counter these groups through a combination of law enforcement, political, and development efforts [sic]."[132][3] The State Department had resisted earlier calls to designate the group, after the 2011 UN bombing.[133] As of June 2014, Boko Haram is not currently believed by the US government to be affiliated to al Qaeda.[4]In March 2014, it was reported that Turkey had transported arms to Kano International Airport, presumably to supply Boko Haram. In an official statement, the 49% government-owned Turkish Airlines denied transporting arms to Nigeria; however, this was contradicted by a Nigerian Navy spokesman, who confirmed that the navy had received arms shipments in Lagos from the airline. An executive of the airline was allegedly recorded in a phone conversation with an adviser to Turkish prime minister Recep Erdogan expressing concerns about the shipment, saying "I do not know whether these [weapons] will kill Muslims or Christians. I feel sinful."[134]
The Nigerian government claims that Boko Haram is "the West Africa branch of the world-wide Al-Qaida movement with connections with Al’shabb in Somalia and AQIM in Mali." They deny having committed human rights abuses in the conflict, and therefore oppose US restrictions on arms sales which they see as being based on the US mis-application of the Leahy Law.[135][136] On 12 November 2014 the US State department said they had refused to sell Cobra helicopters to Nigeria, citing concerns over the Nigerian military's ability to use and maintain the Cobras. On 1 December the US embassy in Abuja announced that the US had discontinued the training of a Nigerian battalion, at the request of the Nigerian government. A spokesman for the US state department said "We regret premature termination of this training, as it was to be the first in a larger planned project that would have trained additional units with the goal of helping the Nigerian Army build capacity to counter Boko Haram. The U.S. government will continue other aspects of the extensive bilateral security relationship, as well as all other assistance programs, with Nigeria. The U.S. government is committed to the long tradition of partnership with Nigeria and will continue to engage future requests for cooperation and training."[137][138] Cameroon's foreign minister announced on 30 November that a coalition force to fight terrorism, which would include 3,500 soldiers from Benin, Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria, would soon be operational.[139]
Financing
Boko Haram gets funding from bank robberies and kidnapping ransoms.[79][140] Any funding they may have received in the past from al-Qaeda affiliates is insignificant compared to the estimated $1 million ransom for each wealthy Nigerian kidnapped. Cash is moved around by couriers, making it impossible to track, and communication is conducted face-to-face. Their mode of operation, which is thought to include paying local youths to track army movements, is such that little funding is required to carry out attacks.[141] Equipment captured from fleeing soldiers keeps the group constantly well-supplied.[142] In February 2012, recently arrested officials revealed that while the organization initially relied on donations from members, its links with AQIM opened it up to funding from groups in Saudi Arabia and the UK.[143][144] The group also extorts local governments. A spokesman of Boko Haram claimed that Kano state governor Ibrahim Shekarau and Bauchi state governor Isa Yuguda had paid them monthly.[145][146] In the past, Nigerian officials have been criticized for being unable to trace much of the funding that Boko Haram has received.[147] Boko Haram has occasionally been connected in media reports with cocaine trafficking;[148][149] however, there appears to be a lack of evidence regarding this means of funding. James Cockayne, formerly Co-Director of the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation and Senior Fellow at the International Peace Institute, wrote in 2012,[150][151]"Given their appreciation of the contested nature of much African governance, it comes as something of a surprise that Carrier and Klantschnig [Review of Africa and the War on Drugs, 2012] fiercely downplay the impact that cocaine trafficking is having on West African governance. On the basis of just three case studies (Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho and Nigeria) the authors conclude that 'state complicity' in the African drug trade is 'rare', and the dominant paradigm is 'repression'. As a result, they radically understate the close involvement of political and military actors in drug trafficking – particularly in West African cocaine trafficking – and overlook the growing power of drug money in African electoral politics, local and traditional governance, and security."
Adversaries
The Nigerian military is, in the words of a former British military attaché speaking in 2014, "a shadow of what it's reputed to have once been. It's fallen apart." They are short of basic equipment, including radios and armoured vehicles. Morale is said to be low. The country's defense budget accounts for more than a third of the security budget of $5.8 billion, but only 10% is allocated to capital spending.[152] In a 2014 US DOD assessment, funds are being "skimmed off the top", troops are "showing signs of real fear," and are "afraid to even engage."[4]:9In July 2014, Nigeria was estimated to have had the highest number of terrorist killings in the world over the past year, 3477, killed in 146 attacks.[153] The governor of Borno, Kashim Shettima, of the opposition ANPP, said in February 2014:[154]
"Boko Haram are better armed and are better motivated than our own troops. Given the present state of affairs, it is absolutely impossible for us to defeat Boko Haram."
