Several commentators
have pointed to the similarities between the pre-World War I era and
our own. While every historical analogy is, by definition, inexact,
they are right to raise the alarm.
In 1914, Europe was
divided into two camps: the Entente, consisting of Britain, France,
and Russia, and the Central Powers, predominantly Germany and the
Austro-Hungarian Empire (Italy was formally a member, but went
neutral when the war started, eventually joining the Entente). While
this division had its roots in the long history of inter-imperialist
rivalry over the acquisition of colonies in Africa and the Far East
– with the “haves” being Britain and France, and
the “have nots” being Germany and Austria – by the
turn of the century the conflict began to re-focus on the European
theater, where the breakup of the Ottoman Empire in Southeastern
Europe – the Balkans – put the rival camps on a
collision course.
Intent on penetrating
the region and promoting its pan-Slavic agenda, Russia was fanning
the flames of Serbian nationalism in the region, and the Kingdom of
Serbia was the logical launching pad for this campaign. Serbia was
a cauldron of ultra-nationalist sentiment, where – at the
instigation of Russian agents – secret societies sprang up
militantly agitating for a “Greater Serbia.” A
pseudo-mystical ultra-nationalist narrative was elaborated for
popular consumption, based on the idea of restoring the old “Greater
Serbia” of the pre-Ottoman era, a supposedly glorious chapter
in the history of the race that ended with the defeat of Prince
Lazar on the famous Field of Blackbirds: Lazar died heroically,
fighting off Turkish Janissaries. The great problem of the Serbian
nationalists, however, was – and is – their expansive
concept of what “Greater Serbia” consists of: every spot
on which a Serbian Orthodox church or monastery ever existed is,
today, considered Serbian territory by these radicals, and back in
1914 they were far more numerous – and powerful – than they
are at the present moment. Indeed, as Ralph Raico points
out:
“The
immediate origins of the 1914 war lie in the twisted politics of the
Kingdom of Serbia.[1]
In June, 1903, Serbian army officers murdered their king and queen
in the palace and threw their bodies out a window, at the same time
massacring various royal relations, cabinet ministers, and members
of the palace guards. It was an act that horrified and disgusted
many in the civilized world. The military clique replaced the
pro-Austrian Obrenovic dynasty with the anti-Austrian
Karageorgevics. The new government pursued a pro-Russian,
Pan-Slavist policy, and a network of secret societies sprang up,
closely linked to the government, whose goal was the ‘liberation’
of the Serb subjects of Austria (and Turkey), and perhaps the other
South Slavs as well.”
The foreign policy of
the Serbian government, with ultra-nationalist Prime Minister
Nicolas Pasic at its head, “aimed at the creation of a Greater
Serbia,” writes Raico, “necessarily at the expense of
Austria-Hungary.” The Russians, the British, and the French
all backed the Serbs’ expansionist claims, and, with Russian
help, a series of Balkan wars saw the doubling in size of the
Serbian kingdom as the decibel level of Serbian revanchist agitation
picked up. It was in this volatile context that a Bosnian Serb
fanatic, one Gavrilo Princip, shot and killed Archduke Francis
Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, in Sarajevo. Princip and his collaborators were members of the “Black
Hand,” an extreme nationalist group headed up by the chief of
Serbian intelligence.
The Austrian
annexation of Bosnia had added fuel to the fire, and set off a
series of assassination attempts on Austrian officials by the “Black
Hand.” When the Archduke visited Sarajevo, Austrian troops
were massing on the Bosnian-Serbian border, backing up an Austrian
demand that the Serbs renounce all claims to the territory. The
Serbs complied, but the actions of Princip and his co-conspirators
set off an explosion that ended with the destruction of European
civilization.
What turned a regional
conflict over narrowly defined issues of chiefly local interest into
a global conflagration was the system of alliances and resulting
intrigues that plagued world politics. I won’t go into the
longstanding controversy over who bears the chief burden of “war
guilt”: suffice to say here that the structural logic of the
two rival alliances had an escalating effect, one that dragged the
rest of Europe – and us – into the vortex of
destruction. From the trenches of the Great War sprang the worst
monsters of the twentieth century: fascism, national socialism, and
Bolshevism. The death toll was in the millions.
In its broad outlines,
we face a similar situation today. The Balkans of the new millennium
is undoubtedly the Middle East, and here it is that, once again, a
country imbued with a religiously-inspired vision of a “Greater”
version of itself is pushing an expansionist policy, having roughly
doubled its size since its inception as an independent nation.
Inspired by an ideological vision that seeks to recreate a glorious
past kingdom, and driven by the religious fanaticism of a militant
ultra-nationalist movement, the state of Israel is the Serbia of our
time – the epicenter and catalyst of the coming conflict.
Of course, the
specifics are quite different: yet the broad outlines of the Balkan
scenario fit the Middle East to a tee. We have the modern day
Entente – the “haves,” i.e. the Western powers of
the US, Britain, and France, versus the “have nots,”
those being Russia, Iran, and Syria. Standing warily on the
sidelines is China, a formerly “have not” nation on its
way to becoming a superpower, which is increasingly tilting toward
the latter. And of course the Western allies have their Middle
Eastern protectorates, or what’s left of them, in Jordan,
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states.
Under
normal conditions, the narrowly defined issues of whether the
Ba’athists should continue to rule Syria, or the status of the
occupied territories of Palestine, would be of chiefly local
interest. Under the conditions of inter-imperialist rivalry,
however, every local ethnic-religious-territorial dispute has the
potential to become an issue of global import. That’s what
gave Gavrilo Princip the opportunity to fire the first shot of the Great War and achieve a malign immortality. It’s not hard to
imagine a similarly explosive incident somewhere in the Middle East
signaling the first volleys of World War III. The region is so
crowded with tripwires that it’s only a matter of time before
Uncle Sam stumbles over one and is driven by the structural logic of
its alliances into a war with Iran: indeed, the first shots of that
war have already been fired, in Syria, where the World War I analogy
seamlessly segues into a parallel
with World War II.
The end of the cold
war did not lead to a “unipolar world,” as Charles
Krauthammer and his fellow neocons celebrated it in the early 1990s.
Instead of the “benevolent global hegemony” envisioned
by Bill Kristol and Robert Kagan in their nineties foreign policy
manifesto, we are back to the pre-WWI era of old-fashioned
inter-imperialist rivalry. Instead of the “end of history,”
we stand at the beginning of a new era of nationalism, religious
fanaticism, and ideologically-driven violence. Combined with the
structural incentives for conflict inherent in our system of alliances
and the built-in dangers of a policy of “collective security,” this is a
recipe for another world war.
In reading various
accounts of the origins of World War I, I am struck by the leitmotif
of unintended consequences that runs throughout that tragic story:
it is a narrative of events that took on a life of their own, and
created such a momentum for war that all the combatants were dragged
along the road to destruction in spite of themselves.
As the Russians send
missiles to Syria, and the US (and its Gulf allies) support and arm
the Islamist rebels, the involvement of Iran is bound to drag in the
United States sooner or later. Meanwhile, our modern day Serbians,
the Israelis, are busy swallowing up ever-greater portions of the
occupied territories of Palestine, and conducting bombing raids on
Syrian territory. In short, the Middle
East is a tinderbox, even more explosive than the Balkans of 1914 –
and 2014 may mark the beginning of yet another hundred-year cycle of
global conflict.
Source: http://original.antiwar.com/justin/2013/06/02/are-we-on-the-brink-of-world-war-iii/
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