The answers will vary depending on who you ask—and it depends on if one believes stealth is a baseline requirement to survive over a future battlefield or not.
The U.S. Air Force has publicly embraced stealth as the end all and be all, while the U.S. Navy has taken a more skeptical approach. While Air Force officials publicly pronounce that the F-35 will be able fight alone and unafraid, the Navy has argued for balanced survivability using a combination of assets including electronic attack, stand-off weapons and, yes, some measure of stealth.
Part of the difference in the two services’ diverging positions can be explained by different political messaging strategies. Publicly, the Air Force doesn’t want to admit the utility of electronic attack or support platforms because they seem to believe that might erode support for the F-35. Meanwhile, the Navy has bills to pay other than for aviation and that service doesn’t see the performance differential between the F/A-18E/F and F-35C as being worth the massive cost plus up.
After a discussion with Air Force and Navy officials—it’s apparent that the truth lies somewhere in between. There is consensus that in the future as anti-access/area denial threats evolve, wide-band all-aspect stealth will probably be necessary. But that likely requires a large flying-wing aircraft like a strategic bomber. Moreover, support assets including electronic attack and cyber are going to be part of the mix. Against the Chinese or Russians, no one is going to be able to go it alone.
A dispute starts to emerge on the advantages of high-frequency stealth aircraft—jets like the F-22 and F-35 which are designed to operate primarily against the C, X and Ku band radars. Navy leaders are adamant that the service needs complementary capabilities that include stealth as part of a larger overall bag of tricks. Meanwhile, Air Force leaders will assert that the F-35 in particular will operate without the support of any external electronic warfare assets. However, the service’s own air warfare experts at Nellis AFB, Nev., freely admit that stealth works best when complemented with other capabilities like electronic attack—and those officers recognize the need for a platform like the EA-18G Growler. Detection via radar is decided by the signal to noise ratio—stealth reduces the signal while jamming increases the noise. That’s just basic physics—ideally, one works both sides of the problem to achieve the best results.
At the tactical level—as I recently discussed with a good friend who is an Air Force Weapons School grad with lots of stealth experience—a four-ship of F-35Cs supported by Growlers and E-2D Advanced Hawkeyes and other naval assets is likely to be more effective than a four-ship of Super Hornets operating with the same support assets. While the F-35C does not have good kinematic performance, it does (or will eventually) have stealth, excellent sensors and phenomenal electronic warfare capabilities. Indeed, combining the F-35C with the Super Hornet might work very well in a scenario where the Joint Strike Fighter is used as a spotter for the F/A-18E/Fs. Indeed, the Navy’s director of air warfare Rear Adm. Mike Manazir told me as such a couple of years ago when I was at the U.S. Naval Institute.
But the problem for the Navy is that the F-35C is expensive both to buy and sustain onboard a carrier. There are many in the Navy that simply don’t believe that any added performance benefits the F-35C brings to the table would be worth the massive additional cost. Moreover, there is a growing understanding in the naval community that the F-35C fundamentally does not have the range or payload needed to keep the carrier relevant in the anti-access/area denial environment of the Western Pacific. Indeed, there have been suggestions that the Navy truncate or cancel its portion of the Joint Strike Fighter buy. But only time will tell…
Dave Majumdar is the defense editor for The National Interest. You can follow him on Twitter: @davemajumdar.
Image: Northrop Grumman/Social Media.
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Full scale or miniature prototypes of the long range strike bomber may have already been built for testing
Prototypes
of new US long range strike bombers may already have been built and
tested after it was revealed that spending on the project has jumped to
$1 billion in 2015.
The U.S. Air Force is moving forward with plans for a top-secret next generation bomber that could one day fly without a pilot.
Spending on the project has topped a billion dollars this year alone - and companies vying to win a contract to build the bombers are already said to have built either full-scale or miniature prototypes and tested them in wind tunnels.
Spending on the long range bomber was $200 million in 2012.
A billion dollars has been spent in 2015.
Spending could increase to $3 billion in 2018.
100 brand-new bombers will hopefully cost as $55 billion in total. They will replace 1960s-vintage B-52s and B-1s from the ’80s.
The U.S. Air Force is moving forward with plans for a top-secret next generation bomber that could one day fly without a pilot.
Spending on the project has topped a billion dollars this year alone - and companies vying to win a contract to build the bombers are already said to have built either full-scale or miniature prototypes and tested them in wind tunnels.
Spending on the long range bomber was $200 million in 2012.
A billion dollars has been spent in 2015.
Spending could increase to $3 billion in 2018.
100 brand-new bombers will hopefully cost as $55 billion in total. They will replace 1960s-vintage B-52s and B-1s from the ’80s.
New Pentagon Equipment Is No Longer Pushing the Envelope
For the past six years, a newly
cost-conscious Pentagon has aimed to buy arms that are less complex and
use more existing or commercial technology. And it’s worked. The cost of
major projects is dropping, says Frank Kendall, the defense
undersecretary for acquisition. And he has the data to prove it.
But the bad news, Kendall says in a new 210-page report,
is that Pentagon arms buyers have become so risk-adverse that America’s
cutting-edge weapons aren’t quite so cutting-edge. And that’s allowing
China and Russia to catch up.“In my view, our new product pipeline is not as robust as it should be at a time when our technological superiority is being seriously challenged by potential adversaries,” Kendall said in his report, which analyzes the state of Pentagon’s massive, multibillion-dollar acquisition establishment.
He’s not alone. Last month at a military conference in London, the Dutch air force chief called out the U.S. Army’s effort to build future helicopters, saying it doesn’t push the envelope enough. Lt. Gen. Alexander Schnitger declared that the two primary designs now being evaluated are unambitious and could fall far short of what NATO needs to win a war in 2040.
Kendall has been sounding the alarm that the U.S. military’s technological superiority over its potential foes is narrowing, particularly when it comes to new Chinese equipment.
“In some areas we may not be pushing the state-of-the-art enough in terms of technical performance,” he wrote.
Historically, big Pentagon weapons programs have been susceptible to “requirements creep,” the accretion of program goals that have slowed development and sent costs skyward. The VH-71 effort to replace Marine One — the presidential helicopter — fell apart in large part because the requirements were still being changed even as aircraft were being built.
To fix this, Kendall and others have instituted changes — under the broad name of Better Buying Power — that locked down program requirements early on. But in a rapid-changing world, and with U.S. weapons-development timelines still measures in years, Kendall’s new report seems to question whether locking in requirements early is the best way to proceed.
Now he argues that not all cost growth is bad, particularly when it responds to a global threat.
“Simply delivering what was initially required on cost and schedule can lead to failure in achieving our evolving national security mission — the reason defense acquisition exists in the first place,” he writes.
On the flip side, Kendall says, many of the acquisition reforms put in place by him and his predecessor, current Defense Secretary Ashton Carter, are working. Defense firms are making more profit based on performance and companies are “doing a better job of meeting cost targets.”
An initiative called “should-cost,” appears “to be taking hold,” which is a “major cultural change,” Kendall wrote. Should-cost “requires our managers to actively seek ways to save money and to set targets for doing so, not just to stay within their budgets,” he said.
Shay Assad is the director of defense pricing — the person who determines what projects should cost the Pentagon. He cited a “space-related procurement” in which the Pentagon saved $900 million in a single year. In another project, the Pentagon saved more than $2 billion over a five-year period.
“We’ve saved billions of dollars, I know we have,” Assad said.
In a certain helicopter deal, the Pentagon entered negotiations predicting that a multiyear contract might save 10 percent; instead, they squeezed 20 percent out, he said.
“What we’re trying to get the companies to focus on is accepting challenging, but doable cost,” Assad said in a July interview. “Those companies that are, they’re making more profit.”
Kendall’s report found that subcontractors to major firms are making a higher percentage of profit than the company’s they are supplying. “Since 2001, first-tier subcontractors earned higher margins than their associated prime contractors on the same program,” he wrote.
The report also fired shots at lawmakers — including Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee — who have proposed to give more acquisition power to the uniformed service chiefs. After 2017, according to the proposed legislation, new major projects would be overseen by the military services, while the defense undersecretary for acquisition would thereafter control only joint projects or service-specific ones the defense secretary delegates.
McCain and supporters of his legislation argue the changes add accountability to acquisition projects. Kendall says the data in his report shows that Better Buying Power is working and that lawmakers shouldn’t just make change to make change.
“I encourage the stakeholders of defense acquisition to examine this report, prior reports, and other data-driven analyses to help guide ongoing discussions and policymaking,” he said. “While it is important to continue improving our policies and practices, change for change’s sake isn’t the answer. We should use experience supported by data-driven analysis to help ensure we don’t embrace policy reforms that carry unintended adverse consequences.”
Microwave absorbing circuit can enhance plane stealth
The team released the technical and design details of an “invisibility circuit” they claim has the potential to help aircraft trick the best early warning systems in use today.
The researchers are affiliated with the Huazhong University of Science and Technology in Wuhan in central China’s Hubei province.
According to their paper, they have created a multi-layer electrical circuit that can “trap” microwaves at ultra-high frequencies, thus confusing radar systems and enabling aircraft to sneak past them
What is unique about the latest finding is that the material used to create the circuit would be almost impossibly thin. At under one centimeter, it is just a tenth the size of similar products developed by overseas competitors. This means it could be used to coat planes for the first time, pundits say.
Stealth planes including the F-22 and F-35 used by the US military are not quite as evasive as they sound, according to Huang, who said they can be spotted by advanced radar systems even from a considerable distance.
Such radars typically use microwaves at strengths of 2 gigahertz or lower to identify and track stealth aircraft. This is because the currently available coating materials can only absorb electromagnetic waves at high frequencies. Jiang’s team said the new circuits hit the military’s sweet spot as they can absorb waves ranging from 0.7Ghz to 1.9Ghz.
Many similar projects are kept under wraps because of their implications for national security and national defence. Some are supported by military funding, which prohibits their public disclosure.
The new circuit is not without problems.
First, it is unable to absorb microwaves generated at frequencies of 2Ghz or above, meaning that it could still be spotted by advanced radar systems, some of which can operate at over 40 Ghz.
As such, it could take years before it is used on an actual aircraft, Huang said.
It may initially be applied as an undercoat beneath other cutting-edge paints that are already used on stealth planes, he added.
Winning the Airwaves: Sustaining America's Advantage in the Electromagnetic Spectrum
Unfortunately, “failed to keep pace” is an appropriate description of the Pentagon’s investments in EMS warfare capabilities over the last generation. In the absence of a peer rival following the end of the Cold War, DoD failed to pursue a new generation of capabilities needed to maintain its EMS superiority. This pause provided China, Russia and other rivals with an opportunity to field systems that target vulnerabilities in sensor and communication networks the U.S. military has come to depend on. As a result, America’s once significant military advantage in the EMS is eroding, and may in fact no longer exist. This does not have to remain the case. DoD has the opportunity to develop new operational concepts and technologies that will allow it to “leap ahead” of its competitors and create enduring advantages in EMS warfare.
A Long-Term Competition:
The ways in which militaries conducted EMS warfare have changed significantly over the last hundred-plus years. We can think of these changes as a series of major phases, each of which placed a different emphasis on the use of active or passive EMS capabilities and countermeasures. Within each phase, incremental improvements to existing EMS capabilities allowed militaries to gain temporary advantages over their competitors. These advantages dissipated as the other side developed the next generation of countermeasures. More enduring advantages were the product of new operational concepts and capabilities that enabled militaries to transition to a new phase of the EMS warfare competition before their rivals.
For example, in the waning years of the Cold War, the U.S. military began this type of leap by embracing technologies that would reduce the detectability of U.S. forces in the EMS, such as stealth and low probability of interception/low probability of detection (LPI/LPD) sensors and communication systems. This transition promised to give U.S. forces a distinct advantage over Soviet forces that continued to rely on high-power sensors, communications systems and jammers. It was never completed, however, due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Following the end of the Cold War, DoD truncated a number of key programs intended to support this transition, including those building stealth B-2 bombers and F-22 fighters.
Today, the Pentagon has an opportunity to gain an enduring advantage over America’s enemies by finishing the transition to the next phase of the EMS warfare competition. A shorthand way of describing this new approach would be “low-to-no power” EMS warfare, where emissions from sensors, communication systems, jammers and major platforms that must operate in contested areas minimize their detectable emissions. This should be one focus of a “Third Offset” strategy that is intended to use new technologies to defeat the numerical and geographic advantages of potential enemies. If embraced by DoD’s leadership and funded by Congress, new operational concepts and capabilities for this next phase in EMS warfare would help the U.S. military to take back the airwaves and dominate this critical domain in which future wars may be won or lost.
New Operational Concepts:
The shift should begin with the creation of new operational concepts that inform DoD’s future capability requirements and investment priorities. Without operational concepts that describe new ways of fighting, the military services will not be able to update their doctrine, and the acquisition system cannot be prompted to incorporate new technologies. The Services are already pursuing some operational concepts for low-to-no power EMS warfare. The Navy, for instance, is developing tactics for E/A-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft to use passive capabilities, in order to geolocate threat emitters alone or in concert with other aircraft through the Navy Integrated Fire Control (NIFC) network.
Other concepts that would apply more broadly across the joint force and for a wider range of missions and scenarios in the low-to-no power EMS warfare regime include using passive and multi-static detection capabilities to find hostile forces while avoiding detection by their active and passive sensors; taking advantage of enhanced emissions control and low-power countermeasures to avoid detection while operating inside contested areas; and using a new generation of jammers, decoys and even directed energy weapons to support U.S. strikes and attack the enemy.
New Technologies:
Executing these new operational concepts will require the U.S. military to evolve and expand its portfolio of EMS capabilities. To operate effectively in a low-to-no power EMS warfare environment, DoD will need capabilities that are highly networked; able to “maneuver” across the EMS in order to remain undetected and target enemy networks; have the capacity to perform multiple EMS warfare functions such as communications, sensing, jamming, deception or decoying; and are small and cheap enough to be deployed on nearly every platform that must operate in contested areas. Most importantly, U.S. EMS warfare systems will need to be controlled by adaptable and intelligent processors that go beyond simply executing automated pre-planned responses and can develop techniques to sustain U.S. EMS operations while disrupting those of the enemy.
Some systems with these attributes are already in the U.S. military’s inventory or will be fielded in the next several years, such as the APG-77 and APG-81 radars on the F-22 and F-35, Air and Missile Defense Radar, Next Generation Jammer and SLQ-32 Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP) upgrade. Other potential capabilities are languishing in research and development due to a lack of new, validated requirements and other barriers that inhibit their transition into DoD’s acquisition system.
Overcoming Barriers:
Operating concepts and capabilities similar to those suggested above would help DoD to transition to the low-to-no power phase of EMS warfare. For this transition to occur, however, DoD will first need to address major conceptual, organizational and programmatic impediments to progress that derive from the lack of an institutional vision for how U.S. forces should fight in the EMS.
For instance, technologists, operators and policy makers often do not communicate effectively regarding the potential for emerging technologies to enable new approaches to warfare. While some in DoD are beginning to develop new concepts for the next phase in the EMS warfare competition, their efforts are hindered by the U.S. military’s continued emphasis on operating as it has in the past, rather than embracing new ways of operating and fighting in the EMS.
The lack of new operational concepts has inhibited DoD’s development of formal requirements that would “pull” new EMS warfare technologies into its acquisition process. Moreover, new systems that could support low-to-no power operations that are already fielded, such as active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars, are prized more for their ability to support old operational concepts rather than their potential to enable different approaches to EMS warfare.
The Pentagon could overcome these barriers with a concerted effort initiated and overseen by the new Electronic Warfare Executive Committee (EXCOM). The EXCOM should oversee the development and implementation of a new vision for how future U.S. forces will operate and fight in the EMS. This vision should guide the efforts of the Services and Defense Agencies to develop low-to-no power EMS warfighting operating concepts and requirements.
To ensure the services are able to implement these new approaches to EMS warfare, DoD should prioritize its research and development investments to further mature networking, agility, multifunctionality, miniaturization and adaptability technologies. And to enable these technologies to transition, the Services should greatly increase cooperation between multiple executive and management offices now responsible for developing and procuring new EMS warfare systems. This would help DoD as a whole to field more agile, multifunction capabilities essential to future EMS warfare operations.
American and allied military forces have gained significant advantages over their enemies in previous EMS warfare competitive regimes. A failure to develop new operational concepts and capabilities needed for this next phase of EMS warfare, however, could result in situations where the U.S. military will be at risk of losing the battle for the airwaves.
Bryan Clark and Mark Gunzinger are Senior Fellows at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA).
Image: Wikimedia Commons/U.S. Navy
Electronic Warfare version of China J-16 twin seat fighter similar to USA EA-18 Growler
A possible new electronic warfare (EW) variant of the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation (SAC)
J-16 twin-seat strike fighter made its first flight on 18 December,
according to Chinese sources, potentially adding a significant offensive
capability to the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF).
Images of the new variant have emerged on several Chinese military web pages, including a 21 December 2015 video report on the popular Ifeng web page. The most salient modifications are two new wingtip pods similar to the Northrop Grumman AN/ALQ-218 Tactical Jamming Receiver, leading to comparisons with the E/A-18G Growler electronic attack variant of Boeing's Super Hornet.
The Boeing EA-18G Growler is an American carrier-based electronic warfare aircraft, a specialized version of the two-seat F/A-18F Super Hornet.
Images of the new variant have emerged on several Chinese military web pages, including a 21 December 2015 video report on the popular Ifeng web page. The most salient modifications are two new wingtip pods similar to the Northrop Grumman AN/ALQ-218 Tactical Jamming Receiver, leading to comparisons with the E/A-18G Growler electronic attack variant of Boeing's Super Hornet.
The Boeing EA-18G Growler is an American carrier-based electronic warfare aircraft, a specialized version of the two-seat F/A-18F Super Hornet.
EA-18 Growler
This possible J-16 EW prototype appears to lack the usual fuselage-mounted gun and the infrared search and tracking system (IRST) also appears to be missing, but the J-16, which resembles the Russian Sukhoi Su-30, would have up to 10 wing and fuselage hardpoints for ordnance and active jamming pods.
An EW version of the J-16 equipped similarly to the E/A-18G would give PLAAF strike packages a far greater chance of reaching their targets and avoiding increasingly capable air defences.
Development of a J-16 EW variant could also lead to a similar carrier warfare version of the twin-seat J-15S.
While in early 2014 an Asian government source estimated that 100 J-16s would be in PLA service by 2020, the emergence of an EW version could increase that number.
A new electronic warfare variant of the SAC J-16 reportedly first flew on 18 December 2015. Source: Via Chinese Internet
A close-up of the new electronic warfare pod on the wingtips of the SAC J-16 shows a similarity to the Northrop Grumman AN/ALQ-218 Tactical Jamming Receiver. (Via Ifeng web page)
This possible J-16 EW prototype appears to lack the usual fuselage-mounted gun and the infrared search and tracking system (IRST) also appears to be missing, but the J-16, which resembles the Russian Sukhoi Su-30, would have up to 10 wing and fuselage hardpoints for ordnance and active jamming pods.
An EW version of the J-16 equipped similarly to the E/A-18G would give PLAAF strike packages a far greater chance of reaching their targets and avoiding increasingly capable air defences.
Development of a J-16 EW variant could also lead to a similar carrier warfare version of the twin-seat J-15S.
While in early 2014 an Asian government source estimated that 100 J-16s would be in PLA service by 2020, the emergence of an EW version could increase that number.
A close-up of the new electronic warfare pod on the wingtips of the SAC J-16 shows a similarity to the Northrop Grumman AN/ALQ-218 Tactical Jamming Receiver. (Via Ifeng web page)
Revealed: U.S. Navy's Plan to Defeat Russia's Deadly S-400
“This enhanced targeting capability provides our aircrews with a significant advantage, especially in an increasingly dense threat environment where longer-range targeting is critical to the fight,” said Capt. David Kindley, U.S. Navy F/A-18 and EA-18G program manager.
The enhanced hardware would allow multiple Growlers to coordinate their efforts against ever more capable enemy systems that proliferating around the world as part of the Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) battle network. According to Boeing, the upgrades include an advanced targeting processor, high-bandwidth datalink and a Windows-based tablet, which is integrated with the Growler’s mission system. The new upgrades are necessary to keep paces with an ever-changing threat environment.
“The complexity of global threat environments continues to evolve,” said Dan Gillian, Boeing F/A-18 and EA-18G programs vice president. “This long-range targeting technology is essential as we advance electronic attack capabilities for the conflicts of today and tomorrow.”
The Navy’s decision to upgrade the Growler fleet comes after the Fleet Experiment 2015 exercise validated the service’s concept to use multiple EA-18Gs to generate a “weapons quality track” against enemy emitters. Under the NIFC-CA construct, Rear Adm. Mike Manazir, the Navy’s director of air warfare, told me in December 2013 that the service would need a minimum of two airborne EA-18Gs linked via a high-speed datalink both to each other and to a third point—a Northrop Grumman E-2D Hawkeye—to perform a time distance of arrival analysis to precisely locate threat emitters.
With the three separate points, the Navy expects to be able to narrow down the location of multiple mobile threat emitters to a narrow enough “ellipse” as to generate a weapons quality track in real time. The tactic works best when there are three Growlers working in conjunction with each other—but an E-2D Advanced Hawkeye can substitute for one of the EA-18Gs. While the Hawkeye has an excellent electronic support measures suite, it has neither the capability of the EA-18G nor can it get as close to the threat.
The new technique is essential to the Navy’s plans to fight in a threat environment dominated by advanced integrated air defense systems that could include VHF radars better capable of tracking stealth aircraft and highly mobile double-digit surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems like the Russian–built S-400 Triumf (SA-21 Growler) or Chinese HQ-9.
Older techniques to suppress or destroy enemy air defenses relied on satellite imagery and long-range intelligence gathering aircraft to develop an order of battle for fixed enemy SAM sites. Those techniques are not effective against these newer, more mobile threats.
Dave Majumdar is the defense editor for the National Interest. You can follow him on Twitter: @davemajumdar.
Image: Flickr/U.S. Naval Forces Central Command
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Russia is using french missile technology to develop hypersonic missiles and Russia could also deploy anti-hypersonic missile defense by 2019
Russia is using French missile technology to develop a new, ultra-high speed nuclear attack missile, the House Armed Services Committee disclosed this week.
According to the document, which is labeled “unclassified,” the graphic reveals how the French defense company MBDA Missile Systems and ONERA, the French national aerospace research center, are working with Raduga, a Russian missile manufacturer, and Rosoboronoexport, the Russian state arms company, to develop a hypersonic missile capable of reaching speeds of Mach 4 to Mach 8, or 3,069 miles per hour to 6,138 miles per hour.
Rogers said the hypersonic vehicle appears to be “a new nuclear weapon delivery system,” and questioned retired Air Force Gen. C. Robert Kehler, a former commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, about the weapon.
“In general terms, I would be concerned about technology transfer to any potential adversary,” Kehler said. “Whether Russia is an enemy is open for some conversation but I would be very concerned about technology transfer to any of the potential adversaries.”
The chart describes the flight test sequence of a Russian jet-powered hypersonic missile launched from a Tu-22 bomber and initially powered by a first stage derived from an “A84” missile.
After accelerating, the jet-powered missile flies for between 20 and 30 seconds at Mach 4 to Mach 8 over a distance of up to 25 miles before crashing. The missile send telemetry signals to an airborne receiver during the flight.
Thomas K. Scheber, a former Pentagon nuclear weapons policymaker and former Los Alamos National Laboratory official, said China, Russia, Pakistan, and India are developing advanced strike weapons.
“Numerous reports on Russian strategic force developments cite the potential value of deploying conventional warheads on ballistic missiles,” Scheber said, noting plans for conventional warheads on ballistic missiles.
“In November 2014 a Russian defense industry executive announced that Russia would have an air-launched hypersonic missile by 2020,” he added.
On China, Scheber noted that China conducted six test of a hypersonic glide vehicle designed to be launched from a long-range missile.
“The vehicle, dubbed DF-ZF in press reports, is described as capable of maneuvering to avoid defenses and gliding to its target at speeds up to ten times the speed of sound, i.e., hypersonic,” he said, noting that the “DF-ZF could carry either a nuclear warhead or perform non-nuclear strike missions.”
Russia Claiming Anti-hypersonic missile defense will be deployed by 2019
Russia's air defenses will have the ability to effectively repel hypersonic attacks by 2020, according to the Russian Ground Forces' Air Defense Force chief Alexander Leonov.
Russia's next generation air defense systems are set to enter service before the end of 2019.
According to the document, which is labeled “unclassified,” the graphic reveals how the French defense company MBDA Missile Systems and ONERA, the French national aerospace research center, are working with Raduga, a Russian missile manufacturer, and Rosoboronoexport, the Russian state arms company, to develop a hypersonic missile capable of reaching speeds of Mach 4 to Mach 8, or 3,069 miles per hour to 6,138 miles per hour.
Rogers said the hypersonic vehicle appears to be “a new nuclear weapon delivery system,” and questioned retired Air Force Gen. C. Robert Kehler, a former commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, about the weapon.
“In general terms, I would be concerned about technology transfer to any potential adversary,” Kehler said. “Whether Russia is an enemy is open for some conversation but I would be very concerned about technology transfer to any of the potential adversaries.”
The chart describes the flight test sequence of a Russian jet-powered hypersonic missile launched from a Tu-22 bomber and initially powered by a first stage derived from an “A84” missile.
After accelerating, the jet-powered missile flies for between 20 and 30 seconds at Mach 4 to Mach 8 over a distance of up to 25 miles before crashing. The missile send telemetry signals to an airborne receiver during the flight.
Thomas K. Scheber, a former Pentagon nuclear weapons policymaker and former Los Alamos National Laboratory official, said China, Russia, Pakistan, and India are developing advanced strike weapons.
“Numerous reports on Russian strategic force developments cite the potential value of deploying conventional warheads on ballistic missiles,” Scheber said, noting plans for conventional warheads on ballistic missiles.
“In November 2014 a Russian defense industry executive announced that Russia would have an air-launched hypersonic missile by 2020,” he added.
On China, Scheber noted that China conducted six test of a hypersonic glide vehicle designed to be launched from a long-range missile.
“The vehicle, dubbed DF-ZF in press reports, is described as capable of maneuvering to avoid defenses and gliding to its target at speeds up to ten times the speed of sound, i.e., hypersonic,” he said, noting that the “DF-ZF could carry either a nuclear warhead or perform non-nuclear strike missions.”
Russia Claiming Anti-hypersonic missile defense will be deployed by 2019
Russia's air defenses will have the ability to effectively repel hypersonic attacks by 2020, according to the Russian Ground Forces' Air Defense Force chief Alexander Leonov.
Russia's next generation air defense systems are set to enter service before the end of 2019.
