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Thursday, May 7, 2015

Ukrainian crisis

 http://www.rferl.org/http://www.rferl.org/contentlive/liveblog/26805126.html

 www.usnews.com

A Geopolitical Game Changer

The Ukraine crisis has strengthened Western resolve and left Russia in a vulnerable position.

 www.usnews.com

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This isn't working out as planned, Mr. Putin.
+ More
 
The Associated PressThe Ukraine crisis is accelerating shifts in power. Russia is a net geopolitical loser; Europe is emerging stronger; NATO is starting to boost defenses; and China sees new openings. These changes are reshaping the international landscape. Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 shocked the West, but its reaction was muted. Russian peacekeepers already patrolled the separatist areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Although evidence of Russia’s preparations for war was evident months before, Georgia contributed to the initiation of the conflict. Ukraine is different. Russia’s seizure of Crimea and parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions has stirred outrage in the West. Moscow falsified unrest in Ukraine to justify an unprovoked assault, violating solemn international obligations. The Kremlin seeks to carve a coercive sphere of influence by destabilizing neighbors. Russia is overplaying its hand, however, and losing ground on multiple fronts. Hobbled by corruption and high dependence on hydrocarbon exports, the economy suffers also from growing state interference, a steep oil and soon to be gas price drop, and Western sanctions. Yet, Europe is strengthening its relations with Russia’s western neighbors, NATO is being revitalized, and its defense budgets will grow. Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling is angering Europeans, not scaring them.
[READ: The Spy Who Brought Back the Cold War]
Meanwhile, Beijing is more welcome in anxious Central Asia. China is making huge infrastructure investments and pulling gas eastward via pipelines that redraw geopolitical boundaries. If a nuclear deal is sealed with Iran and economic sanctions eased, its energy exports will grow and compete on the world market against those from Russia and other producers.
Russia can take steps to recover from self-inflicted wounds but is not yet doing so. A full withdrawal from eastern Ukraine would end many crippling Western sanctions. The cessation of intimidating military maneuvers and the use of gas as a political weapon would improve ties with Europe. Allowing the new Eurasian Economic Union (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and soon Kyrgyzstan) to become a depoliticized, rules-based entity would bring economic benefit and boost land-based trade between China, Europe and the Middle East. Slashing state economic interference and corruption would boost Russian entrepreneurship and productivity.
Rather than seizing these opportunities, the current policies of Russia jeopardize its substantial interests in Europe. The European Union is Russia’s largest trading partner and accounts for three-quarters of Russia's inward foreign direct investment stocks. EU competition policy is stopping Russia from building a gas pipeline via the Black Sea that could box in customers. An EU energy union would further reduce risks of undue reliance on Russian energy.
[READ: Putin in Cairo]
With the emergence of the Ukraine crisis, Germany for the first time is leading the West – not just Europe – in dealing with Moscow on a major security issue. The Minsk II accord reached in February is replete with ambiguities, suggesting that Berlin and Paris lack the necessary clout to manage prime-time security issues on their own. On the eve of the Minsk II talks German Chancellor Angela Merkel weakened her bargaining leverage by averring that progress in Ukraine could not be “achieved by more weapons.”Without meaningful Western military aid, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko acceded to unreasonable demands from Russian President Vladimir Putin. Partly as a result, Ukraine’s eastern front remains vulnerable.
On April 15 German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble beseeched America to do more to help Europe address the Ukraine crisis: “We know that we need the United States.” One way to do this is to fix the Normandy format used in the Minsk ceasefire talks (France, Germany, Russia, Ukraine). This format puts too much burden on Germany and France; it should be augmented with U.S., EU and perhaps Polish and U.K. participation.
Aggression in Ukraine has given NATO new relevance. It has launched a constant rotation of air, maritime and ground presence on the alliance’s eastern border. America is strengthening ground force presence in Poland and the Baltics. A number of European countries are increasing their defense spending and efficiency while focusing more on territorial defense. But recent calls for a European army ring hollow. Too many Europeans still think any crisis can be solved by diplomacy alone; history suggests that negotiating is more effective when backed by the willingness to use force if necessary. France understands this, but the U.K. ought to recover its will to fully engage and not act as if it is halfway out of Europe.
[SEE: Editorial Cartoons on Vladimir Putin and Russia]
Many Europeans, especially in Central and East Europe, see the United States as a security guarantor, despite some popular anti-Americanism. U.S. reconnaissance and intelligence are essential to monitoring the Minsk II ceasefire. If Russia were sharply to expand aggression – heightened violence this week in eastern Ukraine is worrying – America and several European allies would likely rush military aid to Ukraine with the aim of improving defenses and raising the costs of aggression. Additionally, sanctions would be expanded. Regardless, Ukraine urgently needs more aid for governance and security sector reform.
Russia’s aggression abroad and repression at home have altered the basic assumptions of earlier Western policy. By misjudging the tolerance for aggression in Europe, Moscow is bringing on the encirclement it fears. The West is now better prepared to deal with any further aggression and more confident that Ukraine’s future will be as part of an enlarged Europe. 

 Ukrainian crisis

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 

Ukrainian crisis
Petro Poroshenko addresses Euromaidan.jpg
Main topics
Related topics
Ukraine Russia
Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation#Breakaway republic Donetsk People's Republic Luhansk People's Republic
A prolonged crisis in Ukraine began on 21 November 2013, when then president Viktor Yanukovych suspended preparations for the implementation of an association agreement with the European Union. This decision resulted in mass protests by its opponents, known as the "Euromaidan". After months of such protests, Yanukovych was ousted by the protesters on 22 February 2014, when he fled the Ukrainian capital city of Kiev. Following his ousting, unrest enveloped the largely Russophone eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, from where he had drawn most of his support. An ensuing political crisis in Ukrainian autonomous region of Crimea resulted in the annexation of Crimea by Russia on 18 March. Subsequently, unrest in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine evolved into a war between the post-revolutionary Ukrainian government and pro-Russian insurgents.

Contents

Euromaidan and revolution

Main articles: Euromaidan and 2014 Ukrainian revolution
Ukraine became gripped by unrest when President Viktor Yanukovych refused to sign an association agreement with the European Union on 21 November 2013.[1] An organised political movement known as 'Euromaidan' demanded closer ties with the European Union, and the ousting of Yanukovych.[2] This movement was ultimately successful, culminating in the February 2014 revolution, which removed Yanukovych and his government.[3]

Post-revolution unrest

Main article: 2014 pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine
Following flight of President Yanukovych on 23 February 2014, protests by pro-Russian and anti-revolution activists began in the largely Russophone region of Crimea.[4] These were followed by demonstrations in cities across eastern and southern Ukraine, including Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, and Odessa.

Crimean Crisis

Main article: Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation
Starting on 26 February 2014, as protests gripped Crimea, pro-Russian armed men gradually began to take over the peninsula.[5] Russia initially said that these uniformed militants, termed "little green men" in Ukraine, were "local self-defence forces".[6] However, they later admitted that these were in fact Russian soldiers without insignias, confirming on-the-ground reports of a Russian incursion into Ukraine.[7][8][9][10][11][12][13] By 27 February, the Crimean parliament building had been seized by Russian forces. Russian flags were raised over these buildings, and a self-declared pro-Russian government said that it would hold a referendum on independence from Ukraine.[14] Following that internationally unrecognised referendum, which was held on 16 March, Russia annexed Crimea on 18 March.

War in Donbass

Main articles: War in Donbass and 2014 Russian military intervention in Ukraine

Damaged building in Lysychansk, 4 August 2014
From the beginning of March 2014, demonstrations by pro-Russian and anti-government groups took place in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine, together commonly called the "Donbass", in the aftermath of the 2014 Ukrainian revolution and the Euromaidan movement. These demonstrations, which followed the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, and which were part of a wider group of concurrent pro-Russian protests across southern and eastern Ukraine, escalated into an armed conflict between the separatist forces of the self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics (DPR and LPR respectively), and the Ukrainian government.[15][16] Prior to a change of the top leadership in August,[17] the separatists were largely led by Russian citizens.[18] Russian paramilitaries are reported to make up from 15% to 80% of the combatants.[18][19][20][21][22]
Between 22 and 25 August, Russian artillery, personnel, and what Russia called a "humanitarian convoy" were reported to have crossed the border into Ukrainian territory without the permission of the Ukrainian government. Crossings were reported to have occurred both in areas under the control of pro-Russian forces and areas that were not under their control, such as the south-eastern part of Donetsk Oblast, near Novoazovsk. These events followed the reported shelling of Ukrainian positions from the Russian side of the border over the course of the preceding month.[23][24][25][26][27] Head of the Security Service of Ukraine Valentyn Nalyvaichenko said that the events of 22 August were a "direct invasion by Russia of Ukraine".[28] Western and Ukrainian officials described these events as a "stealth invasion" of Ukraine by Russia.[27] As a result of this, DPR and LPR insurgents regained much of the territory they had lost during the preceding government military offensive. A deal to establish a ceasefire, called the Minsk Protocol, was signed on 5 September 2014.[29] Violations of the ceasefire were common. Amidst the solidification of the line between insurgent and Ukrainian territory during the ceasefire, warlords took control of swathes of land on the insurgent side, leading to further destabilisation.[30] The ceasefire completely collapsed in January 2015. Heavy fighting resumed across the conflict zone, including at Donetsk International Airport and Debaltseve.[31] A new ceasefire agreement, called Minsk II, was signed on 12 February.[32]

Elections in Ukraine

Main articles: Ukrainian presidential election, 2014, Ukrainian parliamentary election, 2014 and Donbass general elections, 2014
Internationally unrecognised Donbass general elections, 2 November 2014
Amidst the prolonged crisis, multiple elections were held across Ukraine. The first election held since the ousting of President Yanukovych was the 25 May presidential election, which resulted in the election of Petro Poroshenko as president of Ukraine. In the Donbass region, only 20% of polling stations were open due to threats of violence by pro-Russian separatist insurgents.[33] Of the 2,430 planned polling stations in the region, only 426 remained open for polling.[33]
As the war in Donbass continued, the first post-revolutionary parliamentary elections in Ukraine were held on 26 October 2014.[34] Once again, separatists stymied voting in the areas that they controlled. They held their own elections, internationally unrecognised and in violation of the Minsk Protocol peace process, on 2 November 2014.[35]

Effects of the crisis

Main articles: International sanctions during the Ukrainian crisis and Russian financial crisis (2014–present)
The crisis has had many effects, both domestic and international. According to an October 2014 estimate by the World Bank, the economy of Ukraine contracted by 8% during the year 2014 as a result of the crisis.[36] Economic sanctions imposed on Russia by western nations contributed to the collapse in value of the Russian rouble, and the resulting Russian financial crisis.[37]
The war in Donbass caused a coal shortage in Ukraine, as the Donbass region had been the chief source of coal for power stations across the country. Furthermore, Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Station was forced to shut down one of its reactors after an accident. The combination of these two problems led to rolling blackouts across Ukraine during December 2014.[38]
Additionally due to the Ukrainian Crisis, a new pipeline in Turkey was proposed with an annual capacity around 63 billion cubic metres (bcm), will carry natural gas to Europe completely bypassing Ukraine as a traditional transit hub for Russian gas.[39]

 NATO/OTAN

The Ukraine crisis and NATO-Russia relations


The Ukraine crisis appears to be a potential turning point in Euro-Atlantic security. Having come as a surprise to many, some senior Western officials and politicians have talked of a changed European security landscape, and that the crisis both creates new security realities for the twenty first century and demands a significant response from NATO.


Vladimir Putin's inauguration as a
 President of Russia, 7 May 2012
© REUTERS

At the same time, however, the crisis is the crystallisation of a number of wider and longer-term problems that have been increasingly visible for some time, most notably the intensifying sense of strategic dissonance between Russia and the West. Although many have focused on the increasing tensions between the West and Russia since Vladimir Putin returned to the presidency in 2012 and the subsequent failure of a “reset” in US-Russia politics, in fact the relationship – particularly in terms of European security – has been deteriorating for some time.
Indeed, today’s crisis illuminates very clearly the point that Moscow understands European security in very different conceptual terms from the West. Western capitals see the emergence of a Europe ‘whole, free and at peace’, Moscow sees a continent still fragmented, still dominated by bloc mentality (given US influence in European security), and burdened by ongoing conflict.
Where Western capitals see the “open door” policy and the enlargement of organisations such as NATO and the EU contributing to wider European stability, Moscow sees the expansion of these organisations destabilising European security. Where Western leaders have sought to emphasise partnership with Russia, including attempting to develop strategic partnership and the creation of numerous seats at the diplomatic table, Moscow sees itself increasingly isolated, the mechanisms for interaction failing to provide Moscow with a voice. 


Russo-Georgia war in 2008
© REUTERS

If Secretary General Rasmussen could state in June, therefore, that NATO has for the last 20 years – until the Ukraine crisis – considered Russia as a partner with whom the Alliance could cooperate, this is denied by senior Russian officials and thinkers who point to NATO enlargement and the ballistic missile defence project as activities that are not those of a partner.
This different understanding has been amplified by the fact that for much of the last 15 years, the West and Russia have drawn very different conclusions about the causes and consequences of the major episodes of the post Cold War era, such as the Colour revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, the gas crises in 2006 and 2009 and the Russo-Georgia war in 2008. The Ukraine crisis is one more example of this, as the West accuses Russia of aggression against Ukraine and illegally annexing Crimea. Moscow rejects this and asserts that it is responding to a crisis provoked by the US and EU, and is securing its interests against NATO expansion.
At the same time, these disagreements illustrate two important points. 


First, it reflects Moscow’s different understanding of the indivisibility of security: Europe is divided into two parts – the wider OSCE space, in which agreements are merely politically binding (and thus open to change or abuse), and the “bloc” spaces of NATO and the EU, in which agreements are legally binding. Second, it reflects Moscow’s belief that the current Euro-Atlantic security structure not only is incapable of effectively addressing existing problems – such as arms control, particularly the Treaty of Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), and unresolved conflicts, such as Moldova/Transnistria, but generates new ones.
In response, Moscow has increasingly sought to launch its own initiatives to address these problems. In 2003, for instance, it proposed the Kozak Memorandum which suggested a federalised solution to the Transnistria conflict, and in 2008 it launched what became known as the “Medvedev proposals” for a fresh European security debate and new treaty. In the end, the Kozak memorandum was rejected and the Medvedev proposals were channelled into the OSCE Corfu process. Both were viewed in Moscow as being rebuffed by the West not because of their flaws, but because they were Russian initiatives. If Rasmussen has recently stated that NATO must now adapt to Russia seeing it as a threat, therefore, it is perhaps more accurate to suggest that Russia has seen NATO as a potential threat for much longer.
The Ukraine crisis is therefore, in many ways, an additional confirmation of these longer-term problems and disputes. And even if it is resolved soon, numerous points of conceptual and practical tension remain. Indeed, they are being accelerated by the response of both sides to the current crisis, which has emphasised the lack of trust between the West and Russia on one hand –as each accuses the other of both breaking their pledges and providing political and material support for the opposing sides in the conflict in Ukraine itself – while calling on the other to desist from such support and weigh in to resolve the situation.


Ukraine's President Petro Poroshenko talks 
to local residents in the town of Svyatogorsk,
 June 20, 2014
© REUTERS

The crisis itself, of course, remains very active. Despite President Poroshenko’s proposed 15 point peace plan, the possibility of further deterioration remains distinct. In June, senior NATO officials pointed to a renewed build up of Russian armed forces on the Ukrainian border, indicating it was a “regrettable slip backwards”. This suggests that the Russian leadership seeks to retain the option to intervene in Ukraine further, which would imply deeper Western sanctions against Russia. Furthermore, for its part, Moscow has denied the build up, stating that it is a rotation of forces, while condemning the indiscriminate use of heavy weapons by Ukrainian forces in built up areas in their campaign against the separatists that has led to many civilian casualties and a major increase in refugees.
If a deterioration of the immediate crisis within Ukraine itself cannot be ruled out, with all its potential ramifications of civil war in Europe, the intensification of the wider trend of more systemic dissonance is already evident. Various security aspects of the crisis – such as the infiltration of Crimea, and Russian military exercises and a build up on Ukraine’s border – have unsettled Eastern European members of the Alliance and created a debate in the West about the strength of NATO’s Article Five commitment to defend its members. This has resulted both in enhanced reassurance efforts and the preparation of a Readiness Action Plan. This plan envisages enhancing intelligence and awareness capabilities, more high intensity military exercises, prepositioning equipment and supplies further east and improving the capacity of the NATO Rapid Reaction Force. Furthermore, Barack Obama has proposed a $1 billion package to enhance European security.
Immediate concerns about the Euro-Atlantic architecture are justified – Moscow has long stated its opposition to NATO and its enlargement, and even its desire to attempt to roll back NATO’s influence if the opportunity presents itself. At the same time, these reassurance measures address only certain more conventional military aspects that the Alliance should be considering, such as the capacity of the Russian military, as reflected in the exercises. They may, however, be less effective at addressing other potential types of threats illustrated by the current crisis, and so it may be worth supplementing such measures with a push to complete security sector reforms in new member states.


Signing of NATO-Russia Founding Act,
 27 May 1997

It is also worth reflecting on what Moscow’s responses to these moves might be – not least since the strengthening of “reassurance” will be seen in Moscow to justify the concerns it already had about the move of NATO infrastructure to Russia’s borders. Indeed, some Russians have already voiced concerns about NATO using the Ukraine crisis as a reason to rethink the terms of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, even changing the balance of power across Europe by though the putative membership of Sweden and Finland, and strengthening its presence in the Black Sea region.
First, it is possible that Moscow will again attempt to advance its proposals both for the resolution of the Transnistria conflict on one hand, and increased attempts to secure more support for a rethink of the European security architecture. Second, Moscow may respond by putting existing arms control arrangements under pressure, perhaps by bolstering its military presence in Kaliningrad and Crimea, or by suspending its participation in (or withdrawing completely from) arms control agreements. Finally, it appears likely that Moscow will continue to hold snap exercises – and a major strategic level exercise, Vostok 2014, is scheduled for September this year. The result of this is likely to be a self-reinforcing cycle of increasing dissonance.
Russia should, therefore, become a serious priority for the Alliance. Beyond questions of well-tailored reassurance, therefore, two points are worth making. First, it is important for policy makers to be aware of the different understandings of post Cold War history – including the details of Russian initiatives such as the Kozak memorandum to the Medvedev security treaty proposals. Second, it is time for a major reassessment of Russia itself. This has proven difficult in the past, since Western states have varying relationships with Russia – with the result that some Western views of Russia are often out-of-date. For NATO this is particularly important: the reforms of the Russian military, for instance since 2008 have clearly had some effect. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Russian military? What can NATO learn about signals being emitted by Moscow? How can surprises be avoided in future?

 BBC

Baltic states shiver as Russia flexes muscles

 
Katya Adler Europe editor

"The West talks so much about the impending threat of attack by Russia on the Baltics. We're afraid this will just make it more likely that Putin will do something!"
22-year-law graduate Lukas Borusevicius and his friend Laurynas Juozapaitas came to meet me in a pub in Vilnius to discuss relations with Russia and Lithuania's sudden re-introduction of military conscription.
The violence in Ukraine and fear of regional spillover have come as quite a shock here. The 25 years since breaking away from the Soviet Union have been relatively peaceful. Until now.
Russia has been holding increasingly frequent snap military drills near its eastern European neighbours, not to mention overflights and naval exercises in the Baltic Sea.

In Lithuania, a "war manual" has been hastily put together as the country reintroduces military conscription
A Lithuanian "war manual" has been hastily put together. It's available in all public libraries.
"Keep a sound mind, don't panic and don't lose clear thinking," the manual explains. "Gunshots just outside your window are not the end of the world."

Cyber warfare

Lukas and Laurynas had been busily planning their upwardly mobile careers - but now they may have to swap sharp-looking suits for military fatigues.
"All my friends are talking about it, on the phone, on Facebook. There's even a new website here called - 'Will You Be Drafted?'" Lukas says.
"But I will go. I think even people who say they won't will help if the aggression starts. My grandfather fought for freedom. My father fought for Lithuanian independence, so it's in my heart to fight for my country."
Those most panicked here liken the sound of Nato jets policing the skies to the sound of freedom.
But it is unlikely that Russian President Vladimir Putin will roll his tanks into the streets of the Baltics any time soon.

Last month, US troops took part in a military parade in Estonia's city of Narva - on the border with Russia
Estonian Prime Minister Taavi Roivas told me it would be "insane" for anyone to attack them in a conventional military way, because "Estonia or Latvia or Lithuania are as much in Nato as Great Britain or the US".
But the Baltic nations say they are already under attack from Russia by non-conventional means, such as cyber warfare and Russian propaganda, mainly on TV channels watched by the sizeable Russian-speaking minority in Latvia and Estonia.

Money talks

I can't help thinking we are all falling for an element of this propaganda. Vladimir Putin is spooking Europe with his audacity, aggression and unpredictability.
Invading and annexing the three Baltic states would be too costly and far too dangerous for him. Spreading fear is far easier, as is exacerbating divisions between the Baltics' Russian speakers and the rest of the population.
And it's not just here, at the edges of Europe, that President Putin is meddling.
He never gave up on Russia's wider sphere of influence, even after the break-up of the Soviet Union.
He doesn't view individual European countries as a particular threat, but rather the European Union as a whole, that some former Soviet republics are now part of.

President Putin has described the collapse of the USSR as a "major geopolitical disaster"
And so he exploits existing cracks and seeks leverage and influence in Europe through Russia's exports of natural gas, cultivating relations with increasingly popular far-left and far-right parties in Europe (Austria's Freedom Party, France's National Front to name a couple) and with Russian investment.
Money talks particularly loudly in smaller countries like Cyprus and Slovakia. It won't have passed President Putin by that the EU needs unanimity to pass any new sanctions against Russia.
For its part, Russia accuses the West of propaganda and expansionism. It says Nato is using the situation in Ukraine as an excuse to move closer to Russian borders.
On Friday, as EU foreign ministers meet in Latvia to discuss Russia and Ukraine, Russia is holding large-scale military exercises in annexed Crimea as well as breakaway regions of Georgia, while Nato launches a major simulated warfare exercise in the Black Sea.
It's not going to make people in the Baltics feel much assured.

 BBC

Ukraine conflict: Why is east hit by conflict?

By Paul Kirby BBC News
  • 18 February 2015
  • From the section Europe


Civilians have been caught in the middle as the intensity of violence increases

Pro-Russian rebels have entered the strategic town of Debaltseve in eastern Ukraine after heavy fighting - despite a ceasefire agreement.
Most of the Ukrainian government forces have pulled out of the town, a key transport hub.
A new truce deal was reached on 12 February through international mediation, in an attempt to stop the fighting spiralling out of control.
What prompted the flare-up in a conflict that has cost more than 5,600 lives and few saw coming?


How did eastern Ukraine return to full-scale conflict?

Fighting started in April 2014 and raged for months until Ukraine and the separatists came to a deal on 5 September to halt the violence and free prisoners.
But the ceasefire never held entirely. Both sides used the relative lull to build up their forces and for months the rebels tried to seize Donetsk airport, a strategic and symbolic asset, from government forces.

With the start of 2015, a new rebel push began and by 22 January the airport was in their hands.
Donetsk airport - coveted prize
Violence flared the length of the September ceasefire line and casualties mounted:
  • Civilians killed by shells and rockets in rebel-held cities of Donetsk and Luhansk
  • Thirty people killed in Ukrainian port city of Mariupol, in artillery attack said by observers to come from rebel-held areas
  • Rebels besiege major road and rail hub of Debaltseve, where thousands of Ukrainian troops are based, leading to a withdrawal on 18 February
  • Rebels fire rockets at civilian areas in Kramatorsk, government-controlled city and military HQ far beyond conflict zone
  • Ultra-nationalist volunteer battalion linked to the government seizes villages from rebels outside Mariupol in south
Ghost town captured by rebels


Will the new ceasefire work?

The deal struck on 12 February in Minsk by the leaders of Germany, France, Ukraine and Russia is similar to the old one, but tries to tackle some of its shortcomings.
For the rebels, the new ceasefire line is the same as the old one, so they lose some of the territory they have gained. But government forces must pull back from the current front-line, and territory they have lost since January is confirmed as lost.
But a key omission from the deal was Debaltseve - because the sides could not agree about who would end up controlling it.
Even if the bloodshed stops and the guns fall silent, the future status of the rebel-held areas of Donetsk and Luhansk remains unclear.
Ukraine is adamant there is no new deal on autonomy for the rebel areas, only decentralisation - so that could anger the rebels.
And it is difficult imagining the rebels agreeing to hold elections under Ukrainian law in their areas, just as it is seeing Ukraine getting back control of its eastern border.
Both conditions are part of the 13-point plan agreed in Minsk.


So what is in the 13-point plan?

  • Immediate ceasefire from 0000 on 15 February (2200 GMT on 14 February)
  • Buffer zone separating heavy weapons of both sides. Before, big guns had to pull back by 15km (9 miles)
  • Now, minimum buffer zone of 50km for 100mm artillery and up to 140km for rockets
  • Effective verification by international security group OSCE
  • Amnesty and release of all hostages and illegally detained people by fifth day of pull-out
  • Restoration of government pensions and other welfare payments for civilians in the east
  • Full Ukrainian control over eastern border, after local elections under Ukrainian law and a constitutional deal on future of Donetsk and Luhansk by end of 2015

Ukraine's war: The human cost
  • 5,665 people killed and 13,961 wounded in eastern Ukraine
  • Fatalities include 298 people on Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 shot down on 17 July
  • 5.2 million people estimated to be living in conflict areas
  • 978,482 internally displaced people within Ukraine, including 119,832 children
  • 600,000 fled to neighbouring countries, of whom more than 400,000 have gone to Russia
Source: Figures from UN reports, 6 and 17 February


Why did the September ceasefire break down?

Each side accused the other of tearing up the peace deal.
For the government, it was the rebels' decision to hold their own local elections in November 2014, in defiance of the Kiev authorities.
The separatists were then angered by the government decision to scrap the special status of their two regions, Donetsk and Luhansk.

Among the terms of the truce were a commitment to pull back heavy guns from the front line by at least 15km (9 miles), a release of prisoners and an agreement for international observers to monitor the truce and a buffer zone on the Ukrainian border with Russia.
Ukraine would also grant wider self-rule to Donetsk and Luhansk.
Both sides used the ceasefire to rearm, but the rebels now appear to have better quality tanks and weapons than the government.

Nato said the unmarked armoured vehicles were from Russia
The ceasefire that never was
Russia tests new weaponry in Ukraine


Who has the upper hand now?

The rebels certainly have made big gains, with the capture of Donetsk airport and the assault on Debaltseve.
The airport gave them a strategic asset a few miles from the centre of Donetsk city, their biggest stronghold.

Even before the airport had been captured, Ukraine accused separatist forces of seizing more than 500 sq km (194 sq miles), mainly around Debaltseve and Mariupol.
Casualties on both sides have been heavy, and journalists say the separatists have suffered major losses.
Ukrainian forces made significant gains last summer, many of which have not been reversed.
The separatists opened up a coastal front by the Sea of Azov before the September ceasefire, moving within range of the port city of Mariupol, but the ultranationalist pro-government Azov battalion recaptured some villages outside the city in early February.


Why did the fighting start in the first place?

In April 2014, pro-Russian activists seized control of government buildings in towns and cities across the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
The events were a repeat of what had happened in Ukraine's Black Sea peninsula of Crimea.

Gunmen there seized government buildings in February 2014 and raised the Russian flag a week after elected President Viktor Yanukovych, friendly to Moscow, fled during massive pro-EU street protests in Kiev.
An early attempt by nationalists to remove the status of Russian as a second language alarmed many Russian speakers, and officials in Moscow portrayed the new leaders in Kiev as US-backed Ukrainian nationalists bent on violating minority rights.
A flawed referendum on joining Russia was quickly held in Crimea and within a month the peninsula's annexation was complete.
There was little bloodshed in Crimea, but Ukraine's fledgling revolutionary government was in no position to fight back, with only 6,000 troops reportedly ready for combat.
However, when pro-Russian separatists made a move on Ukraine's industrial east and Russian forces appeared to be building up on the borders, the authorities in Kiev ordered an "anti-terrorist operation".

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