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Theory of mind (often abbreviated "ToM") is the ability to attribute mental states—beliefs, intents, desires, pretending, knowledge, etc.—to oneself and others and to understand that others have beliefs, desires, and intentions that are different from one's own.[1] Deficits occur in people with autism spectrum disorders, schizophrenia, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder,[2] as well as neurotoxicity due to alcohol abuse.[3] Though there are philosophical approaches to issues raised in discussions such as this, the theory of mind as such is distinct from the philosophy of mind.Contents
Definition
Theory of mind is a theory insofar as the mind is not directly observable.[1] The presumption that others have a mind is termed a theory of mind because each human can only intuit the existence of their own mind through introspection, and no one has direct access to the mind of another. It is typically assumed that others have minds by analogy with one's own, and based on the reciprocal nature of social interaction, as observed in joint attention,[4] the functional use of language,[5] and understanding of others' emotions and actions.[6] Having a theory of mind allows one to attribute thoughts, desires, and intentions to others, to predict or explain their actions, and to posit their intentions. As originally defined, it enables one to understand that mental states can be the cause of—and thus be used to explain and predict—others' behavior.[1] Being able to attribute mental states to others and understanding them as causes of behavior implies, in part, that one must be able to conceive of the mind as a "generator of representations".[7][8] If a person does not have a complete theory of mind it may be a sign of cognitive or developmental impairment.Theory of mind appears to be an innate potential ability in humans, but one requiring social and other experience over many years to bring to fruition. Different people may develop more, or less, effective theories of mind. Empathy is a related concept, meaning experiential recognition and understanding the states of mind, including beliefs, desires and particularly emotions of others, often characterized as the ability to "put oneself into another's shoes". Recent neuro ethological studies of animal behaviour suggest that even rodents may exhibit ethical or empathic abilities.[9] Neo-Piagetian theories of cognitive development maintain that theory of mind is a byproduct of a broader hypercognitive ability of the human mind to register, monitor, and represent its own functioning.[10]
Research on theory of mind in (human and animal, adults and children, normally and atypically developing) has grown rapidly in the almost 30 years since Premack and Woodruff's paper, "Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?".[1] The emerging field of social neuroscience has also begun to address this debate, by imaging humans while performing tasks demanding the understanding of an intention, belief or other mental state.
An alternative account of theory of mind is given within operant psychology and provides significant empirical evidence for a functional account of both perspective taking and empathy. The most developed operant approach is founded on research on derived relational responding and is subsumed within what is called, "Relational Frame Theory". According to this view empathy and perspective taking comprise a complex set of derived relational abilities based on learning to discriminate and verbally respond to ever more complex relations between self, others, place, and time, and the transformation of function through established relations.[11][12][13]
Philosophical roots
Contemporary discussions of ToM have their roots in philosophical debate—most broadly, from the time of Descartes' Second Meditation, which set the groundwork for considering the science of the mind. Most prominent recently are two contrasting approaches in the philosophical literature, to theory of mind: theory-theory and simulation theory. The theory-theorist imagines a veritable theory—"folk psychology"—used to reason about others' minds. The theory is developed automatically and innately, though instantiated through social interactions.[14]On the other hand, simulation theory suggests ToM is not, at its core, theoretical. According to simulation theorists, the primary method for understanding the minds of others that people employ is simply to place themselves "in the mental shoes" of the other. It is an attractively intuitive idea that is also explicit in the "golden rule" most people learn as children: "treat others as you would like to be treated". In other words, imagine how you might react to someone else doing an action to you before you do the same action to someone else. ST involves three steps:[15]
- The creation of pretend states to match those of the target.
- The processing of those pretend states by the same mechanisms that the attributor uses to understand his own mental states.
- The assignment or "projection" of those states onto the target.
An alternative simulation theory has been proposed, the "inverse modeling" hypothesis. According to this view, the actions of mirror neurons simulate the intended goal of an action first. After this motor simulation, the observer uses his conceptual abilities to infer the intention of the action.[19][20] By this model, the role of mirror neurons is an instrumental tool that can be used to guess the meaning of intentional behavior by producing a model of that behavior in context to aid understanding.
Another simulation theory that tries to account for broadly congruent mirror neurons is the response modeling theory. These theorists propose that the function of mirror neurons in social cognition is not so much to "mirror" the target’s action. Rather, the function is to instantly prepare a complementary action in response to the target. They dynamically couple action observation to action execution. The impetus for this view was the discovery that mirror neurons are actually more active when preparing for a complementary action rather than an imitative action.[21][22] In other words, the function of some mirror neurons is to instantly anticipate and prepare a response to an observed action.
Two additional kinds of simulationism have been proposed.[23] One version (Alvin Goldman's) emphasizes that one must recognize one's own mental states before ascribing mental states to others by simulation. The second version of simulation theory proposes that each person comes to know his or her own and others' minds through what Robert Gordon[23] names a logical ascent routine, which answers questions about mental states by re-phrasing the question as a metaphysical one. For example, if Zoe asks Pam, "Do you think that dog wants to play with you?", Pam would ask herself, "Does that dog want to play with me?" to determine her own response. She could equally well ask that to answer the question of what Zoe might think. Both hold that people generally understand one another by simulating being in the other's shoes.
One of the differences between the two theories that have influenced psychological consideration of ToM is that theory-theory describes ToM as a detached theoretical process that is an innate feature, whereas simulation theory portrays ToM as a kind of knowledge that allows one to form predictions of someone's mental states by putting oneself in the other person's shoes and simulating them. These theories continue to inform the definitions of theory of mind at the heart of scientific ToM investigation.
Recently other accounts of our ability to know the minds of others have been proposed. For example, a recent theory defended by Shaun Gallagher, interaction theory, rejects the standard interpretations as being overly "mental". In interaction theory, the minds of others are directly perceived during intersubjective encounters. According to IT, very little mentalizing occurs in our day-to-day interactions. Rather than first perceiving another's actions and then inferring the meaning of their actions, the intended meaning is automatically apparent upon perception. Hidden away mental states like "beliefs" and "desires" are therefore unnecessary to explain behavior. We can see the meaning of their behavior through their actions and expressive movements.[24] For example, upon seeing an angry face an observer does not see first a face that is contorted into a scowl and then infer that the target is angry. The anger is immediately apparent on the face of the other. The overwhelming majority of interactions in our daily lives are face-to-face so it makes sense that our primary way of understanding one another is from a second-person perspective rather than a detached, theoretical, third-person perspective.
"In most intersubjective situations, that is, in situations of social interaction, we have a direct perceptual understanding of another person's intentions because their intentions are explicitly expressed in their embodied actions and their expressive behaviors. This understanding does not require us to postulate or infer a belief or a desire hidden away in the other person's mind. What we might reflectively or abstractly call their belief or desire is expressed directly in their actions and behaviors".[25]
This ability has been termed "primary intersubjectivity" and includes emotional, sensory-motor, perceptual, and nonconceptual embodied practices that are exhibited by pre-linguistic children.[26] It is considered "primary" for two reasons: (1) Ontogenetically it is the earliest appearing intersubjective abilities in children, and (2) even into adulthood it remains the most essential ability that we utilize in interacting and understanding others.[27] These abilities are multimodal and nonconceptual, which is evident in well-known experiments regarding neonate imitation.[28] In these experiments the neonate is only minutes old and therefore does not have conceptual abilities; yet the neonate can imitate the facial expressions of others, which is a multimodal process that requires a nonconceptual connection between visual stimulus and the neonates own facial configuration.
Furthermore, the fact that most interactions take place in cooperative contexts leads to "secondary intersubjectivity". During most interactions, intentions are apparent based upon the pragmatic context of the situation in which they are occurring. We can instantly see what the other "intends" or "wants" based upon their actions and the current context; we do not need to infer their intentions as if they are hidden away.[29] There is a "shared world" that we live in where we intuitively and instinctively perceive others as minded beings like ourselves. Dan Zahavi echoed these sentiments when he wrote, "it is not the case that we first see inanimate objects and then animate them through a subsequent addition of mental components. Rather, at first we see everything as expressive, and then we go through a process of de-animation".[30]
The intuitive assumption that others are minded is an apparent tendency we all share. We anthropomorphize non-human animals, inanimate objects, and even natural phenomenon. Daniel Dennett referred to this tendency as taking an "intentional stance" toward things: we assume they have intentions, to help predict future behavior.[31] However, there is an important distinction between taking an "intentional stance" toward something and entering a "shared world" with it. The intentional stance is a detached and functional theory we resort to during interpersonal interactions. A shared world is directly perceived and its existence structures reality itself for the perceiver. It is not just automatically applied to perception; it in many ways constitutes perception.
The philosophical roots of the Relational Frame Theory account of ToM arise from contextual psychology and refer to the study of organisms (both human and non-human) interacting in and with a historical and current situational context. It is an approach based on contextualism, a philosophy in which any event is interpreted as an ongoing act inseparable from its current and historical context and in which a radically functional approach to truth and meaning is adopted. As a variant of contextualism, RFT focuses on the construction of practical, scientific knowledge. This scientific form of contextual psychology is virtually synonymous with the philosophy of operant psychology.[32]
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